STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Case No. 86-04 Issued: June 30, 1986 _______________________________ ) LEWISTON TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, ) ) Complainant, ) ) v. ) DECISION AND ORDER ) THE LEWISTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE, ) ) Respondent. ) _______________________________) On October 9, 1985, the Lewiston Teachers Association (Association) duly filed with the Maine Labor Relations Board (Board) a prohibited practice complaint alleging that the Lewiston School Committee (Committee) has refused to bargain with the Association as required by 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1) (Supp. 1985), in violation of 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) (1974). More specifically, the Association alleges that on May 15, 1985, and thereafter, the Committee refused to bargain over contract proposals tendered by the Association concerning the following: compensation for work in excess of seven hours per work day, compensation for each required preparation period in excess of three per day, compensation for greater than specified department head or athletic director daily instructional time, compensation for mandatory attendance at evening open houses, procedures for the reap- pointment of involuntarily transferred employees, stipends for itin- erant kindergarten teachers, payments for acquisition of teaching materials by involuntarily transferred employees, and the retention of previous contract language regarding academic freedom, employees' religious and political activities and the privacy of employees' per- sonal lives. The Association alleges that the Committee has consistently refused to bargain over a contract proposal concerning the timely designation of ultimate supervisors made on February 6, 1985. The Association also alleged that the Committee has consistently -1- refused to bargain a proposal concerning compensation for greater than specified general instructional time made by the Association on March 27, 1985, and that the Committee has consistently refused to bargain over a proposal concerning the qualifications of evaluators made by the Association on August 13, 1985. The Committee's November 1, 1985 answer and counterclaim admits, with the following specific exceptions, that the above-mentioned pro- posals, as set forth by the Association in its complaint, were offered by the Association on May 15, 1985. The Committee also states that it refused to bargain over these provisions, after impasse, claiming that they were not mandatory subjects for bargaining. The Committee answers by way of exception that its refusals to negotiate Association proposals concerning kindergarten stipends and reimbursement for materials acquisitions was inadvertent and that it has unconditionally offered to reopen negotiations regarding these two mandatorily nego- tiable proposals. The Committee also answers that the Association's proposal as set forth in the complaint with regard to compensation for general instructional time for teachers other than department heads or ath- letic directors was presented and refused consideration by the Committee on August 22, 1985. The Committee also avers that on August 13, 1985, it refused to negotiate the Association's proposal set forth in the complaint concerning the establishment of qualifica- tions for evaluators. The Committee contends that as of May 15, 1986, the Association's proposals concerning these two subjects were not mandatorily negotiable and that the Committee was not required to bargain over modified proposals concerning these issues made "on the eve of factfinding." The Committee counterclaims that, with the exception of proposals concerning itinerant kindergarten teachers and concerning materials acquisitions, the Association's insistence on the negotiation of each of the proposals above, past impasse and after the Committee requested that such proposals be withdrawn, constitutes a refusal to confer, negotiate and participate in fact-finding in good faith, and a prohib- ited practice within the meaning of 26 M..R.S.A. 964(B) [sic] (1974). -2- The Committee asks that the complaint be dismissed and that the Asso- ciation be ordered to "cease and desist from insisting upon bargaining with respect to proposals which are not mandatory and negotiable sub- jects for bargaining." On November 12, 1985, Alternate Chairman Donald W. Webber con- ducted a prehearing conference in this matter. The Prehearing Conference Memorandum and order issued by Alternative Chairman Webber on December 30, 1985, is incorporated in and made a part of this deci- sion and order. As a result of the parties' prehearing agreement, the following factual issues were submitted to the Board for resolution: 1. At the point of impasse, had the Association made known its willingness to consider alternative formulations to its initial proposal requiring limits on the amount of general instructional time? 2. What is the primary purpose of open houses in the Lewiston School System, and what was the history of these open houses with respect to mandatory teacher attendance and compensation? On January 8, 1986, the Board, consisting of Alternate Chairman William M. Houston, presiding, Thacher E. Turner, Employer Represent- ative, and George W. Lambertson, Employee Representative, conducted an evidentiary hearing concerning the issues framed by the complaint and response and narrowed by the Prehearing Conference Memorandum and Order. The parties were afforded full opportunity to appear, to pre- sent