STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Case No. 87-19
Issued: September 11, 1987
________________________________________
)
AUBURN FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, )
LOCAL 797, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION )
OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, )
)
Complainant, )
)
v. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
PAULA A. VALENTE, Acting Manager of )
the City of Auburn, Maine, and the )
CITY OF AUBURN, a municipal corporation,)
)
Respondents. )
________________________________________)
The question presented in this prohibited practice case is
whether Paula A. Valente, Acting Manager of the City of Auburn, and
the City of Auburn (hereinafter referred to together as "Employer")
violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(A), (B), (C), (D) and (E) by unilater-
ally discontinuing the annual uniform allowance for the civilian
Auburn dispatchers employed at the Lewiston-Auburn 9-1-1 Center.
We hold that the Employer's action violated the Municipal Public
Employees Labor Relations Law ("Act"), 26 M.R.S.A. ch. 9-A (1974 &
Pamph. 1986). We will, therefore, fashion a remedy appropriate to
redress this violation and to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The prohibited practice complaint was filed on April 29, 1987,
pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(B) (Pamph. 1986) by the Auburn
Firefighters Association, Local 797, International Association of
Firefighters, AFL-CIO ("Union"). The Union's complaint charged that
the Employer's action violated the sections of the Act mentioned in
the preceding paragraph. The Employer filed its answer on May 13,
1987, denying that its action transgressed any provision of the Act,
alleging that its action was permitted by the impasse exception to the
unilateral change rule, and moving to dismiss the Union's complaint.
In lieu of the usual prehearing conference, counsel for the par-
ties met and reached agreement on a joint prehearing conference
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memorandum. Said memorandum was filed on June 11, 1987, and its con-
tents are incorporated herein by reference.
A hearing on the merits of the case was conducted by the Maine
Labor Relations Board ("Board"), Chairman Edward S. Godfrey presiding,
with Employer Representative Thacher E. Turner and Employee Represent-
ative George W. Lambertson, on June 16, 1987. The parties were given
full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce
documentary evidence, and to make argument. The parties filed
posthearing briefs, the last of which was received on July 16, 1987,
which were considered by the Board in reaching its decision.
JURISDICTION
The Complainant Auburn Firefighters Association, Local 797,
International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, is the certified
bargaining agent, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(2)
(1974), for a bargaining unit composed of the 9-1-1 Dispatchers
employed by the City of Auburn. The City of Auburn is the public
employer, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(7) (Pamph. 1986),
of the employees mentioned in the preceding sentence. At all times
relevant hereto, Paula A. Valente has been either the Assistant City
Manager or the Acting City Manager of the City of Auburn. Since the
act concerning Ms. Valente arose out of and was performed by her in
the course of her official duties with the City of Auburn, Ms. Valente
is a public employer, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(7)
(Pamph. 1986). The jurisdiction of the Board to hear this case and to
render a decision and order herein lies in 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5) (1974
& Pamph. 1986).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon review of the entire record, the Labor Relations Board
finds:
1. The Complainant Auburn Firefighters Association, Local 797,
International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, is the certified
bargaining agent, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(2)
(1974), for a bargaining unit composed of 9-1-1 Disoatchers employed
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by the City of Auburn.
2. The City of Auburn is the public employer, within the defini-
tion of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(7) (Pamph. 1986), of the employees mentioned
in the preceding paragraph.
3. At all times relevant hereto, Paula A. Valente has been
either the Assistant City Manager or the Acting City Manager of the
City of Auburn. The act of Ms. Valente, which is the subject of this
case, arose out of and was performed by her in the course of her offi-
cial duties with the City of Auburn; therefore, Ms. Valente is a
public employer, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(7) (Pamph.
1986), of the employees whose job classification is included in the
bargaining unit mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof.
4. During 1982, the Auburn 9-1-1 Dispatchers asked the City to
provide them with a uniform allowance to enable the purchase of work
uniforms.
5. The City acceded to the employees' request mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, with the understanding that the uniform allowance
was not merely additional compensation but was to be used only for the
purchase of uniforms.
