Maine State Employees Association v. Maine Department of Inland 
Fisheries and Wildlife and State of Maine, No. 85-02, 8 NPER ME-16010
(Jan. 17, 1985), vacated, Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and 
Wildlife v. Maine State Employees Association, No. CV-85-51 
(Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty.), aff'd., 503 A.2d 1285 (Me. 1986)

STATE OF MAINE                             MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
                                           Case No. 85-02
                                           Issued:  January 17, 1985
_______________________________________
                                       )
MAINE STATE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,     )
                                       )
                      Complainant,     )
                                       )
                v.                     )
                                       )
MAINE DEPARTMENT OF INLAND FISHERIES   )         DECISION AND ORDER
AND WILDLIFE                           )
                                       )
               and                     )
                                       )
STATE OF MAINE,                        )
                                       )
                      Respondents.     )
_______________________________________)

     The question presented in this prohibited practices case is did
the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife and the State of
Maine (hereinafter referred to together as "State") unilaterally
change the motor vehicle use policy, for certain employees of the
Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife, in violation of the stat-
utory duty to bargain.  We find that, on and after September 11, 1984,
an impermissible unilateral change has occurred, and order an appro-
priate remedy.

     The Maine State Employees Association ("Union") filed the prohib-
ited practices complaint in this matter on June 29, 1984, alleging
that the State had unilaterally changed employee wages, hours, and
working conditions by prohibiting certain use of motor vehicles owned
by the State by certain employees of the Department of Inland
Fisheries and Wildlife.  The State filed an answer on July 23, 1984,
denying that it had made any unilateral changes in the terms and con-
ditions of employment and averring that the changes which were made
were required by an Act of the Legislature and that the State's
response to said enactment was expressly allowed by the two relevant
collective bargaining agreements between the parties.  The statute
under which this case arises is the State Employees Labor Relations
Act, 26 M.R.S.A. Sec. 979, et seq. ("Act").

                                 -1-

     A pre-hearing conference on the case was held on August 14, 1984,
Alternate Chairman Donald W. Webber presiding.  On August 17, 1984,
Alternate Chairman Webber issued a Pre-Hearing Conference Memorandum
and Order, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.

     A hearing on this matter was held on September 27, 1984, Alternate
Chairman William M. Houston presiding, with Alternate Employer Repre-
sentative Carroll R. McGary and Alternate Employee Representative
Russell A. Webb.  The Union was represented by John R. Lemieux, Esq.,
and the State by Susan Farnsworth, Esq.  The parties were given full
opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evi-
dence, and to make argument.  Both parties filed post-hearing briefs
which were considered by the Board.

                             JURISDICTION
              
     The Maine State Employees Association is the certified bargaining
agent, within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. Sec. 979-H(2) (Supp. 1983-84),
for the State employee Supervisory Services and Law Enforcement
Service bargaining units.  The Maine Department of Inland Fisheries
and Wildlife and the State of Maine together are the public employer,
defined in 26 M.R.S.A. Sec. 979-A(5) (Supp. 1983-84).  The jurisdiction
of the Maine Labor Relations Board ("Board') to hear this case and to
render a decision and order herein lies in 26 M.R.S.A. Sec. 979-H(2) and
(3) (Supp. 1983-84).
                                     
                           FINDINGS OF FACT

     Upon review of the entire record, the Labor Relations Board finds:
              
     1.  The Maine State Employees Association is the certified
bargaining agent, as defined in 26 M.R.S.A. Sec. 979-A(l) (Supp. 1983-84),
for the State employee Supervisory Services and Law Enforcement Serv-
ices bargaining units.
              
     2.  The Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and wildlife and the
State of Maine together are the public employer, as defined in 26
M.R.S.A. Sec. 979-A(5) (Supp. 1983-84), of all of the employees whose
positions are included in the bargaining units mentioned in the pre-

                                  -2-

ceding paragraph.

     3. The relevant portions of Article XXXVII, "State Vehicles and
Equipment," in the 1982-1983 collective bargaining agreements, between
the State and the Union for the bargaining units noted in paragraph 1
above, stated:

               "3.  Use of vehicles while on duty status:

               (a)  Members of the bargaining unit, while on
          duty, are authorized to transport members of their
          immediate family within their assigned area.

               (b)  Members of the bargaining unit may use
          their assigned motor vehicles for personal errands
          within their assigned area while on duty.

