STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Case No. 91-03
Issued: January 31, 1991
_________________________________
)
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL NO. 340, )
)
Complainant, )
)
v. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
TOWN OF ORONO, )
)
Respondent. )
_________________________________)
The questions presented in this prohibited practice case are whether
the Town of Orono (hereinafter referred to as "Employer") violated
26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(A), (C) and (E) through certain statements made by one
of the members of the Orono Town Council to a bargaining unit employee
represented by the Complainant, Teamsters Union Local No. 340 ("Union").
We hold that the Councilman's statement violated the Municipal Public
Employees Labor Relations Law ("Act"), 26 M.R.S.A. Ch. 9-A (1988 and Supp.
1990). We will, therefore, fashion an appropriate remedy to redress such
violation and to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The prohibited practice complaint was filed by the Union on July 10,
1990, pursuant to 968(5)(B) of the Act. The Employer filed its answer on
July 27, 1990, denying that the statement complained of was uttered by a
person who is a public employer within the meaning of the Act, denying
that the Employer transgressed any provision of the Act, and moving to
dismiss the Union's complaint. A prehearing conference on the case was
held on August 16, 1990, Public Chair Peter T. Dawson presiding. On
August 21, 1990, Chair Dawson issued a Prehearing Conference Memorandum and
Order, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Prior
to the evidentiary hearing and in compliance with the Prehearing Order, the
parties each filed a written memorandum briefly outlining their factual and
legal positions.
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A hearing on the merits of the case was conducted on September 28,
1990, by the Maine Labor Relations Board ("Board"), Public Chair Peter T.
Dawson presiding, with Employer Representative Thacher E. Turner and
Employee Representative George W. Lambertson. The Complainant was repre-
sented by Carl Guignard, one of its business agents, and the Respondent was
represented by Thomas C. Johnston, Esq. The parties were given full oppor-
tunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce documentary
evidence, and to make argument. The parties filed posthearing briefs, the
last of which was received on November 15, 1990, which were considered by
the Board in reaching its decision. The Board met to deliberate on the
case on December 3, 1990.
JURISDICTION
The Complainant, Teamsters Union Local No. 340, is the certified
bargaining agent, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(2) (1988), for
a bargaining unit composed of all full-time Police Sergeants, Patrolmen and
Police Detectives employed by the Town of Orono. The Respondent, the Town
of Orono, is the public employer, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A.
962(7) (Supp. 1990), of the employees whose classifications are included
in the above-named bargaining unit. The jurisdiction of the Maine Labor
Relations Board to hear this case and to render a decision and order herein
lies in 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(C) (1988).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon review of the entire record, the Labor Relations Board finds:
1. Teamsters Union Local No. 340 is the certified bargaining agent,
within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(2) (1988), for a bargaining unit
consisting of all full-time Police Sergeants, Patrolmen and Police
Detectives employed by the Town of Orono.
2. The Town of Orono is the public employer, within the definition of
26 M.R.S.A. 962(7) (Supp. 1990), of the employees whose classifications
are included in the bargaining unit mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
3. The most recent collective bargaining agreement between the par-
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ties for the unit noted in paragraph 1 hereof expired on June 30, 1989.
4. The parties have been involved in direct negotiations and have
particiated in mediation in an effort to reach a successor agreement to
that mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
5. The Orono Town Council is the general legislative body of the Town
of Orono and consists of seven elected members.
6. The Town Council's role in collective bargaining is: to select
the chief negotiator and bargaining team that represents the public
employer, to determine the parameters of the management team's negotiating
authority, and to review, ratify or reject, and fund the final tentative
agreement reached at the bargaining table.
7. During the current round of negotiations mentioned in paragraph 4
above, the Town Council has met in executive session with the chief manage-
ment negotiator to discuss the progress of the negotiations. During such
discussions, the Council members have reached a consensus on the employer's
position on the various issues outstanding between the parties at the
bargaining table.
8. At all times relevant hereto, Scott Thomas has been a duly-elected
member of the Orono Town Council.