6. On or about April 1 of each year from 1983 through 1986, on
the same date as the City pays a uniform allowance to each of its
organized firefighters, the City paid a uniform allowance to each of
the Auburn 9-1-1 Dispatchers.
7. Since receiving the uniform allowance in 1982, the
Dispatchers have always used all of the uniform allowance to purchase
uniforms which are virtually identical with those worn by the Auburn
Firefighters. These uniforms consist of a shirt, with a patch pro-
vided by the Auburn Fire Chief sewn thereon; a sweater; pants or a
skirt; a belt; socks; and shoes. Whenever additional patches were
required, they were provided without charge by the Auburn Fire Chief.
8. Although no written rule or regulation requires the
Dispatchers to wear uniforms to work, said employees have always done
so since first receiving the uniform allowance in 1982. Since the
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Dispatchers have always worn the uniforms for work, no opportunity has
arisen where an employee could have been disciplined for not wearing
the uniform.
9. Through a bargaining agent election conducted on
September 26, 1986, the Complainant Union became the certified
bargaining agent for the bargaining unit mentioned in paragraph 1
above.
10. In a letter to the City Manager of the City of Auburn dated
October 10, 1986, the Union sought to initiate negotiations for the
initial collective bargaining agreement for the bargaining unit noted
in paragraph 1.
11. At the first bargaining session between the parties, held on
November 19, 1986, ground rules for the negotiations were established.
12. At the second bargaining session, held on December 4, 1986,
the City presented the Union with a comprehensive written proposal for
a complete collective bargaining agreement for the Dispatchers
bargaining unit. The Union outlined its position that the current
collective bargaining agreement between the parties for the Auburn
Firefighters bargaining unit, with certain modifications to tailor
that instrument to the Dispatchers' job functions, should be adopted
for the Dispatchers bargaining unit.
13. The City's proposed bargaining agreement did not provide a
uniform allowance for the Dispatchers. The Union proposed to increase
the annual clothing allowance from $250 to $300.
14. A third bargaining session was held on December 9, 1986.
15. During the parties' fourth bargaining session, held on
February 3, 1987, the City presented a comprehensive proposed collec-
tive bargaining agreement to the Union. Other than correcting some
typographical errors, the City's proposal was identical with its pro-
posal mentioned in paragraph 12 above. At the same time and place,
the Union presented the City with a written proposal, memorializing
the position which it took at the second bargaining session, noted in
paragraph 12, supra.
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16. During their fifth bargaining session, on February 12, 1987,
the parties discussed their earlier proposals.
17. During the parties' sixth bargaining session, held on
February 18, 1987, the City presented a comprehensive proposed collec-
tive bargaining agreement to the Union. The only substantive changes
in this proposal, from those mentioned in paragraphs 12 and 15 hereof,
were a requirement in proposed article XI that grievants submit
grievances to the Union "within 3 days after the occurrence of the
incident precipitating the grievance" (no such temporal limitation
was included in the first two proposals) and a shortening of the
period of time during which individual grievants, the Union, and the
City could timely present grievances, from 30 days of actual or
reasonably constructive knowledge of the underlying event or, in any
case within 1 year of said event (as noted in the first two proposals)
to within 7 days of actual or reasonably constructive knowledge of the
underlying event giving rise to the grievance.
18. The parties' seventh and final bargaining session was held on
February 27, 1987.
19. Throughout the negotiations, the City consistently refused
to offer to pay any uniform allowance to the Dispatchers and the Union
steadfastly demanded that the Dispatchers receive an annual uniform
allowance of $300.00, payable in one lump sum during the first week of
April.
20. Both of the parties' proposed comprehensive collective
bargaining agreements contained articles which mirror provisions of
the Act; i.e., articles where the City recognized the Union as the
exclusive bargaining agent for the bargaining unit mentioned in
paragraph 1; articles where the City agrees not to discriminate
against, restrain, or coerce the employees as a result of the
employees' membership in the Union, holding Union office, or being a
member of the Union negotiating committee; and articles prohibiting
the employees from engaging in any work stoppage, slowdown, or strike.