               (c)  Transportation, while on duty, for a
          member of his/her immediate family, beyond the
          member's assigned area or station, shall require
          prior permission from his/her immediate super-
          visor."

               "4.  Use of vehicles when not on scheduled
                    duty status:

               (a)  No State vehicle shall be used outside a
          member's assigned area when the member is not on
          scheduled duty status without prior approval from
          the appropriate appointing official or his/her
          designee,.

               (b)  Whenever a State vehicle is used by a
          member during a non-duty status, the member must
          assume an 'on-duty' status for communication and
          operational purposes.

               (c)  Expenses incurred for gasoline, oil and
          other costs as the result of using a state vehicle
          under this section 4 shall be borne by the member
          involved.

               (d)  The use of State vehicles within the
          provisions of this section 4 shall be restricted
          to occasions that involve necessary personal bus-
          iness or emergencies.  Such use shall be kept to
          an absolute minimum."

     In the agreement for the Supervisory Services unit, the two
paragraphs cited are numbered 4 and 5, rather than 3 and 4, as they
are designated in the Law Enforcement Services unit agreement and as

                                  -3-

they appear above.
              
     4.  In addition to the requirement of assuming "on-duty" status
for communication and operational purposes when the unit employees
were not on scheduled duty status, the Department of Inland Fisheries
and Wildlife's Policies and Procedures also required said employees to
carry identification and to have a firearm in their possession.  Said
Policies and Procedures defined the term "assigned area," outlined the
officials whose permission was needed to travel beyond said zone, and
provided that "[t]he phrase 'necessary personal business' shall not be
interpreted to mean a commercial venture."
              
     5.  When they were in State vehicles but were not on scheduled
duty status, the Game Wardens were available for and did respond to
radio complaints about alleged violations of law within their assigned
area and answered calls for assistance from Wardens and other law
enforcement personnel.  During these same periods, the Wardens
investigated any violations of law which they observed and provided
the appropriate law enforcement response thereto.
              
     6.  On August 30, 1982, the Union demanded negotiations with the
State, with respect to the wages, hours, and working conditions of the
employees in the two units mentioned in paragraph 1, supra, for suc-
cessor agreements to the 1982-83 collective bargaining agreements.
              
     7.  Shortly after August 30, 1982, the State and the Union
engaged in collective bargaining for successor agreements to the
1982-83 collective bargaining agreements for the two units noted in
paragraph 1 above.  Said negotiations proceeded through mediation,
fact-finding, and interest arbitration and, ultimately, resulted in
successor collective bargaining agreements.  The successor agreements
which were ratified by the Union's membership and by the Legislature
and became effective on September 11, 1984.
              
     8.  On September 7, 1983 the Legislature enacted Chapter 588 of
the Public Laws of 1983.  That Legislation was signed by the Governor
on September 15, 1983 and became effective on January 1, 1984.  The
Law, which applied only to the Department of Inland Fisheries and
Wildlife, provided, in relevant part: "No employee may use any

                                  -4-

department equipment or vehicles for other than official business."

     9.  The Legislative Record, reporting the House and Senate debate
over the Act mentioned in the preceding paragraph, contained unre-
butted statements by Representative Phyllis R. Erwin and Representative
Maynard G. Conners.  Those remarks indicated that, although the
Legislature was aware of alleged abuses in the Wardens' non-official
use of State vehicles, some private uses were allowed by the appli-
cable collective bargaining agreements and the Legislature was not
changing the practices permitted in said agreements.  During the
relevent Senate debate, Senator Charles P. Pray stated:

              "Mr. President and Ladies and Gentlemen of the
         Senate, this Bill as is common in late hours of any
         legislative session was drafted rather quickly and
         rather late in the evening last night, due to that
         I think that there are some ambiguities in the
         language that we will not (sic) be enacting.  I
         think that it is necessary to add some remarks to the
         Legislative Record to clarify those ambiguities . . .
              "If I could call the Senate's attention to the
         Bill, and on paragraph 6 on page 3 of the Bill
         simply gives the Commissioner the same authority to
         regulate the use of vehicles and equipment that
         other Commissioners have under their respective
         statutes.  It does not prohibit personal use
         vehicles during the time when a warden is on duty
         or when he is available for duty and is signed in
         with the Department.  Many of you who are familiar,
         a number of game wardens are located in the rather
         rural, unorganized territories of the State and
         basically they are on-call twenty-four hours a day.
              "It is not intended to arrogate (sic) any
         rights concerning the use of vehicles and equipment
         that now exists in collective bargaining
         agreements.  Any changes in policy concerning,the
         use of vehicles would, of course, have to be nego-
         tiated in the usual manner."

