Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v. Town of Millinocket, No. 79-40, Interim Decision and Order, April 26, 1979 ; Decision and Order, Oct. 11, 1979. STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Case No. 79-40 _______________________________ ) TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 48, ) State, County, Municipal and ) University Employees in the ) State of Maine, ) ) Complainant, ) ) v. ) INTERIM DECISION AND ORDER ) TOWN OF MILLINOCKET ) ) and ) ) MILLINOCKET POLICE ASSOCIATION,) ) Respondents. ) _______________________________) This case comes to the Maine Labor Relations Board ("Board") by way of a prohibited practice complaint and letter objecting to election filed December 4, 1978 by Teamsters Local Union No. 48 ("Local No. 48"). The Millinocket Police Association's ("MPA") response, including a motion to dismiss, was filed December 12, 1978, and the Town of Millinocket's ("Town") response and motion to dismiss was filed December 18, 1978. A pre-hearing conference on the case was held on January 9, 1979 with Alternate Chairman Donald W. Webber presiding. As a result of this pre-hearing conference, Alternate Chairman Webber issued on January 15, 1979 a Pre-Hearing Conference Memorandum and Order, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. At the pre-hearing conference, the parties agreed that the Board should decide the legal issues raised by the motions to dismiss prior to any scheduling of a fact hearing on the merits of the complaint and letter objecting to election. The parties' briefs arguing these legal issues were all filed by February 28, 1979, and the Board proceeded to deliberate over the preliminary legal issues on April 10, 1979, Chairman Edward H. Keith presid- ing, with Michael Schoonjans, Employee Representative and Kenneth T. Winters, Alternate Employer Representative. JURISDICTION No party has challenged the jurisdiction of the Maine Labor Relations Board in this matter, and we conclude that the Board has jurisdiction to hear and render a decision in this case as provided in 26 M.R.S.A. 968. FINDINGS OF FACT Upon review of the pleadings filed in this case as well as the Pre-Hearing Conference Memorandum and Order, the Board finds that: -1- 1. On December 4, 1978, Local No. 48 filed a prohibited practice complaint and letter objecting to election with the Board. 2. The Complaint alleges that the Town violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(A), (C), and (E) and the MPA 26 M.R.S.A. 964(2)(A) by engaging in certain conduct prior to a November 22, 1978 decertification/ certification election which decertified Local No. 48 and certified the MPA by a 6-4 vote as bargaining agent for a bargaining unit of police officers. The essence of this alleged conduct was that the Town refused to deal with Local No. 48 stewards and continued to deal with a former Local No. 48 steward after the steward had been elected president of the MPA and had been replaced as steward by Local No. 48. The relief sought by the complaint includes, among other things, an order directing the Town to recognize the stewards designated by Local No. 48 so long as Local No. 48 is the certified bargaining agent, and an order directing the Town to cease assisting in the formation of the MPA by dealing with its president while Local No. 48 is the certified bargaining agent. 3. The jurat or statement of the oath at the end of the complaint contains the signature and seal of a notary public and states that: "Personally appeared the above-named Richard R. Peluso and attested to the truth of the statements, to the best of his knowlewdge, as herinabove written." 4. The letter objecting to the November 22, 1978 election alleges the same facts alleged in the complaint, and asks that the election be set aside on the ground that the Town's and the MPA's conduct interfered with the holding of a fair election. DECISION Respondents urge that the complaint and the letter objecting to election should be dismissed because: 1. The complaint contains an insufficient statement of oath under Rule 4.02 of the Board's Rules and Procedures. 2. The complaint does not allege facts which would entitle Local No. 48 to the relief sought. 3. The complaint was not timely filed under Rule 3.08 of the Board's Rules and Procedures. 4. Local No. 48 lacks standing to seek the relief requested in the complaint. 5. The letter objecting to election is void because it does not object to the conduct of the November 22, 1978 election as required by Rule 3.07(B) of the Board's Rules and Procedures. Local No. 48 contends that the grounds raised by Respondents for dismissing the complaint and letter are without merit, and that the complaint and letter should be consolidated for hearing. After carefully considering the matter, we are of the opinion, for the reasons discussed below, that the complaint complies with the Board's Rules, that the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, and that Local No. 48 has standing to seek the relief requested. We agree with Respondents' argument, however, that the letter objecting to election should be dismissed because it does -2- not object to the conduct of the election. We accordingly will deny the motions to dismiss the prohibited practice complaint and grant the motions to dismiss the letter objecting to election. Because the letter will be dismissed, there is no occasion to decide whether the complaint and letter should be consolidated. 