STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Case No. 01-03 Issued: November 16, 2000 _________________________________ ) AUGUSTA UNIFORMED FIRE FIGHTERS ) ASSOCIATION LOCAL 1650, IAFF, ) AFL-CIO-CLC, ) ) Complainant, ) PREHEARING OFFICER'S DECISION ) ON MOTION FOR DEFERRAL v. ) ) CITY OF AUGUSTA, ) ) Respondent. ) _________________________________) INTRODUCTION The Augusta Uniformed Firefighters Association Local 1650 ("Union") has filed two prohibited practices complaints against the City of Augusta ("City"), Case Nos. 01-03 and 01-09. These cases have been consolidated by agreement of the parties. In Case No. 01-03, the Union complains that the City had knowledge of health insurance coverage changes prior to the ratification of the side agreement on health insurance coverage, and did not reveal this knowledge to the Union. In Case No. 01- 09, the Union complains that the City failed to meet and negotiate within the requisite 10-day period over the impact of health insurance coverage changes. Prior to the prehearing conducted in this matter, the City moved that the Board should defer to an arbitrator's decision issued on September 11, 2000, on a related grievance between these parties. The City stipulated in oral argument that the motion to defer was directed only to the Union's first complaint in this matter, Case No. 01-03. The following issue was presented to the arbitrator by stipulation of the parties: [-1-] _________________________________________________________________ Does the change in health insurance coverage violate either collective bargaining agreement and if so, what shall be the remedy? The arbitrator's decision addressed two grievances filed on behalf of two individuals, arising under the two collective bargaining agreements.[fn]1 In one grievance, the Union challenged the health insurer's refusal to pay for a prescription medication. In the other grievance, the Union challenged the health insurer's annual change in benefit structure. In both cases, the arbitrator concluded that the City did not violate the respective collective bargaining agreement. Both parties presented evidence to the arbitrator regarding the city's knowledge of coming changes to the health insurance plan during the negotiation process. The arbitrator found that: The Union argues that the City was aware that there would be changes, withheld this information, and sold the Union on MMEHT [the new insurer] coverage. The evidence, however, does not persuade me that this was the case. Ms. Blair testified convincingly that the City first became aware that there would be changes after bargaining had concluded and after ratification of the contract by the Union. I therefore conclude that the City did not mislead the Union during bargaining. If the City had consciously mislead [sic] the Union at the bargaining table, this would be a very different case. In the absence of such evidence, however, I conclude that the City did not violate the collective bargaining agreement as alleged. The issue presented is whether the Board should defer to the arbitrator's decision is this matter. ____________________ 1 The arbitration related to the interpretation of two collective bargaining agreements for both the Uniformed Firefighters Association, Local 1650, and the Uniformed Firefighters Association Platoon Chiefs, Local 1650A. The prohibited practice complaint in Case No. 01-03 references only the agreement between the City and the Uniformed Firefighters Association, Local 1650. -2- _________________________________________________________________ JURISDICTION Board Rule 4.07(D) provides, in part, that the prehearing officer shall cause a record to be made of argument respecting any request for deferral and shall grant or deny the deferral request. Therefore, this matter is properly before the prehearing officer for disposition. DISCUSSION In cases involving a motion to defer to a post-arbitral award, the seminal NLRB case remains Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955). Under the Spielberg standard, the NLRB will defer to the findings of an arbitrator if (1) the proceedings are fair and regular, (2) all parties agreed to be bound and (3) the decision is not repugnant to the purpose and policies of the NLRA. In Raytheon Corp., 140 NLRB 883 (1963), the NLRB added the requirement that the arbitrator must have considered and ruled on the unfair labor practice issue that the NLRB is subsequently called upon to decide. More recently, in Olin Corp., 268 NLRB 573 (1984), the NLRB relaxed the Raytheon requirement that the arbitrator must have specifically considered the unfair labor practice. Rather than requiring such evidence, Olin applied a presumption that the arbitrator has considered the unfair labor practice if (1) the contractual issue is "factually parallel" to the unfair labor practice issue and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice. 268 NLRB at 574. The MLRB has not been called upon to defer to post-arbitral decisions so frequently that the "factual parallelism" standard of Olin has been explicitly considered or adopted by this Board. However, the Board has found that the Spielberg standard provides proper guidance on the issue of post-arbitral deferral. See AFSCME, Council 74 v. City of Bangor, No. 80-50, slip op. at 2 (Me.L.R.B. Sept. 22, 1980), reversed on other grounds, City of -3- _________________________________________________________________ Bangor v. AFSCME, CV-80-563 (June 11, 1981). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has found that the issue of post-arbitral deferral is "largely a matter within the discretion of the Board," which must weigh competing policy interests in the decision: The Board's deferral policy is designed to "give full effect to the parties" agreement to submit contract disputes to arbitration.' . . . For that reason, the Board has often deferred to a pending arbitration when, as in this case, "the bargaining agreements and their meaning are at the center of the dispute." . . . The Board nevertheless must balance that important policy goal against its statutory duty to [prevent prohibited practices]. . . . [I]t frequently has declined to defer when it determines that deferral would not be consistent with its statutory mission. City of Bangor v. MLRB, 658 A.2d 669, 672-673 (1995) (citations omitted). Applying the Spielberg standards to the City's motion to defer here, there has been no allegation that the arbitration proceeding was not fair and regular, that the parties