testimonial and documentary evidence, to cross-examine witnesses and to argue orally. Both parties filed initial and reply briefs, the last of which was filed March 27, 1986. The Board's final delibera- tions concerning the issues in the cause occurred on Wednesday, June 25, 1986. JURISDICTION We conclude that the Board has jurisdiction over this controversy pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(1974). The complaint and counter- claim allege violations of the obligations to bargain and to par- ticipate in fact-finding in good faith prescribed in 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C) and (E) (Supp. 1985), which violations are specifically pro- hibited by 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) and (2)(B) (1974). -3- FINDINGS OF FACT The parties were able to stipulate, to a considerable extent, the relevant facts underlying the controversy. Those factual stipulations have been substantially incorporated in the Board's findings of fact. Based upon the parties' stipulations and admissions, observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, the content of the testimonial and documentary evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom the Board makes the following findings of fact. The Association is the duly certified collective bargaining agent for a unit of certificated professional employees of the Lewiston School Committee within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(2) (1974). The Committee is the public employer of the employees in that bargain- ing unit within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(7) (Supp. 1985). The Committee and the Association were parties to a collective bargaining agreement in effect from about September 1, 1983, until August 31, 1985. Eight negotiation sessions were held in an attempt to negotiate a successor to that agreement commencing January 9, 1985 and ending on May 15, 1985. There is no indication in the record that the Committee requested that permissive subjects be removed from negotiations prior to impasse. At the parties' May 15, 1985 negotiating session the Associa- tion's Chief Negotiator, Mary Saltis, presented, among other pro- posals, the Association's proposal concerning limitations on instructional time. In discussion concerning that proposal Saltis informed the Committee that if the Committee desired to remove.the past contractual language containing limitations on general instruc- tional time, which to that point the Association had requested be retained, the Association desired to negotiate a formula for compen- sation of teachers forinstructional time exceeding specified amounts. After presentation of this alternative proposal the parties caucused. Thereafter, the Association made unspecified changes in some unspec- ified proposals. However, no exact formula for compensation regarding general instructional time was presented after the caucus. The par- -4- ties reached and declared impasse in negotiations later that evening.fn1 As of May 15, 1985, the Association's proposals included the following: [VIII.A.2.] Whenever the employee's workday exceeds seven hours, reimbursement for the excess shall be made at the rate of (yearly salary divided by 180 days divided by 7 hours) per hour. Thirty (30) minutes will be reimbursed as a whole hour. [VIII.B.2.] Whenever Junior and Senior High School teachers are assigned class loads requiring more than three (3) individual preparations at any one time, reimbursement shall be made according to the following formula: (number of preps in excess of 3 x (yearly salary/3) + yearly salary. Two (2) or more sections of any course (such as in academic biology and career biology; or French I: French speaking and French non-speaking; or college chemistry and vocational chemistry) shall constitute a single preparation not- withstanding the fact that the sections may not be working on the same assignments at any given time. [VIII.B.4.] Instructional time in the Junior and Senior High Schools shall not exceed 260 minutes per teacher, per day, with the exception of those involved in block schedule teaching assignments such as vocational instruction whose assignments shall not exceed 290 minutes per day per teacher. Instructional time in the Elementary Schools shall not exceed 300 minutes per-teacher, per day, such minutes to include appropriate subject areas according to the instructional schedule as promulgated from time to time by the School Committee. [If the Committee desires to remove these limitations the Association proposes a formula for compensation of teachers for instructional time exceeding specified amounts.] [VIII.B.5 & 6] Whenever a department head, or athletic director is assigned instructional time in excess of 4/5 of the instructional time of a regular teacher, reimbursement shall be made according to the following formula: (yearly salary + 1/5 yearly salary). [VIII.D.1.] Mandatory attendance at evening open houses shall be reimbursed according to the formula set forth in Section A.2. [XII.E.] The immediate supervisor responsible for eval- uations, scheduling, budget materials and/or other _______________ 1 In the absence of other evidence on point we have adopted the parties' stipulation that they reached impasse on May 15, 1985. -5- administrative policies for employees assigned to more than one building shall be designated by October 1 of each year by the Superintendent. If an employee is assigned to more than one school in a single day, that employee's assigned supervisor shall resolve any conflicts that