Legislative Record - Senate, September 7, 1983, at 34.

    10.  On December 12, 1983, Colonel John Marsh sent a memorandum to
all Wardens which stated, in relevant part: "[Rlecent legislation
makes it unlawful on January 1 for an employee of this Department to
use any Department equipment or vehicles for other than official use."

    11.  On December 15, 1983, the Union demanded a meeting with the
Commissioner of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife, pursuant to Article

                                  -5-

LVII of the Law Enforcement Services bargaining unit collective
bargaining agreement, to discuss the Department's change of its
vehicle use policy.
             
    12.  During December of 1983, three Union staff representatives
met with Deputy Commissioner of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife Norman
Trask, Game Warden Major Merrill, and the Department's Personnel
Officer.  In the course of that meeting, the Department officials
stated that the Department's position was that Chapter 588 prohibited
the Wardens from the type of non-official vehicle use which had been
permitted under the relevant collective bargaining agreements and that
such use would not be allowed on and after January 1, 1984.
          
    13.  There were no negotiations between the Union and the State
over the change in the Department's vehicle use policy, prior to said
change being implemented on January 1, 1984.  On that date, the
Department's interpretation of Chapter 588, discussed in the preceding
paragraph, was put into effect.
             
    14.  During the course of the collective negotiations mentioned in
paragraph 7 above, the State counter-proposed that the existing provi-
sions pertaining to the use of State vehicles while off duty, cited in
paragraph 3, supra, be deleted.
             
    15.  Throughout the fact-finding and interest arbitration pro-
ceedings mentioned in paragraph 7 above, the State maintained the
position that the off-duty use of State vehicles, by employees in the
State employee Law Enforcement Services and Supervisory Services bar-
gaining units which was allowed by the collective bargaining agreement
sections cited in paragraph 3 hereof, should be deleted from the suc-
cessor agreements.  Recognizing that said vehicle use policies may have
been abused in the past, both the Fact-Finding Report and the Interest
arbitration decision rejected the State's argument, kept the quoted
language in the successor agreements, and suggested that the solution
to such problems was "greater scrutiny to assure that the abuses do not
occur."
             
    16.  The collective bargaining agreements, which succeeded those
quoted in paragraph 3 above and which, subsequent to being ratified by

                                  -6-

the Legislature, were executed by the parties and became effective on
September 11, 1984, contain an Article on State vehicles and equipment
whose relevant parts are identical to those cited in paragraph 3,
supra.
            
    17.  After September 11, 1984, the State has continued to prohibit
the law enforcement employees of the Department of Inland Fisheries
and Wildlife, whose classifications are included in the bargaining
units mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, from using State vehicles for
anything but official business.

                               DECISION
             
     The Union's complaint charges that the State violated 26 M.R.S.A.
Sections 979-C(1)(A), (B), and (E) by unilaterally discontinuing the
practice of allowing the personal, non-commercial use of State
vehicles by on-duty and off-duty Game Warden employees of the
Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife.  The motor vehicle use
policy in contention was explicitly approved by the 1982-1983 collec-
tive bargaining agreements for the Wardens' bargaining units and the
practice continues to be enjoyed by the other law enforcement
employees in the Supervisory Services and the Law Enforcement Services
bargaining units.  The State admitted that it has changed the policy
in question unilaterally and without bargaining the same with the
Union.  While recognizing that its conduct would have violated the Act
under most circumstances, the State argues that it did not breach the
Act in this case because its action was required by legislative enact-
ment.
              
     Section 979-C(1)(E) requires the public employer to negotiate
over the wages, hours, working conditions and contract grievance
arbitration of and for its employees with the employees' bargaining
agent.  The statutory duty to bargain not only requires the employer
to negotiate over the mandatory subjects of bargaining but it also
prohibits the employer from making unilateral changes in those areas.
N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 1111, 8 L.Ed. 2d
230 (1962); State v. Maine Labor Relations Board, 413 A.2d 510, 515
(Me. 1980).  The rationale behind the unilateral change rule is that

                                  -7-

modifications in the mandatory subjects of bargaining, which are not
the product of collective bargaining between the employer and the cer-
tified bargaining agent but which result solely from employer action,
circumvent the duty to negotiate and frustrate the purpose of Section
979-C(1)(E) as much as does a flat refusal to negotiate.  Unilateral
management changes in the mandatory subjects of bargaining have the
inherent effect of interfering with the employees' right to engage in
bargaining and, therefore, also violate Section 979-C(1)(A) of the
Act.  Lane v. Board of Directors of M.S.A.D. No. 8, 447 A.2d 806, 810
(Me. 1982); Maine State Employees Association v. State of Maine, MLRB
No. 84-19, at 10 (July 23, 1984).
              