1. The complaint's statement of oath. Respondents argue that the statement of oath contained in the complaint is insufficient because the statement does not declare, under penalty of perjury, that the contents of the complaint are true and correct to the best of the signer's knowledge and belief. Respondents apparently read Rule 4.02 of the Board's Rules and Procedures to require that the words "under penalty of perjury" appear in the statement of oath. We do not agree with this reading of the Rule. There is no requirement contained in Rule 4.02 or any other of the Board's Rules that the exact language of Rule 4.02 be parroted in the statement of oath in a complaint. It is not the form of the statement of oath but the substance of the statement that is significant. The purpose of Rule 4.02 is to impress upon the signer of a prohibited practice complaint that he/she will be held accountable for the truth and accuracy of the contents of the complaint. While it would unquestionably be wise for a complainant, in order to remove all possible objections to the form of its statement of oath, to repeat verbatim the language contained in Rule 4.02, there likely is no one particular form of statement which accomplishes the purpose of Rule 4.02 any better than does another form. What is important is that the language of the statement evince an awareness on the part of the signer that he/she is responsible for the statements contained in the complaint. The statement of oath contained in Local No. 48's complaint plainly complies with the spirit of Rule 4.02. The statement provides that: "Personally appeared the above-named Richard R. Peluso and attested to the truth of the statements, to be best of his knowledge, as hereinabove written." A notary public's signature and seal follow this statement. We note that among the dictionary definitions of the world "attest" is "to affirm to be true or genuine" and "to put (one) on oath." We believe that the complaint's statement of oath sufficiently evinces an awareness on the part of the signer that he was swearing to the truth and accuracy of the statements contained in the complaint. Respondents also contend that they have been denied the protection afforded by a statement of oath declared under penalty of perjury. To remove any doubts that the signer of the complaint is willing to be held accountable for the truth and accuracy of the contents of the complaint, to the best of his knowledge and belief, we will order that Local No. 48 file with the Board and mail to the parties within 10 calendar days of its receipt of this Interim Decision and Order, a new page 2 to its complaint containing the following signed, notarized statement: "I, Richard R. Peluso, have signed this complaint and hereby declare, under penalty of perjury, that the statements contained in this com- plaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. /s/______________________ Richard R. Peluso (Cont'd) -3- "State of Maine "County of Kennebec, ss. "Personally appeared before me Richard R. Peluso and acknowledged that he signed the foregoing declaration. (seal) /s/________________________ Notary Public" Local No. 48's complaint will be deemed to be dismissed if the above statement of oath is not submitted within 10 calendar days of receipt of this Interim Decision and Order. 2. Sufficiency of the allegations contained in the complaint. We do not agree with Respondenets' contentions that the complaint fails to allege facts which would entitle Complainant to the relief sought. The complaint alleges that in October, 1978, the Town refused to deal with Local No. 48 stewards and continued to deal with a former Local No. 48 steward who had been replaced as steward after he filed a petition to decertify Local No. 48 as bargaining agent and was elected president of the MPA. The plain import of the complaint, particularly when read in conjunction with the letter objecting to election, is that this alleged conduct by the Town interfered with the holding of a free and fair election on November 22, 1978. Assuming all allegations in the complaint are true, we believe that the complaint sufficiently alleges facts which could entitle Local No. 48 to the relief sought. See, e.g., Columbus Janitor Service, Division of Servisco, 191 NLRB 902 (1971). The complaint accordingly cannot be dismissed on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 3. The timeliness of the filing of the complaint. Rule 3.08 of the Board's Rules and Procedures provides in pertinent part that "[a]ll challenges to the conduct of a party to an election shall be by a prohibited practice complaint filed in accordance with Title 26, Maine Revised Statutes, 968 . . . and in conformity with the provisions of Rule 3.07(B) . . ." Section 968(5)(B) of the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Act, 26 M.R.S.A. 961, et seq. ("Act") provides in relevant part that no hearing