21. The Union's sole written offer and the first two offers from
the City all contain proposed articles or portions of articles which
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are substantially identical. Essentially similar provisions suggested
by both parties were: the Recognition Article; the Management Rights
Article; sections 2 and 3 of the Union's proposed Dues Checkoff
Article; the Strikes and Slowdowns Article; section 1 of the Hours of
Work and Overtime Article; the Holidays Article, with the exception of
a "one time national holiday mandated by the President and observed by
other Auburn city departments" proposed by the Union; paragraph 3 of
the City's proposed Sick Leave Article; the Grievance Procedure
Article; section 1 of the City's proposed Leaves Article; the Duration
of the Contract Article (virtually identical language in both;
however, each uses different inception and expiration dates); and the
Inconsistent Rules, Regulations, and ordinances Article.
22. Although the Vacations Article suggested by the two parties
are different, both proposals provide for the same rate of vacation
time accrual for the first fifteen years of employee service.
23. Despite the fact that both parties proposed contract language
mirroring provisions of the Act and even though several of the
agreement articles proposed by both parties were substantially iden-
tical, the parties did not conclude a single tentative agreement
during the course of their negotiations.
24. On March 16, 1987, the Union unilaterally requested the
Executive Director of the Board to appoint a mediator to assist the
parties in their negotiations, pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 965(2)(B)
(Pamph.1986).
25. On or about April 1, 1987, on orders from Paula A. Valente,
the City discontinued the established practice of providing the
$250.00 annual uniform allowance to the Auburn 9-1-1 Dispatchers,
without having first negotiated an agreement permitting said change
with the Union.
26. Prior to the hearing on the merits of this case before the
Board, the City never notified the Dispatchers that they were not
required to wear their uniforms to work.
27. The negotiations between the parties, described in paragraphs
11-24 above, did not reach the point of bona fide impasse, within the
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meaning of the impasse exception to the unilateral change rule.
DISCUSSION
The obligation to bargain collectively created by 26 M.R.S.A.
965(1) (Pamph. 1986) and enforceable against the public employer and
the certified bargaining agent through 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) and
(2)(B) (1974), respectively, requires the parties to "negotiate in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, working conditions and
contract grievance arbitration." 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C).
Concomitant with the duty to negotiate is a prohibition against public
employers making unilateral changes in the mandatory subjects of
bargaining. We have outlined the rationale behind the unilateral
change rule, as well as the ambit of the prohibition, as follows:
Changes in the mandatory subjects of bargaining implemented
unilaterally by the public employer contravene the duty to
bargain created by 965(1) of the Act and violate 26
M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E). The rationale behind this principle
of labor law is that an employer's unilateral change in a
mandatory subject of bargaining "is a circumvention of the
duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of [the
Act] much as does a flat refusal" [to negotiate]. NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 1111, 8 L.Ed.2d 230
(1962); Lane v. Board of Directors of M.S.A.D. No. 8, 447
A.2d 806, 809-810 (Me. 1982). -
In order to constitute a violation of 964(1)(E),
three elements must be present. The public employer's
action must: (1) be unilateral, (2) be a change from a
well-establishled practice, and (3) involve one or more of
the mandatory subjects of bargaining. Bangor Fire Fighters
Association v. City of Bangor, MLRB No. 84-15, at 8 (Apr. 4,
1984). An employer's action is unilateral if it is taken
without prior notice to the bargaining agent of the
employees involved in order to afford said representatives
reasonable opportunity to demand negotiations on the con-
templated change. City of Bangor v. A.F.S.C.M.E., Council
74, 449 A.2d 1129, 1135 (Me. 1982).
Coulombe v. City of South Portland, MLRB No. 86-11, slip op. at 11-12
(Dec. 29, 1986)), 9 NPER ME-18008, citing Teamsters Local Union No.
