STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Case No. 01-03
Issued: November 16, 2000
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)
AUGUSTA UNIFORMED FIRE FIGHTERS )
ASSOCIATION LOCAL 1650, IAFF, )
AFL-CIO-CLC, )
)
Complainant, ) PREHEARING OFFICER'S DECISION
) ON MOTION FOR DEFERRAL
v. )
)
CITY OF AUGUSTA, )
)
Respondent. )
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INTRODUCTION
The Augusta Uniformed Firefighters Association Local 1650
("Union") has filed two prohibited practices complaints against
the City of Augusta ("City"), Case Nos. 01-03 and 01-09. These
cases have been consolidated by agreement of the parties.
In Case No. 01-03, the Union complains that the City had
knowledge of health insurance coverage changes prior to the
ratification of the side agreement on health insurance coverage,
and did not reveal this knowledge to the Union. In Case No. 01-
09, the Union complains that the City failed to meet and
negotiate within the requisite 10-day period over the impact of
health insurance coverage changes.
Prior to the prehearing conducted in this matter, the City
moved that the Board should defer to an arbitrator's decision
issued on September 11, 2000, on a related grievance between
these parties. The City stipulated in oral argument that the
motion to defer was directed only to the Union's first complaint
in this matter, Case No. 01-03.
The following issue was presented to the arbitrator by
stipulation of the parties:
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Does the change in health insurance coverage violate
either collective bargaining agreement and if so, what
shall be the remedy?
The arbitrator's decision addressed two grievances filed on
behalf of two individuals, arising under the two collective
bargaining agreements.[fn]1 In one grievance, the Union
challenged the health insurer's refusal to pay for a prescription
medication. In the other grievance, the Union challenged the
health insurer's annual change in benefit structure. In both
cases, the arbitrator concluded that the City did not violate the
respective collective bargaining agreement.
Both parties presented evidence to the arbitrator regarding
the city's knowledge of coming changes to the health insurance
plan during the negotiation process. The arbitrator found that:
The Union argues that the City was aware that there
would be changes, withheld this information, and sold
the Union on MMEHT [the new insurer] coverage. The
evidence, however, does not persuade me that this was
the case. Ms. Blair testified convincingly that the
City first became aware that there would be changes
after bargaining had concluded and after ratification
of the contract by the Union. I therefore conclude
that the City did not mislead the Union during
bargaining. If the City had consciously mislead [sic]
the Union at the bargaining table, this would be a very
different case. In the absence of such evidence,
however, I conclude that the City did not violate the
collective bargaining agreement as alleged.
The issue presented is whether the Board should defer to the
arbitrator's decision is this matter.
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1 The arbitration related to the interpretation of two collective
bargaining agreements for both the Uniformed Firefighters Association,
Local 1650, and the Uniformed Firefighters Association Platoon Chiefs,
Local 1650A. The prohibited practice complaint in Case No. 01-03
references only the agreement between the City and the Uniformed
Firefighters Association, Local 1650.
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JURISDICTION
Board Rule 4.07(D) provides, in part, that the prehearing
officer shall cause a record to be made of argument respecting
any request for deferral and shall grant or deny the deferral
request. Therefore, this matter is properly before the
prehearing officer for disposition.
DISCUSSION
In cases involving a motion to defer to a post-arbitral
award, the seminal NLRB case remains Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,
112 NLRB 1080 (1955). Under the Spielberg standard, the NLRB
will defer to the findings of an arbitrator if (1) the
proceedings are fair and regular, (2) all parties agreed to be
bound and (3) the decision is not repugnant to the purpose and
policies of the NLRA. In Raytheon Corp., 140 NLRB 883 (1963),
the NLRB added the requirement that the arbitrator must have
considered and ruled on the unfair labor practice issue that the
NLRB is subsequently called upon to decide.
More recently, in Olin Corp., 268 NLRB 573 (1984), the NLRB
relaxed the Raytheon requirement that the arbitrator must have
specifically considered the unfair labor practice. Rather than
requiring such evidence, Olin applied a presumption that the
arbitrator has considered the unfair labor practice if (1) the
contractual issue is "factually parallel" to the unfair labor
practice issue and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally
with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice.
268 NLRB at 574.
The MLRB has not been called upon to defer to post-arbitral
decisions so frequently that the "factual parallelism" standard
of Olin has been explicitly considered or adopted by this Board.
However, the Board has found that the Spielberg standard provides
proper guidance on the issue of post-arbitral deferral. See
AFSCME, Council 74 v. City of Bangor, No. 80-50, slip op. at 2
(Me.L.R.B. Sept. 22, 1980), reversed on other grounds, City of
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Bangor v. AFSCME, CV-80-563 (June 11, 1981).
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has found that the issue of
post-arbitral deferral is "largely a matter within the discretion
of the Board," which must weigh competing policy interests in the
decision:
The Board's deferral policy is designed to "give full
effect to the parties" agreement to submit contract
disputes to arbitration.' . . . For that reason, the
Board has often deferred to a pending arbitration when,
as in this case, "the bargaining agreements and their
meaning are at the center of the dispute." . . . The
Board nevertheless must balance that important policy
goal against its statutory duty to [prevent prohibited
practices]. . . . [I]t frequently has declined to defer
when it determines that deferral would not be
consistent with its statutory mission.