9. Frustrated with what they perceived to be a lack of progress in
the negotiations between the parties, off-duty employees, including members
of the bargaining unit mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, engaged in infor-
mational picketing in front of both the Orono Town Hall and Mr. Thomas'
insurance and real estate office, which is located across the street from
the town hall.
10. While engaging in picketing, the employees shouted to passing
motorists such things as "honk if you support [the employees]," "give us a
contract," and statements to the effect that the employees couldn't afford
to pay a portion of the premium for health insurance.
11. On one occasion, Scott Thomas drove past the picketers in his car,
a Saab, and someone on the picket line shouted "how much does a Saab cost?"
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Thomas' wife, Susan Thomas, drove by in her car,
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also a Saab, and someone shouted "how much do two Saabs cost?"
12. On several occasions, the town employees engaged in handbilling.
The employees also carried their picket signs into a meeting of the Orono
Town Council.
13. While he was a member of the Orono School Committee, Scott Thomas
initiated the order for building a "creative playground" in the Town of
Orono. Mr. Thomas was involved in the playground project throughout its
planning and actual construction.
14. The playground was constructed by volunteers, working under the
direction of a consultant from New York. During the construction phase of
the project, Scott Thomas worked as a "foreman" and he chaired the tools
and materials committee.
15. On June 13, 1990, prior to 8:50 p.m., Scott Thomas and others at
the playground site loaded a trailer that was attached to Susan Thomas'
car, with twelve-foot long 2 x 6 dimensional lumber. The lumber was going
to be stored on the trailer overnight at the Thomas home so that it could
be cut on a heavy-duty saw at the University of Maine, early the next
morning, for use at the playground.
16. The trailer was heavily loaded and some of the 2 x 6's were
extended beyond either the front or the rear of the trailer in order to
balance the load.
17. Prior to Ms. Thomas' driving away from the playground area with
the trailer in tow, Scott Thomas told her to go very slow and to go
straight home with the loaded trailer.
18. At approximately 8:50 p.m. on June 13, 1990, Patrolman Roger Gray
was standing in one of the doorways of the truck bay of the Orono Fire
Department and was talking with a group of people that included a fire-
fighter, two call firefighters, and a couple of other persons.
19. Patrolman Gray observed a black Saab convertible, with the top
down and towing a trailer, on Goodrich Avenue approaching the intersection
with Main Street, U.S. Route 2.
20. Although the traffic light controlling traffic approaching Main
Street on Goodrich Avenue was red, Patrolman Gray observed the car mentioned
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in the preceding paragraph enter the intersection at approximately 10 miles
per hour and turn left onto Main Street.
21. Patrolman Gray got into his police cruiser, caught up with the
black Saab, and pulled the car over on North Main Street, approximately
one-quarter mile from the Goodrich Avenue-Main Street intersection.
Throughout this time, the Saab was travelling at approximately 10 miles per
hour.
22. The Saab was being driven by Susan Thomas and the Thomas' 9-year-old
son, Michael, was riding in the right front passenger seat.
23. When Susan Thomas' car was stopped by Patrolman Gray, no registra-
tion plate was displayed on the trailer, the trailer had a rear light out,
and the load on the trailer was unsecured.
24. Patrolman Gray issued a court summons to Susan Thomas, charging
failure to stop for a red light in violation of 29 M.R.S.A. 947(3)(A).
25. When he returned home after a Town Council meeting on June 13,
1990, Susan Thomas told her husband that she had been stopped by a police
officer for passing a red light and that, based on something Michael Thomas
had said, she might not be guilty.
26. On the morning of June 14, 1990, in response to his dad's request
that he describe what he had seen, Michael Thomas said that he had been
looking up at the traffic light and he saw it turn red just as the car was
passing under it. This was the same thing Michael had told his mother
shortly after she received the traffic summons.
27. Scott Thomas began his day's work at the creative playground on
June 14 at 7:00 a.m. At some point during the morning, Mr. Thomas walked
over to the police department, met Captain Green and asked the latter
whether it was permissible to speak with Patrolman Gray about the traffic
summons. Captain Green said that Mr. Thomas should speak with the officer,
who was not on duty at that time, and Mr. Thomas asked the Captain to have
Patrolman Gray contact him when the officer came on duty.