did not agree to be bound, or that the decision was repugnant to the policies and purposes of the MPELRL. The decision to defer therefore depends on evaluating whether the issue decided by the arbitrator was factually parallel to the issue alleged in the complaint or, as this Board has said, whether the meaning of a provision of the collective bargaining agreement is the "center of the dispute." MSEA v. State of Maine, No. 86-09, slip op. at 5 (Me.L.R.B. Apr. 23, 1986) The primary allegation in the complaint in Case No. 01-03 is that the City had knowledge of the insurance coverage changes during negotiations and did not advise the Union, thereby failing to negotiate in good faith. Evidence regarding this same allegation was obviously presented to the arbitrator and she made findings in her decision that the City did not have such knowledge. -4- _________________________________________________________________ However, the parties did not stipulate that she should address this issue. The parties stipulated that the only issue before the arbitrator was whether the insurance coverage change violated the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator's award addressed only the contract violation. An arbitrator must confine herself to the "four corners" of the agreement in making a decision. As the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has found, in order for a dispute to be arbitrable, it must relate to an applicable provision of the agreement. AFSCME, Council 93 v. State of Maine, 635 A.2d 950, 952 (Me. 1993). The four corners of the contract define the limits of the arbitrator's authority and, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, it must be assumed that the parties did not intend the arbitrator to go beyond the bounds of the contract. Westbrook School Committee v. Westbrook Teachers Association, 404 A.2d 204, 208-209 (Me. 1979). In this case, the stipulation of the parties made clear that only a violation of the collective bargaining agreement was at issue. Further, the collective bargaining agreement itself provides, at Art. 13, Sec. 5, that the " . . . arbitrator shall have no power to add to, subtract from or change any of the provisions of this Agreement, nor to render any decision which conflicts with a law." By taking evidence of the knowledge of the parties during the negotiations, and by making findings regarding this, the arbitrator clearly went beyond the "four corners" of the contract that she was to interpret. The arbitrator did not indicate that the language of the contract was ambiguous, such that evidence of pre-contract negotiations was needed to aid in interpreting the contract,[fn]2 or identify any other reason why such evidence was ____________________ 2 For instance, the arbitrator found that the language of the Platoon Chief's contract must be read to require the City to provide payment for full premiums for the health insurance plan, not to require the City to determine and guarantee that exactly the benefits provided by the plan in 1991 would continue to be provided by the health insurance carrier. This finding required an interpretation of the contract (and, perhaps, knowledge of the health insurance provisions of collective bargaining agreements generally), but did not -5- _________________________________________________________________ relevant to the issue before her. While the arbitrator opined that the arbitration would have been a "very different case" if she has found that the City had misled the union at the bargaining table, she did not indicate how a finding of mis- conduct of this sort could have affected the award in the case. In addition, issues regarding the conduct of parties during negotiations are peculiarly within the purview of the Board under 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C). See, e.g., AFSCME, Council 74 v. City of Bangor, supra (when dispute involves an area concerning a matter of interpretation of the MPELRL, deferral not appropriate). For these reasons, it would not be appropriate for the Board to defer to the arbitrator's decision on the issue of the City's knowledge regarding pending insurance coverage changes during negotiations. However, the complaint in Case No. 01-03 can also be read to allege that the health insurance changes violated the collective bargaining agreement. If the Board were to determine that the agreement on health insurance was mutually negotiated in good faith and ratified, the Union might still press the issue of whether the collective bargaining agreement was violated. The parties clearly stipulated that this issue was to be determined by the arbitrator. The arbitrator squarely ruled on this issue in the decision and award. On this issue, the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement is the "center of the dispute." MSEA v. State of Maine, supra., slip op at 5. In the past, the Board has found that deferral to the arbitral process is the preferable course in cases where the conduct to be scrutinized is cognizable both as a prohibited practice and as a breach of contract, thereby giving "full effect ____________________ require ascertaining whether the City knew in advance of coming insurance coverage changes. -6- _________________________________________________________________ to the parties' agreement to submit contract disputes to arbitration." MSEA v. State of Maine, No. 86-09, slip op. at 4 (Me.L.R.B. Apr. 23, 1986). For these reasons, the Board should defer to the arbitrator's decision on the issue of whether the health insurance changes constituted a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. CONCLUSION The City's Motion for Deferral regarding Case No. 01-03 is denied in part and granted in part. The Board shall not defer to the decision of the arbitrator on the issue of whether the conduct of the City during negotiations violated the duty to negotiate in good faith pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) and 965(1)(C). The Board shall defer to the decision of the arbitrator on the issue of whether the change in insurance coverage violated the collective bargaining agreement. Dated this 16th day of November, 2000. MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD /s/_____________________________ Peter T. Dawson Neutral Chair The parties are hereby advised of their right, pursuant to Board Rule 4.07(D), to request review of this decision to the Maine Labor Relations Board. -7- _________________________________________________________________