may arise as to instructions to that employee by one or more of the Administrators of the schools involved. [XIV.D.] If the position the employee is leaving from should reopen prior to October 15 following the transfer, whenever or wherever the School Committee determines that it is practicable, the employee shall be offered a return to his original position. An itinerant kindergarten teacher shall receive an additional stipend of $500.00. [XIV.F.] A classroom teacher being involuntarily transferred to a different grade level, specialty or area of study in another department shall be-provided a maximum of $50.00 to acquire teaching materials for the new position. [XVI.E.] Employees shall be evaluated by the Superintendent and/or an Assistant Superintendent and/or a principal and/or personnel certified in school administra- tion and/or school supervision and/or combined certification in administration and supervision and/or department heads within their respective disciplines at Lewiston High School. [XXV.A.] The personal life of an employee is not an appropriate concern of the Committee except as it may directly prevent the employee from performing properly his assigned functions during the workday. [XXV.B.] Employees shall be entitled to full rights of citizenship, and no religious or political activities or any employee or lack thereof shall be grounds for any discipline or discrimination with respect to the professional employment of such employee, providing said activities do not violate any Local, State or Federal Law. [XXV.C.] The Committee and the Association agree that academic freedom is essential to the fulfillment of the pur- poses of the Lewiston School System, and they acknowledge the fundamental need to protect employees from any censorship or restraint which might interfere with their obligation to pursue truth in the performance of their professional func- tions. Accordingly, they agree as follows: (i) Employees shall be guaranteed full freedom in classroom presentations and discussion and may introduce politically, religiously or otherwise controversial material, provided only that said material is relevant to the course content, is presented in an objective manner and is presented with a balanced view. -6- (ii) In performing their professional functions, employees shall be guaranteed full freedom in expressing their personal opinions-on all mat- ters relevant to the course content, pro- vided, however, that they shall indicate that they are speaking personally and not on behalf of the school, its administration, or the Committee. The Association filed for mediation on May 28, 1985 and mediation sessions took place on June 19, June 27, August 13 and August 19, 1985. On June 28, 1985, the Association submitted a sufficient request for fact-finding which was received by the Board on July 1, 1985. Among the contract provisions identified in the request as issues in controversy were those contractual provisions to which the Association's proposals above pertained. On August 15, 1985, the Committee demanded "the Association withdraw all bargaining proposals which are not mandatory subjects for bargaining and that the Association cease and desist from any further insistence on bargaining with respect to any proposal which is not a mandatory subject for bargaining." The Association declined and pre- sented each of the proposals set forth above to the fact-finding panel. However, the Association modified its position on instruc- tional time by proposing to add the following: [VIII.B.4.] When increases to the above instructional time are made, the teacher shall be compensated at the per them rate divided by 28 (7 hours x 4 quarter hour) for each block of 15 minutes or fraction thereof. With regard to the qualifications of performance evaluators the Association offered to delete its prior proposal and to substitute the following: [XVI.E.] Employees shall be evaluated by personnel trained and certified in the evaluation and supervision of public school employees. A hearing was conducted on August 27 and 28 and a report of the fact- finding panel issued on August 29, 1985. At the fact-finding hearing, the Committee maintained its posi- tion that the proposals at issue set forth above were not mandatorily negotiable subjects for bargaining. The Committee declined to submit -7- these issues to the fact-finding panel and during the course of the fact-finding hearing, the Association acceded to the Committee's request that the fact-finders not rule upon such issues. The fact- finding panel took no action with respect to the latter issues, and the parties reached agreement on all other contract matters remaining in dispute. Subsequent to fact-finding, the parties agreed to conclude and execute a successor collective bargaining agreement, and executed a non-waiver agreement, preserving the right to litigate issues concerning the negotiability of the Association's proposals before the Board. On October 15, 1985, the Committee's counsel wrote to the Association acknowledging that an error had been made with respect to the Association's proposals regarding stipends for itinerant kinder- garten teachers and material acquisitions by involuntarily transferred employees. The Committee made an unconditional offer to reopen nego- tiations with respect to these two items. The Committee's offer of negotiation contained counter-proposals on both subjects. In a letter to the Committee dated October 23, 1985, the Association stated that it desired to reserve negotiation with respect to these two items until after