28. The volunteers who worked on building the creative playground were
fed dinner in the truck bay of the fire station every evening of the week
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during which the construction occurred.
29. Patrolman Gray reported for duty at approximately 5:00 p.m. on
June 14, at which time Captain Green told him that Scott Thomas was working
at the playground and wanted to speak with the officer.
30. At that time, Patrolman Gray knew that Scott Thomas was a member
of the Town Council, having previously delivered a council agenda and other
municipal documents to Mr. Thomas' home.
31. Patrolman Gray proceded directly from the police station, located
downstairs from the fire station in the Orono Town Hall, to the creative
playground. Upon arriving at the playground, Patrolman Gray was told that
Mr. Thomas was having supper at the fire station.
32. At the fire station, Patrolman Gray saw Scott Thomas eating with
other people who had been working on the playground. Gray used the fire
department paging system to request that Mr. Thomas meet him in the
dispatch area.
33. Mr. Thomas walked over to the dispatch area, met Patrolman Gray
and said that he had some information that he wanted to relate concerning
the red light incident the previous evening. Thomas stated that he was
eating at that time and asked whether it would be convenient to talk later
or was the officer going out on patrol. Gray said that he was going on
patrol and the two men proceeded to an office alcove in the quarters area
of the fire station.
34. Mr. Thomas began the conversation by saying that he was not asking
the officer to "fix" the ticket and that he was not going to discuss the
matter with either the police chief or the town manager; however, he had
relevant information for the officer that might persuade him that the sum-
mons should not have been issued.
35. Mr. Thomas told the officer that, prior to Susan Thomas' departure
from the playground with the trailer the previous evening, he had urged his
wife to drive straight home and that, perhaps, she had misinterpreted his
statement as meaning that she should not stop for traffic control signals
on the way home.
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36. Mr. Thomas also stated that his wife and son had perceived the
attendant circumstances differently than had the officer and proceded to
relate the substance of Michael Thomas' observations concerning the traffic
light, as reported in paragraph 26 above.
37. Patrolman Gray stated that, in addition to the citation for
passing a red light, he could have issued summonses to Ms. Thomas for the
unregistered trailer, for having a rear light out on the trailer, and for
towing the trailer with an unsecured load. Mr. Thomas explained the size
and distribution of the load by outlining the facts reported in paragraphs
15 and 16 hereof. Second, the trailer was registered, although no
registration plate was displayed because the tailgate had been removed.
Third, the burnt out light was only one of several on the back of the
trailer and the issuance of a defect card, not a summons, would have been
an appropriate response. Patrolman Gray responded that, despite all of
these explanations, he could have issued a summons for each of the problems
noted in this paragraph.
38. Patrolman Gray then stated that, in addition to himself, there
were three witnesses who saw Susan Thomas pass the red light. Mr. Thomas
asked who the witnesses were and, upon being informed of their identities,
said "[i]sn't that convenient?"
39. Patrolman Gray then stated that, if Ms. Thomas didn't like the
charge, she could go to court. The conversation then proceded as follows:
Mr. Thomas: I realize that we can go to court--but you know and
I know that you know who I am, you know what my name is, you
know that I'm on the council. I know that there are--and we both
know that there are tensions between the town and the contract
employees and there's no contract and all that."
Patrolman Gray then leapt out of his chair and raised his voice,
stating: "Are you insinuating that I misused my power?"
Mr. Thomas: "Let me say this: it's not beyond the realm of
possibility."
Patrolman Gray: "Well, you better see my chief."
Mr. Thomas: "I am not going to see your chief. I am going to
see the District Attorney, Chris Almy."
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40. Patrolman Gray terminated the conversation and left the room and
the fire station.
41. Mr. Thomas did not attempt to have Patrolman Gray disciplined as a
result of the converstaion reported in paragraphs 34-40 above and the
officer has not been disciplined as a result thereof.
42. On August 16, 1990, Susan Thomas, acting through her attorney,
entered a plea of guilty to the charge of failing to stop for a red light
in the Maine District Court and paid the fine assessed for the infraction.