shall be held upon any alleged prohibited practice occurring more than 6 months prior to the filing of the complaint, while Rule 3.07(B) states that within 5 days after the election results are reported by the election officer, "any party who intends to take exception to the conduct of an election shall file his written objection with the Board . . ." The question raised by Respondents is whether Local No. 48's complaint objecting to the conduct of the parties to the election under Rule 3.08 must be filed within 6 months of the occurrence of the alleged prohibited practice, purusant to 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(B), or within 5 days after the election results are reported, in conformity with Rule 3.07(B). This question is relevant because Local No. 48's complaint was filed on Monday, December 4, 1978, the sixth working day after the November 22, 1978 election. If the 6 month statute of limitations found in Section 968(5)(B) of the Act is applicable, then the complaint -4- was timely filed. If the 5 day period set forth in Rule 3.07(B) is applicable, however, the complaint was not timely filed and must be dismissed. We think it clear that Section 968(5)(B) with its six month statute of limitations is applicable. Rule 3.08 and Rule 3.07(B) are, by their language, applicable when a party challenges the conduct of another party or the Board at the election. Local No. 48's complaint does not allege misconduct at the election but instead alleges that conduct commencing some six weeks prior to the election interfered with the holding of a fair election. Because a party to an election frequently does not become aware of another party's misconduct within 5 days subsequent to the election, it would not be fair or logical to hold that Rule 3.08 is applicable when a party challenges conduct which occurred prior to the election. Rule 3.08 with its five-day filing period applies only to challenges to open, observable conduct by a party at the election. Local No. 48's complaint does not challenge such conduct, and Rule 3.08 consequently is not applicable. 4. Local No. 48's standing. Respondents contend that Local No. 48 lacks standing to seek the relief requested in the complaint, and that the request for relief is moot because Local No. 48 has not allegegd any facts which would empower the Board to set aside the election. Among the relief sought in the complaint is an order vacating the results of the November 22nd election, an order directing the Town to recognize the stewards designated by Local No. 48 so long as Local No. 48 is the certified bargaining agent, and an order directing the Town to cease assisting in the formation of the MPA. The relevant inquiry is whether Local No. 48 has standing to file the complaint. If Local No. 48 has standing to file, then it may seek whatever relief it chooses. It is the Board's responsibility under Section 968(5)(C) of the Act to determine, after reviewing the merits of the case, what relief if any will effectuate the policies of the Act. Local No. 48 has standing to file the complaint. 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(B); Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v. Biddeford Police Department, M.L.R.B. No. 78-31 (1979). It consequently has standing to seek the relief requested. The request for relief is not moot because, as discussed, supra, the complaint alleges facts which may entitle Local No. 48 to the relief sought. 5. The letter objecting to election. We agree with Respondents' arguments that Local No. 48's letter objecting to election must be dismissed because it does not object to the conduct of the November 22nd election. As previously noted, Rule 3.07(B) sets forth the procedures by which a party objects "to the conduct of an election." Rule 3.07(B) thus authorizes a party to raise procedural objections relating to the Board's conduct of an election by filing a letter objecting to the election. Local No. 48's letter objecting to election does not object to the Board's conduct of the election, but instead raises the same facts alleged in the prohibited practice complaint. We accordingly will grant Respondents' motions to dismiss the letter objecting to election. ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and by virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor Relations Board by the provisions of 26 -5- M.R.S.A. 968, it is hereby ORDERED: 1. That within 10 calendar days of its receipt of this Interim Decision and Order Complainant file with the Board and mail to the parties a new page 2 to its prohibited practice com- plaint, containing a statement of oath in the form set forth at pages 3 and 4 of this Interim Decision and Order. Failure to submit this filing within 10 calendar days of receipt of this Interim Decision and Order will mean that the prohibited practice complaint is deemed to be dismissed. 2. That Respondents' motions to dismiss the prohibited practice complaint are DENIED. 