the prohibited practice proceeding was completed. The Committee has not proposed to change the length of the school day, the amount of instructional time or traditional teacher loads. The Lewiston School System has had open houses for many years. In a recent grievance arbitration, the Association argued that provisions of the parties' collective bargaining agreement precluded the Superintendent or School Committee from prohibiting an elementary school teacher from using a certain book in teaching her class. The School Committee argued that the Association's cited contract provisions do not preclude such a prohibition. ______________ 2 The offer of negotiation appears to place the Committee at the Association's disposal with regard to resuming negotiations on these issues and does not constitute a demand to bargain within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(B) (Supp. 1985). -8- POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES The Association contends that its proposals regarding compen- sation for greater than specified daily work hours, compensation for greater than specified general and athletic director/department head instructional time and compensation for greater than specified class preparation periods, along with its proposals concerning compensation for attendance at mandatory open houses, stipends for itinerant kin- dergarten teachers and reimbursement for materials acquisitions by involuntarily transferred employees all constitute wage proposals addressing negotiable wage impact. Several previous contract provi- sions had the effect of limiting the Committee's prerogative with regard to various subjects clearly within the realm of educational policy. A number of the proposals made by the Association were made in anticipation of possible consequences of the Committee's decision to withdraw these provisions concerning permissive bargaining sub- jects. The Association admits that up to May 15, 1985, its proposals concerning general instructional time sought the retention of limits which the existing contract set on the amount of instructional time which could be required. The Association contends, however, that on May 15, 1985, in recognition of the Committee's prerogative concerning the ability to prescribe the amount of instructional time, it revised its proposal of limits to general instructional time and alternatively proposed a formula addressing additional compensation for instruc- tional time exceeding specified amounts. The Association also con- tends that although on May 15 it had proposed the retention of contract language specifically designating evaluators, its revised proposal at fact-finding merely required that evaluators selected by the Committee be trained and certified in the evaluation of public employees. The Association contends that although the mandatory open houses required by the Committee are general get-acquainted sessions for parents and staff, rather than forums for parent-teacher confer- ences, the Board need not resolve the nature of these open houses because the Association's open house proposals seek only compensation for open house attendance and not limits on the Committee's authority -9- to schedule open houses or require that they be attended. The Association contends that its proposal concerning the assignment of ultimate supervisors and its proposals concerning the qualifications of evaluators involve mandatorily negotiable working conditions and cause no substantial restraint on the City's preroga- tive to evaluate employees and assign supervisory personnel. The Association avers that its proposal requiring restoration of involun- tarily transferred employees creates merely a procedural right which places no substantive limits on the Committee's exercise of educa- tional policy. The Association contends that its proposals which restrict the Committee's disciplinary authority with regard to employees' lawful religious and political activity and with regard to aspects of employees' personal lives which do not interfere with proper job per- formance, concern mandatorily negotiable working conditions. The Association also contends that its proposals regarding academic freedom secure the alleged substantive constitutional rights to freely determine the teaching methods to be used in teaching any courses which the Committee has determined will be taught and where relevant to course content, to freely express personal opinions and to intro- duce politically, religiously or otherwise controversial material into the classroom. The Association also contends that its proposals concerning academic freedom create a procedural right which does not impinge on the Committee's educational-policy prerogatives. The Association concedes that the Committee is not required to complete negotiations concerning impact before implementing its educa- tional policy decisions but insists that, upon request, such nego- tiations must be initiated in advance of implementation. The Committee contends that with the exception of the Associa- tion's proposals concerning stipends for itinerant kindergarten teachers and payments for teaching materials for involuntarily trans- ferred teachers, the Association's proposals concern educational policy and are not mandatory collective bargaining subjects. The Committee contends that the Association's insistence upon bargaining nonmandatory subjects up to and beyond impasse constitutes a prohib- -10- ited practice. The Committee contends that the Association's propos- als concerning the impact of changes in the length