48 v. Eastport School Department, MLRB No. 85-18, slip op. at 4
(Oct. 10, 1985), 8 NPER ME-17003.
All three elements necessary to establish an unlawful unilateral
change are present in this case. During the negotiations with the
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Union for a collective bargaining agreement for the Dispatchers' Unit,
the Employer consistently took the position that no uniform allowance
should be paid to the dispatchers. Despite espousing this posture at
the bargaining table, the Employer never notified the Union that it
intended to discontinue paying the uniform allowance when it became
payable during the first week of April. The Union's first notice of
the Employer's action was from its members, who were told that they
had to repay the erroneously-delivered stipend to the Employer.
Second, the Employer had regularly paid the uniform allowance to the
dispatchers on or about April 1 of each year since initiating the
practice in 1982; therefore, payment of the uniform allowance had
become an established practice which characterized the dispatchers'
employment relationship with the Employer. Third, we have previously
held that, in instances where employees are required to wear uniforms
to work, the furnishing of such uniforms "has a significant and
material relationship to wages" and, therefore, is a mandatory subject
of bargaining. Council 74, A.F.S.C.M.E. v. Ellsworth School
Committee, MLRB No. 81-41, slip op. at 14 (July 23, 1981), 4 NPER
20-12030. The Board's holding was based on the observation that "the
furnishing of clothing required by the job is a form of compensation,
or 'wages,' for labor or services" and "the employees receive a mone-
tary benefit if the employer provides the clothing," in lieu of the
employees' having to purchase the same at their own expense. Id.
Although it was unclear from the record whether the dispatchers were
required to wear the uniforms to work, the established past practice
was that, since 1982 when the Employer began providing the dispatchers
with funds earmarked for the purchase of uniforms, the dispatchers
always wore uniforms to work.
Although all of the elements required to establish an unlawful
unilateral change are present in this case, the Employer avers that
its action did not violate the duty to bargain because its conduct
came within the scope of one of the four recognized exceptions to the
unilateral change rule. We have noted those exceptions as follows:
We recognize, however that a public employer's unilat-
eral change in a mandatory subject of bargaining during
negotiations may be permissible, if consistent with offers
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made to the bargaining agent during negotiations, in four
very limited situations. In general terms, these four
exceptions to the rule against unilateral changes may occur
as follows: (1) when a bona fide impasse has been reached
between the negotiating parties, see, e.g., NLRB v. Inter-
coastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 954, 958 (5th Cir. 1961);
(2) when important business exigencies require immediate
managerial decision, see, e.g., Pasco County School Bd. v.
Florida Public Employees Relations Comm., 96 LRRM 3347,
3358-3359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (1977); (3) when the union
has waived its right to bargain about the unilateral change,
see, e.g., U.S. Lingerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 750, 751-752
(1968); and (4) when the unilateral change results from a
traditional practice which existed prior to the commencement
of negotiations, see, e.g., McCulloch Corp., 132 N.L.R.B.
201, 213-214 (1961).
Maine State Employees Ass'n v. State of Maine, MLRB No. 78-23, slip
op. at 4 (July 15, 1978), aff'd sub nom. State of Maine v. Maine Labor
Relations Bd., 413 A.2d 510 (Me. 1980), 2 NPER 20-11024; Teamsters
Local Union No. 48 v. Town of Livermore Falls, MLRB No. 80-22, slip
op. at 4 (Aug. 20, 1980), 2 NPER-20-11039. The Employer alleges that
the parties' negotiations had reached the point of impasse and that
its discontinuance of the uniform allowance was consistent with the
"last/best" offer which it made on that topic at the bargaining table.
If the Employer is successful in its contention, the unilateral
change at issue would not violate the statutory duty to bargain.