3. That Respondents' motions to dismiss the letter objecting to election are GRANTED. Dated at Augusta, Maine this 26th day of April, 1979. MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD /s/___________________________ Edward H. Keith Chairman /s/___________________________ Michael Schoonjans Employee Representative /s/___________________________ Kenneth T. Winters Alternate Employer Representative -6- STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Case No. 79-40 ________________________________ ) TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 48, ) State, County, Municipal and ) University Workers in the State ) of Maine ) ) Complainant, ) ) v. ) ) TOWN OF MILLINOCKET ) DECISION AND ORDER ) and ) ) MILLINOCKET POLICE ASSOCIATION, ) ) Respondents. ) ________________________________) On December 4, 1978, Teamsters Local Union No. ("Local 48") filed a prohibited practice complaint pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(B) against the Town of Millinocket, Maine ("Town"), and the Millinocket Police Association ("MPA"). The Town's response to the complaint was filed December 18, 1978, and the MPA's response was filed December 12, 1978. A pre-hearing conference on the case was held January 9, 1979 in Augusta, Maine, with Alternate Chairman Donald W. Webber presiding. As a result of this pre-hearing conference, Alternate Chairman Webber issued on January 15, 1979 a Pre-Hearing Memorandum and Order, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. On April 26, 1979, the Maine Labor Relations Board ("Board") issued an Interim Decision and Order in the case, granting in part and denying in part Respondents' motions to dismiss. The contents of this Interim Decision and Order are hereby incorporated herein by reference. A hearing on the case was held on July 31, 1979 in Bangor, Maine, Chairman Edward H. Keith presiding, with Employer Representative Paul D. Emery and Alternate Employee Representative Roland Gorman. The parties engaged in oral argument at the conclusion of the hearing, and the Board proceeded to deliberate over and decide the case at a conference held after oral argument on July 31, 1979. JURISDICTION Neither party has challenged the jurisdiction of the Maine Labor Relations Board in this matter, and we conclude that the Board has jurisdic- tion to hear and render a decision in this case as provided in 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5). -1- FINDINGS OF FACT Upon review of the entire record, the Board finds: 1. Complainant Local 48 is a public employee organization and bargaining agent within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5) (B). Respondent Town of Millinocket is a public employer within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(B). Respondent MPA is a public employee organization within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(B). 2. On February 4, 1977, Teamsters Local 340, the predecessor union to Local 48, was certified as the collective bargaining agent for a bargaining unit composed of Sergeants and Patrolmen employed by the Millinocket Police Department. The Town and Local 48 commenced negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement for the unit and an agreement with a term of Febru- ary 1, 1977 to December 31, 1978 eventually was executed. 3. Article 7 of the collective bargaining agreement provides in pertinent part "[t]he Town recognizes the right of the Union to designate job stewards and alternates." Article 11 of the agreement provides in pertinent part: "A grievance is hereby jointly defined as any dispute, controversy or misunderstanding which may arise under the interpretation or application of this Agreement. "a. The aggrieved employee must present the grievance to the Shop Steward or Arlternate. "b. The Shop Steward or Alternate shall take up the grievance with the Chief of Police. If the Steward and the Chief of Police have not resolved the grievance within five (5) working days after the meeting between the grievant, Steward, and Police Chief, the Shop Steward shall submit such grievance in writing to the Union Business Representative. "c. Within five (5) working days after the written response of the Police Chief is due, the Union Business Representative shall take the matter up with the Town Manager, or his designee. Within three (3) working days after such meeting . . . , the Town Manager shall render a decision on the grievance. * * * "e. The time limits for processing of grievances may be extended by written consent of both parties. "f. All grievances shall be initiated not later than thirty (30) days after the occurrence of the event giving rise to the grievance." 4. After the Teamsters were certified as the bargaining agent, the members of the unit elected Melvin Gould to be steward for the unit. Local 48 recognized Gould as the unit's steward, and appointed Paul Mott to be alternate steward. Mott acted as steward in Gould's absence at a grievance hearing attended by the Town Manager in July, 1978. 5. Around the first of October, 1978, Gould began circulating a petition among the Sergeants and Patrolmen, seeking to decertify -2- Local 48 as bargaining agent in favor of the MPA. An appropriate number of unit members signed the petition, and the petition was filed with the Board on October 6, 1978. On October 4, 1978, the members of the bargaining unit met to elect officers of the MPA. Gould was elected president. Gould did not subsequent to October 1, 1978 attempt to handle any union business on behalf of Local 48. 