of the work day, the impact of required attendance at open houses, and the impact of both decisions concerning instructional time and the assignment of teacher loads requiring more than three preparations are untimely because the Committee is under no duty to negotiate the impact of a change in educational policy unless and until such a change is imple- mented. The Committee contends that by insisting to impasse on nonman- datory proposals concerning the identity of evaluators and general teacher instructional time and by then later offering amendments to such proposals to make them mandatory, the Association has imper- missibly raised new issues after the point of impasse. The Committee also contends that the Association's proposal con- cerning open houses is not mandatory because the presence of parents at the school is sufficient to remove that portion of the working day from the area of collective bargaining. The Association's proposal concerning the designation of ultimate supervisors is contended by the Committee to unspecifiedly impinge upon the prerogative of the Committee to assign and direct its supervisors. The Committee objects that the Association's proposal concerning reappointment of involun- tary transfers would impermissibly subject the Committee's deter- mination in this regard to grievance arbitration. The Committee contends that the Association's proposal concerning personal privacy unlawfully limits the Committee's discipline, dismissal and nonrenewal decisions to a standard other than just cause and is, therefore, non- mandatory. Additionally, the Committee contends that this proposal is "invalid" because it is not limited to continuing contract teachers but applies to probationary teachers as well. The Committee contends that the Association's proposals con- cerning academic freedom improperly apply to probationary employees, contain a standard varying from just cause, and impinge upon the Committee's exclusive statutory authority to determine what subject matter teachers will teach and the methods and materials whereby it is taught. The Committee asserts that the Association's proposal con- -11- cerning employees' religious or political activities is nonmandatory for the same reasons which it has advanced regarding the Association's academic freedom and personal privacy proposals. Finally, the Committee admits that the Association's proposals concerning stipends for itinerant kindergarten teachers and concerning materials acquisitions by involuntarily transferred employees are man- datorily negotiable subjects which the Committee inadvertently refused to negotiate. DISCUSSION The record before the Board in this case contains little evidence with regard to the events which transpired in collective bargaining negotiations leading up to the parties' mutual declaration of impasse. We are therefore restrained in our ability to determine whether the totality of either party's conduct constitutes a refusal to bargain or bargaining in bad faith. We have therefore made no determination in this regard. With two very limited exceptions the record contains no indication of the extent to which the proposals at issue were modified prior to impasse, or whether other proposals or counterproposals may have been offered and rejected. The issues of negotiability of the proposals under consideration herein, therefore, are couched, with noted exception, in circumstances of steadfast Association insistence upon negotiation and equally steadfast Committee refusal to bargain. Owing to the posture of the case, resolution of the prohibited prac- tices charged appears similar in form to resolution of broad nego- tiability issues posited by way of requests for interpretive ruling. However, since we do not wish to encourage tne resolution of bargaining issues through prohibited practice complaint proceedings, we have accordingly limited our determinations of negotiability to the specific terms of the bargaining proposals under consideration. Impact The Board has consistently held that upon receipt of timely request therefor, the employer must negotiate the impact of the imple- mentation of educational policy upon the mandatory subjects of bargaining. See, e.g., Saco Valley Teachers Association v. M.S.A.D. -12- No. 6 Board of Directors, Nos. 85-07 and -09 Ne.L.R.B. Mar. 14, 1985); East Millinocket Teachers Association v. East Millinocket School Committee, No. 79-24 (Me.L.R.B. Apr. 9, 1974); Caribou Teachers Association v. Caribou School Department, No. 76-22 (Me.L.R.B. Nov. 10, 1976); Westbrook Teachers Association v. School Committee of the City of Westbrook, No. 74-17 (Me.L.R.B. Aug. 21, 1974). In Saco Valley we stated, at page 16, quoting Southern Aroostook Teachers Association v. Southern Aroostook Community School Committee, Nos. 80-35 and -40, slip op. at 18 (Me.L.R.B. Apr. 14, 1982), that: The duty to meet and consult does not include the require- ment that the employer wait until impact bargaining is completed before implementing changes in educational policy; once the duty to meet and consult has been satis- fied" the change can be implemented. See, e.g., M.S.A.D. No. 43 Teachers Association, [M.L.R.B. No. 79-43 (May 1, 1979)]. Were we to hold that the employer could not implement educational policy matters until after impact bargaining was completed, the practical effects of the duty to meet and consult and the duty to bargain would be indistinguishable. This would be contrary to the plain intent expressed in Section 965(1)(C) that the duty to meet and consult be subordinate to the duty to