Westbrook Police Unit v. City of Westbrook, MLRB No. 81-53, slip op.
at 4-5 (Aug. 6, 1981), 4 NPER 20-12033. While the parties' nego-
tiations appeared to be stalled in that no agreement on any subject
other than on the bargaining ground rules was reached at the table,
the parties had not reached a bona fide impasse, within the meaning of
the impasse exception to the unilateral change rule. The words "bona
fide impasse" constitute a term of art which describes "a state of
facts in which the parties, despite the best of faith, are simply
deadlocked." Maine State Employees Ass'n v. State of Maine and Bureau
of Mental Retardation, MLRB No. 79-43, slip op. at 8 (Dec. 6, 1979)
(emphasis added), 2 NPER 20-11002; Sanford Fire Fighters Ass'n v.
Sanford Fire Comm'n, MLRB No. 79-62, slip op. at 8 (Dec. 5, 1979).
In order for a bona fide impasse to develop, the parties must first
satisfy the obligation created by 965(1)(C) of the Act that they
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"negotiate in good faith with respect to" the mandatory subjects of
bargaining. Both our Board and the National Labor Relations Board
examine the same factors to determine whether an impasse exists.
The relevant criteria are: "[t]he bargaining history, the good faith
of the parties in negotiations, the length of the negotiations, the
importance of the issue or issues as to which there is disagreement,
[and] the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state
of negotiations . . . ." Sanford Fire Fighters Ass'n, supra, at 8;
Saunders House v. N.L.R.B., 719 F.2d 683, 687 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984).
The determination of whether a genuine impasse exists is a mixed
question of fact and law "to which no mechanical definition can be
applied." Saunders House, supra, at 688. In the totality of the cir-
cumstances, we conclude that no bona fide impasse was reached in the
parties' negotiations. The bargaining outlined in our findings of
fact was the first round of negotiations between the parties for the
Dispatchers Bargaining Unit; therefore, the bargaining history factor
is not enlightening in this case.
We have outlined several factors to be applied in determining
whether the parties' level of participation in negotiations complied
with the statutory requirement that the parties bargain in good faith
over the mandatory subjects. 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C). Among such
indicators of good faith bargaining are whether the parties have: met
and negotiated at reasonable times, observed the negotiating ground
rules, offered counterproposals, made compromises, accepted the other
party's positions, explained and provided justification for their own
positions, reduced tentative agreements to writing, and participated
in the dispute resolution procedures. Waterville Teachers Ass'n v.
Waterville Bd. of Education, MLRB No. 82-11, slip op. at 4 (Feb. 4,
1982), 4 NPER 20-13011; Sanford HIghway Unit v. Town of Sanford, MLRB
No. 79-50, slip op. at 10-11 (Apr. 5, 1979), aff'd, 411 A.2d 1010 (Me.
1980). While the parties met seven times and exchanged original pro-
posals, neither party offered counterproposals, made compromises, or
accepted any of the other party's positions. Although 965(1)(C)
provides that the duty to negotiate in good faith does not require
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either party to make a concession on any specific issue or to adopt
any particular position, the parties are "obliged to make some reason-
able effort in some direction to compose [their] differences . . . .
if the [duty to bargain] is to be read as imposing any substantial
obligation at all. N.L.R.B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131,
135 (1st Cir. 1953) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
887 (1953); Sanford Highway Unit, MLRB No. 79-50, supra, at 10.
The parties' failure to reach any tentative agreement and thereby to
narrow their differences is particularly indicative of a lack of good
faith bargaining in this case because many of the contract articles
proposed by both parties were substantially identical. Furthermore,
the fact that both parties proposed nearly identical contract articles
echoing provisions of the Act and failed to reach tentative agreement
thereon is also evidence of bad faith bargaining. Reed & Prince,
supra, at 137; N.L.R.B. v. Hospitality Motor Inn Inc., 667 F.2d 562,
563 (6th. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982).
Third, the negotiations between the parties were relatively
short, both in the number of bargaining sessions and in the length of
the negotiations. The parties met only six times to discuss the
merits of the collective bargaining agreement and all of the sessions
were held within less than a three-month period--from December 4, 1986,
through February 27, 1987.