6. Upon learning of Gould's efforts to decertify Local 48, Local 48's International Trustee in a letter dated October 11, 1978 to the Town Manager stated that Gould no longer represented Local 48 as steward, and that Mott and Donald Benson had been appointed as steward and alternate steward, respectively. Copies of this letter were also mailed to Gould, Mott and Benson. 7. Shortly after receiving his copy of the letter, Benson spoke to Town Manager William Ayoob about the removal of Gould as steward. Ayoob stated that he was uncertain as to whom he should deal with, and asked Benson how Local 48 could replace an elected steward with appointed stewards. Gould also spoke with the Town Manager shortly after receiving the October 11th letter. The Town Manager indicated to Gould that he was confused about who was the proper steward for the unit. 8. In early October, 1978, a grievance arose regarding a change in the shift schedule. On or about October 9, 1978, Mott and Benson re- quested a meeting with the Chief of Police to discuss the grievance. The Chief scheduled a meeting for the next day. For some unexplained reason, Mott and Benson failed to appear at this meeting, and did not subsequently contact the Chief about the grievance. The Chief con- sequently thought that the stewards had decided to drop the grievance. 9. On the thirtieth day after the occurrence of the event which gave rise to the shift change grievance, at the end of October or first of November, 1978, Mott and Benson went to Town Manager Ayoob's office. The stewards explained that the Chief of Police was on vacation, and asked Ayoob for a waiver of the 30 day time limit in which to process the grievance. Ayoob refused to agree to the waiver, and again expressed confusion as to which employees were properly acting as stewards. The stewards and Town Manager then briefly discussed the grievance. Although Ayoob stated that under the contract the stewards should have taken the grievance to the Chief first, he did not refuse to discuss the grievance with Mott and Ben- son. Ayoob did not subsequent to the meeting issue a written deci- sion granting or denying the grievance. 10. As a result of receiving Gould's petition on October 6, 1978, the Executive Director of the Board scheduled pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 967(2) a decertification/certification election for the Sergeants and Patrolmen on November 22, 1978. Shortly before the commencement of the election on November 22nd, John Picard, a member of the bar- gaining unit, stated while standing in a hallway in the building where the election was held that he was undecided on how to vote. Town Manager Ayoob overheard Picard's comment and approached Picard, stating in effect that if Local 48 was voted out, he would see that things were easy on Picard. Local 48 was decertified at the election and the MPA certified as the unit's bargaining agent by a 6-4 vote. DECISION Local 48 charges that the Town violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(A), (C), and (E) and the MPA 26 M.R.S.A. 964(2)(A) when the Town refused to deal with either Mott or Benson as Local 48's stewards, and continued to deal with Gould. Among the relief sought by Local 48 to remedy these alleged violations is an order vacating the results of the November 22, 1978 election. The Town argues that the -3- evidence does not show that it refused to deal with Local 48's stewards, while the MPA contends that Gould did not continue to hold himself out as Local 48's steward after being removed from the steward position. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude as more fully discussed below that the evidence does not sustain Local 48's allegations. We accordingly must order that the complaint be dismissed. Were the allegations contained in Local 48's complaint supported by the evidence, we likely would find violations of the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Act ("Act"), and order that the results of the November 22nd election be vacated. So long as Local 48 remained the unit's bargaining agent, the Town was obligated under the Act to deal with those persons whom Local 48 designated as job stewards. Amoco Oil Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1975); North Bros. Ford, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. 