DISCUSSION
The first issue presented is whether Scott Thomas was a public
employer at the time that he uttered the statements that are the subject of
this case. The Board's prohibited practice jurisdiction is limited to pre-
venting public employers, their representatives and agents, public
employees, public employee organizations and their agents, members, and
bargaining agents from engaging in any of the conduct prohibited by 964
of the Act. 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(A) (1988). In determining whether an
individual charged with having committed a prohibited practice is a public
employer, the Board has held that public employer status exists if the
charged conduct " . . . arose out of and was performed [by the individual]
in the course of [his or her] official duties with the [public
employer] . . . . " Auburn Firefighters Ass'n. v. Valente, No. 87-19, slip
op. at 2, 10 NPER ME-18017 (Me.L.R.B. Sept. 11, 1987); Teamsters Local
Union No. 48 v. Eastport School Dept., No. 85-18, slip op. at 2, 8 NPER
ME-17003 (Me.L.R.B. Oct. 10, 1985); Pullen v. Town of Winthrop, No. 85-17,
slip op. at 2 and 8, 8 NPER ME-17002 (Me.L.R.B. Aug. 13, 1985).
At the outset, we note that the public employer is not liable for all
of the statements or actions of the persons who serve as its municipal
officials, officers, employees or agents, unless the relationship between
the conduct at issue and the individual's status with the public employer
described above is present. It was established at the hearing that it is
common and proper for a private citizen who has received a traffic summons
to discuss the citation with the issuing officer. A person who, for some
purposes, is a public employer does not forfeit the right to have a similar
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discussion merely by virtue of his/her employment. In the instant case,
the portion of conversation between Mr. Thomas and Patrolman Gray reported
in paragraphs 33 through 38 of our findings of fact is typical of such a
discussion. Had the conversation at issue been limited to these and simi-
lar matters concerning the circumstances of the red light incident and the
issuance of the citation, the event would have been a "purely personal mat-
ter" between Mr. Thomas and Patrolman Gray.
Scott Thomas changed the tenor of the conversation by explicitly
referring to his membership on the Town Council and by suggesting that
Officer Gray's motive in stopping Ms. Thomas and issuing her the citation
might be connected with the negotiations problems between the Town and
Officer Gray's bargaining agent. In collective bargaining, the Town
Council selects the chief management negotiator, determines the nego-
tiator's bargaining authority, and reviews, ratifies (or rejects) and funds
all final tentative agreements reached at the bargaining table. By men-
tioning his status as a Town Councillor and referring to the on-going
negotiations--a subject with which his sole connection is his council
membership--Mr. Thomas brought the conversation into the scope of his posi-
tion as a public employer, within the definition of 962(7) of the Act.
Second, the Employer has argued that Scott Thomas was not "acting on
behalf of" the Town of Orono at the time of the exchange at issue because
he " . . . did not receive prior approval or ratification of his actions."
Main brief on behalf of the Employer at 3. We rejected a similar averment
in an earlier case where we stated:
The District does not dispute the fact that the statements
were highly improper but instead urges in essence that the
Superintendent is solely responsible because the trustees were
unaware that he intended to make the statements and did not
authorize the making of such statements. This contention does
not absolve the District because it is responsible for statements
and actions of its agents and representatives made in the context
of employee relations matters. See, eg., Bridgton Federation of
Public Employees [v. Hamill, No. 81-54, slip op.] at 9 [, 4 NPER
20-13013 (Me.L.R.B. Nov. 19. 1981)] (Town is responsible for the
"personal opinions" of its Chief of Police and Road Commissioner.)
In addition, there is no evidence that the trustees made any effort
in front of the employees to repudiate [the Superintendent's] state-
ments clearly and unequivocally.
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Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v. Rumford/Mexico Sewerage District, No.