Fourth, the parties were not in accord that their negotiations
were hopelessly stalled and that no agreement was possible. The
Employer apparently believed that impasse had been reached prior to
its discontinuing the uniform allowance. On the other hand, the Union
had requested the intervention of a mediator, indicating that it felt
that agreement might be reached with the assistance of a third party.
In the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the par-
ties' negotiations had not reached a bona fide impasse. Although the
parties had not reached agreement on any issue, we believe that such
inability was due to their failure to satisfy the duty to negotiate in
good faith. The number of bargaining sessions and the parties' lack
of consensus on whether they were at impasse further support our
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holding. Since no bona fide impasse had been reached, the Employer's
unilateral discontinuance of the uniform allowance violated
965(1)(C) of the Act.
The Union further averred that the Employer's action violated 26
M.R.S.A. 964(1)(A) (1974). A public employer's conduct, "which, it
may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employee rights under the Act," is violative of this section.
Coulombe, supra, at 24; Maine State Employees Ass'n v. State Develop-
ment Office, MLRB No. 84-21, slip op. at 8-9 (July 6, 1984), 7 NPER
20-15017, aff'd, 499 A.2d 165, 169 (Me. 1985), 8 NPER ME-17000.
Unlawful unilateral changes not only violate the duty to bargain in
good faith but also tend to interfere with the employees' exercise of
the bargaining rights guaranteed by the Act. Coulombe, supra, at 25.
We hold, therefore, that the unlawful unilateral change at issue
violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(A).
Since we have concluded that the unilateral discontinuance of the
uniform allowance violated 964(1)(E) and (A) of the Act, we will
provide appropriate remedies necessary to effectuate the policies of
the Act. 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(C) (1974). In exercising our remedial
authority, we seek "a restoration of the situation, as nearly as
possible, to that which would have obtained" but for the commission of
the prohibited practice. Sanford Highway Unit, 411 A.2d, supra, at
1016. We will order the Employer to cease and desist from making any
unlawful unilateral change in the uniform allowance and, affirma-
tively, to make its 9-1-1 Dispatchers whole by providing each of them
with a uniform allowance in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty ($250.00)
Dollars.
We have reviewed the balance of the charges contained in the
Union's complaint and find them to be without merit. Said averments
are, therefore, dismissed.
ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and discussion and
by virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor
Relations Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5) (1974 &
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Pamph. 1986), it is hereby ORDERED:
That the Respondents, Paula A. Valente and the City of
Auburn, and their representatives and agents, shall:
(1) Cease and desist from making unlawful unilateral
changes in the wages, hours, or working conditions
of the employees in the Auburn 9-1-1 Dispatchers
Bargaining Unit.
(2) Pay the annual uniform allowance in the amount of
Two Hundred Fifty ($250.00) Dollars to each of the
Auburn 9-1-1 Dispatchers, within thirty (30) days
of the date of this Order.
(3) Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining,
or coercing the Auburn 9-1-1 Dispatchers in their
exercise of the rights guaranteed by the Act.
Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 11th day of September, 1987.
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
/s/____________________________________
The parties are advised of Edward S. Godfrey
their-right pursuant to 26 Chairman
M.R.S.A. 968(5)(P) (Pamph.
1986) to seek review of this
decision and order by the
Superior Court by filing a /s/____________________________________
complaint in accordance with Thacher E. Turner
Rule 80B of the Rules of Civil Employer Representative
Procedure within 15 days of
the date of this decision.
/s/____________________________________
George W. Lambertson
Employee Representative
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
ANDROSCOGGIN, SS. CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-87-407
CITY OF AUBURN, ET AL., )
)
Plaintiffs )
)
v. ) NOTICE OF DISMISSAL
)
AUBURN FIREFIGHTERS )
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 797, )
ET AL., )
)
Defendants )
NOW COMES Plaintiff, by and through its undersigned attorney,
and requests that this court dismiss the above-captioned case, as
the parties have agreed to a settlement.
Dated: October 21, 1987
/s/________________________________
George S. Issacson
Brann & Isaacson
P.O. Box 3070
Lewiston, ME 04240
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