766, 767 (1971). However, Local 48's contentions simply are not supported by the record. The record shows that Local 48 stewards Mott and Benson acted in their capacities as stewards on two occasions between October 1, 1978 and the November 22, 1978 election. On or about October 9, 1978, Mott and Benson asked the Chief of Police to schedule a meeting on a grievance concerning a change in the shift schedule. This the Chief did, setting the meeting for the next day. Mott and Benson failed to attend the meeting and did not again contact the Chief regarding the grievance. When the stewards did not appear at the grievance meeting and did not get back to the Chief about the grievance, the Chief logically assumed that the stewards had decided to drop the grievance. The Chief of Police thus obviously was willing to deal with Mott and Benson in ther capacities as stewards for Local 48. Second, in late October or early November, 1978, while the Chief was on vacation, Mott and Benson approached Town Manager Ayoob to talk about the grievance. Mott and Benson asked for an extension of time in which to process the grievance. This request was denied by Ayoob, which was a proper exercise of the discretion provided to the Town Manager by Article 11(e) of the collective bargaining agreement. While Ayoob again expressed confusion as to which employees were properly designated as stewards for the unit, he did briefly discuss the grievance with Mott and Benson. It is significant that Ayoob at no time refused to deal with Mott and Benson on the ground that these employees had not been properly designated as stewards. It is also signifi- cant that the record contains no evidence that the Town attempted to deal with Gould as a steward for the unit after October 1, 1978. Our conclusion that the Town did not violate the Act is not changed by the fact that the Town Manager's professed confusion over which employees were properly acting as stewards was wholly unwarranted. Article 7 of the collective bargaining agreement unequivocally gave Local 48 the right to designate job stewards and alternates. Once the Town received Local 48's October 11, 1978 letter notifying Ayoob that Gould had been replaced as steward by Mott and Benson, there should have been no doubt in Ayoob's mind about who he was obligated -4- to deal with under the agreement.[fn]1 As previously discussed, however, Ayoob's unjustified confusion did not result in a refusal by Ayoob to deal with Mott and Benson. To the contrary, Ayoob did meet with Mott and Benson and did discuss the grievance when the stewards appeared at the Town Manager's office. We consequently conclude that Ayoob's unjustified confusion did not result in a violation of the Act. We also cannot accept the fact that Ayoob did not issue a written decision on the grievance as evidence that Ayoob refused to deal with Mott and Benson. First, although the Chief of Police was required under the agreement to issue a written decision, Article 11 of the agreement nowhere expressly requires a written decision by the Town Manager. Second, we think that the reason why the Town Manager did not issue a formal response to the grievance was that the stewards had not taken the grievance to the Chief, as required by Article 11(b) These considerations refute any inference created by Ayoob's failure to issue a written decision that Ayoob was not dealing with Mott and Benson. Finally, Local 48 did not allege in its complaint or at the hearing that Ayoob's comments to Picard shortly before the November 22nd election constitute a violation of the Act. Evidence about these comments was offered by Local 48, and was admitted into the record by the Board, for the sole purpose of impeaching the Town Manager's testimony. The issue whether these comments constitute a violation of the Act was not litigated at the hearing. We therefore conclude that the issue whether Ayoob's comments violated Section 964(1) of the Act is not properly before us. Moffitt Building Materials Co., 214 N.L.R.B. 655 (1974). We also conclude that the evidence does not support Local 48's allegation that the MPA violated Section 964(2)(A) of the Act. The record shows that Gould, who was elected president of the MPA on October 4, 1978, did not after October 1, 1978 hold himself out as a representative of Local 48, or otherwise attempt to become involved in the affairs of Local 48. There is no evidence that any other member or officer of the MPA attempted to interfere with or subvert the authority of Mott and Benson to act as Local 48 stewards. We consequently cannot find that the MPA is guilty of any violation of the Act. Because the evidence does not support Local 48's allegations, we must order that the complaint be dismissed. ____________ 1 As Gould recognized in his testimony, his removal as steward for Local 48 was entirely warranted. Around October 1, 1978, Gould commenced circulating among bargaining unit members a petition to decertify Local 48 as the bar- gaining agent. Removal of an elected steward who acts in such direct con- flict with the Union's interests is permissible. See, e.g., Newman v. Local 1101, Communication Workers of America, 570 F.2d 439 (2nd Cir. 1978). -5- ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and decision, and by virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor Relations Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A. 968, it is hereby ORDERED: That Teamsters Local Union No. 48's prohibited practice complaint filed December 4, 1978 against the Town of Millinocket and the Millinocket Police Association is DISMISSED. Dated at Augusta, Maine this 11th day of October, 1979. MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD /s/__________________________ Edward H. Keith Chairman /s/__________________________ Paul D. Emery Employer Representative /s/__________________________ Roland Gorman Alternate Employee Representative -6-