84-08, slip op. at 7, 6 NPER 20-15008 (Me.L.R.B. Mar. 12, 1984); accord,
Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v. Town of Bar Harbor, No. 82-35, slip op. at
12-13, 5 NPER 20-14004 (Me.L.R.B. Nov. 2, 1982). Both of these cases stand
for the proposition that a public employer can avoid being adjudicated of
being in violation of the Act, as a result of the conduct of a person with
apparent authority to act on the employer's behalf, by effectively disa-
vowing the individual's violative conduct and correcting any effects
flowing therefrom, promptly upon learning of such conduct. In the instant
case, Scott Thomas is a member of the Town's general legislative body, in
which all of the powers of the Town are vested, and, as we have held, the
statement at issue arose out of and was uttered within the scope of Mr.
Thomas' status as a public employer. At the latest, the Orono Town Council
learned of Mr. Thomas' statement when the Town was served with the instant
prohibited practice complaint. Although there was no evidence in the
record that the Council ever ratified the statement in contention, there
was no evidence that the Council ever repudiated or otherwise divorced
itself from Mr. Thomas' comments. In the circumstances, we conclude that
the Repondent Town of Orono is responsible for any prohibited practice
adjudicated as a result of the statement at issue.
Turning to the merits of the case, the Complainant has charged that
Mr. Thomas' statement that he was "going to see the District Attorney"
violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(A) (1988). The essence of the declaration at
issue is that Patrolman Gray may have misused his authority as a police
officer and that Mr. Thomas would seek prosecution of such alleged official
malfeasance. The officer's alleged transgression inherently involved union
activity because Mr. Thomas was suggesting that Patrolman Gray may have
been motivated by the on-going negotiations problems between the parties in
stopping Susan Thomas and issuing her the citation for passing a red light.
The standard that we apply in considering alleged violations of
964(1)(A) is as follows:
A finding of interference, restraint, or coercion does not turn
on the employer's motive or on whether the coercion succeeded or
failed, however, but is based on "whether the employer engaged in
conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with
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the free exercise of employee rights under the Act." NLRB v. Ford,
170 F.2d 735 738 (6th Cir. 1948); Teamsters Local 48 v. Town of
Oakland, MLRB No. 78-30 at 3 (Aug. 24, 1978).
Maine State Employees Ass'n v. State Development Office, No. 84-21, slip
op. at 8-9, 7 NPER 20-15017 (Me.L.R.B. July 6, 1984), aff'd, 499 A.2d 165
(Me. 1985).
Applying the above analysis, the fact that Patrolman Gray testified
that he felt intimidated as a result of Mr. Thomas' comments is not dispos-
itive herein. Neither is Patrolman Gray's apparent continued adherence to
the union nor his refusal to withdraw the traffic summons. Union mem-
bership and representation and participation in collective bargaining are
at the core of the rights protected by 963 of the Act. To a person in
Officer Gray's position, a natural and reasonable consequence of the con-
versation at issue would be to blame the threat of possible prosecution on
the continuing collective bargaining difficulties between the parties;
i.e., had it not been for the bargaining dispute, Mr. Thomas would not have
questioned Officer Gray's motive in issuing the summons and the threat
would not have been made. It can reasonably be said that Mr. Thomas'
statement tended to disparage the statutory right to engage in collective
bargaining and to discourage participation therein.
Second, in considering the reasonable likely impact of Mr. Thomas'
statement, we note the relationship between Mr. Thomas and Patrolman Gray.
The Board has recognized that public employees are economically dependent
on their employers and, because of that dependence, employees necessarily
tend "to pick up intended implications of [statements by their employers]
that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear." Maine
State Employees Association v. State of Maine, No. 82-01, slip op. at 5,
5 NPER 20-13020 (Me.L.R.B. Apr. 5, 1982), aff'd sub nom., State of Maine v.
Maine State Employees Association, No. CV-82-185 (Me.Super.Ct., Ken.Cty.,
Oct. 30, 1984). The Orono Town Council is the ultimate employer of all of
the Orono employees. A charge of official misconduct, directed to one of
the municipal employees by a member of the Council, carries with it a
threat to the employee's continued employment. Third, as Mr. Thomas'
testimony suggested, stories about the conversation were rampant among the
municipal employees; therefore, the negative impact thereof on the exercise
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of statutory rights was not limited to officer Gray. We hold that, in the
circumstances, Mr. Thomas' statement tended to interfere with Officer Gray's
exercise of the rights guaranteed by the Act and violated 26 M.R.S.A.