City of Bangor v. MLRB, 658 A.2d 669, 672-673 (1995) (citations
omitted).
Applying the Spielberg standards to the City's motion to
defer here, there has been no allegation that the arbitration
proceeding was not fair and regular, that the parties did not
agree to be bound, or that the decision was repugnant to the
policies and purposes of the MPELRL. The decision to defer
therefore depends on evaluating whether the issue decided by the
arbitrator was factually parallel to the issue alleged in the
complaint or, as this Board has said, whether the meaning of a
provision of the collective bargaining agreement is the "center
of the dispute." MSEA v. State of Maine, No. 86-09, slip op. at
5 (Me.L.R.B. Apr. 23, 1986)
The primary allegation in the complaint in Case No. 01-03 is
that the City had knowledge of the insurance coverage changes
during negotiations and did not advise the Union, thereby failing
to negotiate in good faith. Evidence regarding this same
allegation was obviously presented to the arbitrator and she made
findings in her decision that the City did not have such
knowledge.
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However, the parties did not stipulate that she should
address this issue. The parties stipulated that the only issue
before the arbitrator was whether the insurance coverage change
violated the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator's
award addressed only the contract violation. An arbitrator must
confine herself to the "four corners" of the agreement in making
a decision. As the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has found, in
order for a dispute to be arbitrable, it must relate to an
applicable provision of the agreement. AFSCME, Council 93 v.
State of Maine, 635 A.2d 950, 952 (Me. 1993). The four corners
of the contract define the limits of the arbitrator's authority
and, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, it
must be assumed that the parties did not intend the arbitrator to
go beyond the bounds of the contract. Westbrook School Committee
v. Westbrook Teachers Association, 404 A.2d 204, 208-209 (Me.
1979). In this case, the stipulation of the parties made clear
that only a violation of the collective bargaining agreement was
at issue. Further, the collective bargaining agreement itself
provides, at Art. 13, Sec. 5, that the " . . . arbitrator shall
have no power to add to, subtract from or change any of the
provisions of this Agreement, nor to render any decision which
conflicts with a law."
By taking evidence of the knowledge of the parties during
the negotiations, and by making findings regarding this, the
arbitrator clearly went beyond the "four corners" of the contract
that she was to interpret. The arbitrator did not indicate that
the language of the contract was ambiguous, such that evidence of
pre-contract negotiations was needed to aid in interpreting the
contract,[fn]2 or identify any other reason why such evidence
was
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2 For instance, the arbitrator found that the language of the
Platoon Chief's contract must be read to require the City to provide
payment for full premiums for the health insurance plan, not to
require the City to determine and guarantee that exactly the benefits
provided by the plan in 1991 would continue to be provided by the
health insurance carrier. This finding required an interpretation of
the contract (and, perhaps, knowledge of the health insurance
provisions of collective bargaining agreements generally), but did not
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relevant to the issue before her. While the arbitrator opined
that the arbitration would have been a "very different case" if
she has found that the City had misled the union at the
bargaining table, she did not indicate how a finding of mis-
conduct of this sort could have affected the award in the case.
In addition, issues regarding the conduct of parties during
negotiations are peculiarly within the purview of the Board under
26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C). See, e.g., AFSCME, Council 74 v. City
of Bangor, supra (when dispute involves an area concerning a
matter of interpretation of the MPELRL, deferral not
appropriate).
For these reasons, it would not be appropriate for the Board
to defer to the arbitrator's decision on the issue of the City's
knowledge regarding pending insurance coverage changes during
negotiations.
However, the complaint in Case No. 01-03 can also be read to
allege that the health insurance changes violated the collective
bargaining agreement. If the Board were to determine that the
agreement on health insurance was mutually negotiated in good
faith and ratified, the Union might still press the issue of
whether the collective bargaining agreement was violated.
The parties clearly stipulated that this issue was to be
determined by the arbitrator. The arbitrator squarely ruled on
this issue in the decision and award. On this issue, the
meaning of the collective bargaining agreement is the "center of
the dispute." MSEA v. State of Maine, supra., slip op at 5.
In the past, the Board has found that deferral to the
arbitral process is the preferable course in cases where the
conduct to be scrutinized is cognizable both as a prohibited
practice and as a breach of contract, thereby giving "full effect
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require ascertaining whether the City knew in advance of coming
insurance coverage changes.
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to the parties' agreement to submit contract disputes to
arbitration." MSEA v. State of Maine, No. 86-09, slip op. at 4
(Me.L.R.B. Apr. 23, 1986).
For these reasons, the Board should defer to the
arbitrator's decision on the issue of whether the health
insurance changes constituted a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement.
CONCLUSION
The City's Motion for Deferral regarding Case No. 01-03 is
denied in part and granted in part. The Board shall not defer to
the decision of the arbitrator on the issue of whether the
conduct of the City during negotiations violated the duty to
negotiate in good faith pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) and
965(1)(C). The Board shall defer to the decision of the
arbitrator on the issue of whether the change in insurance
coverage violated the collective bargaining agreement.
Dated this 16th day of November, 2000.
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
/s/_____________________________
Peter T. Dawson
Neutral Chair
The parties are hereby advised of their right, pursuant to Board
Rule 4.07(D), to request review of this decision to the Maine
Labor Relations Board.
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