     To fall within the prohibition of the unilateral change rule, a
management action must alter a mandatory subject of bargaining.  The
National Labor Relations Board has held that an employer's practice of
allowing its employees to use the employer's motor vehicles for their
own personal purposes during off-duty time is a fringe benefit which
relates to the employees' working conditions.  Eagle Material Handling
of New Jersey, 224 NLRB 1529, 1532-33 (1976).  Finding the National
Board's analysis persuasive, this Board has held that public employers
violate the statutory duty to bargain if they unilaterally discontinue
an established policy of allowing the personal off-duty use of offi-
cial vehicles by their organized employees.  Teamsters Local 48 v.
Bucksport School Department, MLRB No. 81-18, at 4 (Dec. 22, 1980);
Teamsters Local 48 v. Town of Jay, MLRB No. 80-02, at 5 (Dec. 26, 1979).

     The State has not denied that it discontinued the policy of
allowing the private, non-commercial use of State vehicles by the Game
wardens without having bargained said change with the Wardens'
bargaining agent.  Having admitted the Union's factual allegations,
the State offered two contentions in support of the position that the
State's actions did not violate any provision of the Act.  The State's
first argument is that the Union has waived its right to complain
about a refusal to bargain, over the change in the vehicle use policy,
by the Union's failure to demand such negotiations in a timely manner.
We have often stated that, to be effective, a waiver of the statutory
right to bargain must be clear and unmistakable.  Maine State

                                  -8-

Employees Association, supra, at 8-9.  No such waiver is present in
this case.  In a memorandum to "All Wardens" dated December 12, 1983,
the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife notified the Wardens
of the impending change in the vehicle use policy.  Three days later,
the Union wrote to the Commissioner of the Department and requested a
meeting to discuss the Department's vehicle use policy.  The prompt
action taken by the Union, in response to the Department's memorandum
of December 12, 1984, clearly refutes any suggestion that the Union
waived its right to bargain over the change in the vehicle use
policy.

     The State's second major contention is that the termination of
the Wardens' private use of State vehicles was required by the
Legislature's enactment of Chapter 588, Section 4, of the Public Laws
of 1983.  The Statute, which has been codified as 12 M.R.S.A. Sec.
7036(6) (Supp. 1984-85) and which became effective on January 1, 1984,
states:
               "Personal use of vehicles and equipment.  No
         employee may use any department equipment or vehicles
         for other than official business."

The State not only argues that modification of the Wardens' vehicle
use policy, as set forth in the relevant collective bargaining
agreements, was required by the above-cited Statute but also that said
Public Law "prescribed or controlled" the use of official vehicles by
the employees of the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife.
Section 979-D(1)(E)(1) provides that, to the extent that matters are
prescribed or controlled by public law, such subjects are removed from
the scope of mandatory bargaining.  Since the unilateral change rule
only applies to the mandatory subjects of bargaining and since the
Wardens' motor vehicle use policy was allegedly removed from the
scope of mandatory bargaining by Section 7036(6), the State concludes
that its unilateral change of said policy did not violate the stat-
utory duty to bargain.

     The Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted the relevant portion
of Section 979-D(1)(E)(1) as prohibiting parties from negotiating
collective bargaining agreements whose terms are inconsistent with
existing law.  State v. Maine Labor Relations Board, supra, 413 A.2d,
                                  -9-