964(1)(A).
The Employer's final argument concerning the conversation at issue is
that Mr. Thomas' statement is protected by the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. The act of verbally protesting an arrest, including the use
of crude and vulgar language, is constitutionally protected speech. State
v. Janisczak, 579 A.2d 736, 739 (Me. 1990). It is undisputed that the
first amendment also protects the right of a citizen who has received a
traffic summons to discuss the matter with the issuing officer. While per-
sons do not forfeit their first amendment rights merely by virtue of being
public employers, The Teachers Association of S.A.D. No. 49 v. The Board of
Directors of M.S.A.D. No. 49, No. 80-49, slip op. at 6, 3 NPER 20-12005
(Me.L.R.B. Nov. 18, 1980), statements that violate 964(1)(A) of the Act
are not constitutionally protected. Id.; Council 74 AFSCME v. Bangor Water
District, No. 80-26, slip op. at 11, 3 NPER 20-12008 (Me.L.R.B. Dec. 22,
1980). The bulk of the discourse between Mr. Thomas and Officer Gray, as
described in paragraphs 33 through 38 of our findings of fact, is constitu-
tionally protected; however, the statement that violated 964(1)(A) was
beyond the protection of the first amendment.
The Complainant's second major contention was that the Employer's con-
duct violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(C) (1988). We have stated repeatedly
that this section of the Act prohibits the public employer from providing
" . . . too much financial or other support of, encouraging the formation
of, or actually participating in, the affairs of the union and thereby
potentially dominating it." Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v. City of Calais,
No. 80-29, slip op. at 5, 2 NPER 20-11018 (Me.L.R.B. May 13, 1980); Oxford
Hills Teachers Association v. M.S.A.D. No. 17 Board of Directors, No. 88-13,
slip op. at 45-46, 12 NPER ME-21000 (Me.L.R.B. June 16, 1989); Council 93,
AFSCME v. City of Portland, No. 90-14, slip op. at 15-16, 13 NPER ________
(Me.L.R.B. Oct. 18, 1990); Teamsters Local Union No. 340 v. Portland
Housing Authority, No. 90-13, slip op. at 9, 13 NPER __________ (Me.L.R.B.
Dec. 3, 1990). There was no evidence in support of the Union's averment;
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therefore, it is dismissed.
The Union's final charge was that the Employer failed to negotiate in
good faith, as required by 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C) (1988), in violation of
26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) (1988). While there are numerous ways in which to
violate the duty to negotiate in good faith, there was no evidence
suggesting any such violation in the record. The failure to bargain charge
is dismissed.
Having held that Mr. Thomas' statement violated 964(1)(A) of the
Act, we will fashion a remedy that will effectuate the policies of the Act.
In considering the appropriate remedy, we note that the violative statement
arose spontaneously as the conversation between Mr. Thomas and Officer Gray
became somewhat heated and said declaration was not part of any established
pattern of violative conduct by the Employer. In the circumstances, we
will order the Employer and specifically Council Member Scott Thomas to
cease and desist from groundlessly threatening bargaining unit employees
with possible criminal prosecution.
ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and discussion, and by
virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor Relations
Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5) (1988), it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. That the Town of Orono and specifically Council
Member Scott Thomas and their representatives and
agents shall cease and desist from groundlessly
threatening bargaining unit employees with possible
criminal prosecution.
2. That the Union's allegations of domination or
interference with the Union, in violation of
26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(C) (1988), and failure to
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negotiate in good faith, in violation of 26 M.R.S.A.
964(1)(E) (1988), are dismissed.
Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 31st day of January, 1991.
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
/s/__________________________
Peter T. Dawson
Chair
/s/__________________________
Thacher E. Turner
Employer Representative
/s/__________________________
George W. Lambertson
Employee Representative
The parties are advised of their right pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(F)
(1988) to seek review of this decision and order by the Superior Court, by
filing a complaint in accordance with Rule 80C of the Maine Rules of Civil
Procedure within 15 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
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