at 515.  Since mandatory collective bargaining was created by the
Legislature, that body may through a clear expression of intent,
prospectively alter, limit, or expand the scope of the statutory duty
to bargain.  Because of the ambiguity of the statutory language, we
hold that 12 M.R.S.A. Sec. 7036(6) does not remove the Game Wardens'
vehicle use policy from the ambit of mandatory collective bargaining.
Although limiting the utilization of State vehicles by the Wardens to
"official business," Section 7036(6) does not define the term
"official business" nor does it expressly prohibit the motor vehicle
use provided in the relevant collective bargaining agreements, which
had been ratified by the Legislature.  Under the pertinent bargaining
agreement articles and pursuant to the Department's Policies and
Procedures, when they used official vehicles for private, non-
commercial purposes during non-duty status, the Wardens assumed on-
duty status for communication and operational purposes and were
required to carry identification and to have a firearm available in
the vehicle.  While on on-duty status for communications and opera-
tional purposes although not on scheduled duty status, the Wardens
were available for an did in fact respond to radio messages about
alleged violations of law within their assigned patrol areas, answered
calls for assistance from other law enforcement personnel, and took
appropriate action whenever they observed violations of law.  The
motor vehicle use permitted by the collective bargaining agreements,
therefore, constituted official business and it was unclear whether
Section 7036(6) was intended to prohibit such use.

     We have examined the legislative history of Section 7036(6), in
an attempt to resolve the ambiguity noted above.  During the debate
over the measure in the House of Representatives, Representative
Phyllis R. Erwin stated:

         "I am on that subcommittee with the Audit and
          Program Review and just last week we had a long
          discussion about these vehicles and the use of the
          vehicles when the wardens are not on duty.  We are
          recommending that they not be allowed to use them.
          We cannot do so.  We had contracts there shown to
          us that are under this collective bargaining where
          all state employees who use state vehicles are all
          allowed the same privilege of using their vehicle

                                  -10-

          on their personal time as long as they pay for
          their gasoline and the expense of that vehicle
          during that period of time.  There is nothing that
          we can do about it unless that contract is changed
          and every state employee is treated the same."

Legislative Record - House, September 6, 1983, at 7.  Later in the
same debate, Representative Maynard G. Conners of Franklin, arguing in
favor of adoption of the measure, stated that the vehicle use policy
was controlled by the relevant collective bargaining agreements and
could not be changed by the Legislature.  Legislative Record, supra,
at 9.  Senator Charles P. Pray, during the Senate debate over Section
7036(6), plainly stated that the measure was not intended to change
the vehicle use policies contained in the collective bargaining
agreements.  The provision was meant to authorize the Commissioner of
Inland Fisheries and Wildlife to regulate the use of State vehicles-
within the limits set forth in the collective bargaining agreements.
Legislative Record - Senate, September 7, 1983, at 34.  A review of
the legislative history of Section 7036(6) did not resolve the ambi-
guity as to whether the enactment was intended to discontinue the nego-
tiated vehicle use policy for the Game Wardens.

     Legislative intent, concerning the Wardens' vehicle use policy,
has been clarified by subsequent legislative action.  During the nego-
tiations between the State and the Union for successor agreements to
the 1982-1983 collective bargaining agreements, the State proposed
that the articles permitting the off-duty use of official vehicles be
deleted from the Supervisory Services and Law Enforcement Services
agreements.  The Union refused to agree with the State's proposal and
the parties persisted in their respective positions through fact-
finding and interest arbitration.  In both of the formal impasse reso-
lution procedures mentioned, the State cited "numerous complaints" of
abuse of the policy, in support of its proposed deletion.  Both the
Fact-Finding and the Interest Arbitration Panels rejected the State's
position.  The Interest Arbitration Report, at page 78, outlined that
Panel's conclusion as follows:

         "The fact that there have been some abuses of a
          benefit does not justify its elimination, where as
          here the evidence shows a greater benefit is
          
                                  -11-

          accrued to the state by the ready availability of
          its personnel who have use of such vehicles.
          Rather the solution should be by greater scrutiny
          to assure that the abuses do not occur.  We agree
          with the fact finders that this provision should
          remain in the parties' agreement."

The successor collective bargaining agreements, negotiated by the par-
ties for the Supervisory Services and Law Enforcement Services
bargaining units, contain State Vehicles and Equipment articles whose
relevant portions are identical to the language contained in the
1982-1983 agreements.  Those articles permit the use of official
vehicles for necessary personal business during non-duty status time
by those unit employees to whom State vehicles have been assigned.
The Game Wardens have not been excluded from the language of the State
Vehicles and Equipment articles.  The successor collective bargaining
agreements were ratified by the Legislature and became effective on
September 11, 1984.  In ratifying agreements which contained a vehicle
use policy identical to that in the 1982-1983 agreements, the
Legislature expressed an intent to continue said benefit for all of
the unit employees with assigned State vehicles.

     The private, non-commercial use of State vehicles by the Game
Warden employees of the Department of Inland Fisheries and wildlife
relates to the working conditions of said employees and is, therefore,
a mandatory subject of bargaining.  The Union did not waive its right
to demand bargaining over a change in the Wardens' vehicle use policy.
Title 12 M.R.S.A. Sec. 7036(6) does not prescribe or control the use of
official vehicles by employees of the Department of Inland Fisheries
and Wildlife.  Since the State implemented a change in the Wardens'
vehicle use policy, unilaterally and without negotiating over the same
with the affected unit employees' bargaining agent, the State has
violated the duty to bargain in good faith mandated by Section
979-C(1)(E) of the Act.  The natural consequence of its action was to
interfere with the Game Wardens' right to engage in collective
bargaining; therefore, the State's conduct also violated Section 979-C
(1)(A) of the Act.

     The Union's final contention was that, by implementing the unila-
teral change in the Game Wardens' vehicle use policy, the State

                                  -12-

violated 26 M.R.S.A. Sec. 979-C(1)(B).  That section of the Act prohibits
discriminatory employment decisions by a public employer in retal-
iation for an employee's engaging in conduct protected by the Act.
Such discriminating treatment has the inherent effect of encouraging
or discouraging membership in an employee organization, within the
meaning of the Act.  Maine State Employees Association v. State
Development Office, MLRB No. 84-21, at 10 (July 6, 1984).  Absolutely
no evidence was presented in support of the argument that the Game
Wardens' vehicle use policy had been changed because those employees
had engaged in activities protected by the Act.  We must, therefore,
dismiss the Union's allegation of a violation of Section 979-C(1)(B).

     We will order the State of Maine and the Department of Inland
Fisheries and wildlife to cease and desist from making unilateral
changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining and to immediately
reinstate the practice of allowing the Department's Game Warden
employees to use official vehicles for personal, non-commercial pur-
poses pursuant to and limited by the terms and conditions of the State
Vehicles and Equipment articles of the current Supervisory Services
and Law Enforcement Services bargaining units' collective bargaining
agreements.  This practice is to remain in effect until the issue of
the use of such vehicles is resolved through negotiations with the
Game Wardens' bargaining agent.  Although the Union's complaint prayed
that the State be ordered to "make whole' the employees adversely
affected by the State's actions, the Union did not offer any evidence
to establish and quantify the amount of such damages, if any.  The
Board will not engage in speculation in fashioning an appropriate
remedial order.  Since no damages were established, none will be
awarded.  These remedies will effectuate the policies of the Act and
restore the status quo.
                                         
                                ORDER

     On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and discussion,
and by virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor
Relations Board by 26 M.R.S.A. Sec. 979-H(3) (Supp. 1984-85), it is hereby
ORDERED:

                                     -13-
         That the State of Maine and the Department of Inland Fisheries
         and Wildlife and their representatives and agents:

             1.  Cease and desist from changing any aspect of the
                 Game Wardens wages, hours, and working conditions
                 without first notifying and bargaining with the
                 Wardens' collective bargaining agent.

             2.  Take the following affirmative actions necessary
                 to effectuate the policies of the Act:
                
                 a.  Immediately reinstate the practice of allow-
                     ing the Game Warden employees of the Depart-
                     ment to use official vehicles for personal,
                     non-commercial purposes pursuant to and
                     limited by the terms and conditions of the
                     State Vehicles and Equipment articles of
                     the current Supervisory Services and Law
                     Enforcement Services bargaining units'
                     collective bargaining agreements.  This
                     practice is to remain if effect until the
                     issue of the use of such vehicles is re-
                     solved through negotiations with the Game
                     Wardens' bargaining agent.

                 b.  Within 30 days of the date of this Decision
                     and Order, notify the Board's Executive
                     Director in writing of the steps taken to
                     comply with this order.

Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 17th day of January, 1985.

                                  MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD



                                  /s/________________________________
The parties are advised of        William M. Houston
their right, pursuant to          Alternate Chairman
26 M.R.S.A. Sec. 979-H(7)
(Supp. 1984-85) to seek a
review by the Superior Court
of this decision by filing        /s/________________________________
a complaint in accordance         Carroll R.- McGary
with Rule 80B of the Rules        Alternate Employer Representative
of Civil Procedure, within
15 days of the date of this
decision.
                                  /s/________________________________
                                  Russell A. Webb
                                  Alternate Employee Representative

                                 -14-