bargain. Contrary to the Committee's interpretation of this portion of our decision, it was not intended to stand for the proposition that timely requested impact bargaining need not be commenced until after implementation of the educational policy from which it arises. Although conclusion of timely requested bargaining concerning the impact of educational policies decisions is not generally required, absent extraordinary circumstances not present in the instant contro- versy an employer must commence timely requested collective bargaining regarding the impact of educational policies decisions prior to implementation and never later than 10 days after a timely and sufficient notice made pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 965(l)(B) (Supp. 1985).fn3 A prerequisite to the ability to request such impact _______________ 3 The employer is also required to bargain, upon request, over any new impact flowing from the implementation of educational policies decisions which was reasonably unforseeable prior to or at the imple- mentation of the educational policies decision. -13- bargaining is reasonable notice made to the bargaining agent of the intended determination of educational policies. Because notice of the intended determination of educational policies decisions is also required to enable the bargaining agent to request and the parties to complete "meet and consult" procedures concerning such decisions prior to their implementation, a bargaining agent will generally receive adequate impact notification simultaneously with the employer's noti- fication of the intended determination of educational policies. However, because the "meet and consult" and "mandatory impact" bargaining obligations are independent, circumstances constituting waiver of "meet and consult" notification will not automatically excuse the notification required to facilitate impact bargaining. In Saco Valley we determined that the school board had not refused to bargain by failing to negotiate the impact of a change in educational policy, more specifically the implementation of an after- school tutorial program, prior to implementing the policy. Our deci- sion and holding in that case was, however, based upon unique circum- stances, principal among which was the union's substantial delay in requesting negotiations. Although the union was aware of the develop- ment of educational policy in the spring and the proposed implemen- tation of the policy at the beginning of the subsequent school year, the union's demand to bargain the substance and impact of the imple- mentation of the policy was not made until the last week in September of the new school year. The Committee's reliance upon Saco Valley to excuse its refusal to bargain over anticipated impact was, therefore, misplaced. As is more fully set forth below we conclude that by refusing to negotiate such reasonably anticipated impact with regard to various compensation proposals land proposals concerning both sti- pends for kindergarten teachers and payments for acquisition of teaching materials by involuntarily transferred employees, the Committee has violated its obligation to bargain and has committed a prohibited practice within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) (1974). The Educational Policies Standard City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973) is the lodestar which the Board has used for more than a -14- decade in determining the applicability of the "educational policies" exemption where, as in the instant case, the exemption has been asserted by an employer to avoid negotiation over subjects sought to be negotiated by the collective bargaining agent of teachers. Elucidating the "exclusionary" standard of educational policies as it relates to the "inclusionary" collective bargaining standard of working conditions Justice Wernick, in pertinent part, stated: "[E]ducational policies" and "working conditions" may be reasonably conceived as categories defining areas with essential purity at the extremities but with inter- mediate zones of substantial intermixture. Thus, in the controversies between teachers and their public employers (currently prevalent throughout the country), even if some of the concrete items in dispute may be readily classifiable at the pure extremes of "policies" or "working conditions", it is undeniable that by far the major portion lie in the intermediate areas with sub- stantial intermixings. How, then, is exclusionary and inclusionary class- ification under the Maine statute rationally to proceed? Again, as already discussed (ante at p. 413), the key is found in ascertainment of the legislatively prescribed direction of emphasis by which particular features of one classification must be considered legislatively subordinated to factors of the opposed classification. The legislative language on its face sufficiently offers an answer for these purposes. The crucial words appear in Section 965, subd. 1, par. C. After first clarifying that the obligation to bargain includes the duty "To confer and negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, working conditions and contract grievance arbitration . . .", the statute immediately thereafter specifies, in parti- cular relationship to the public employers of teachers, the exception that "public employers of teachers shall meet and consult but not negotiate with respect to educational policies . . .." Had the legislature seen fit to end its recitation at this point, it might be held a reasonable conclusion that the concept of "educational policies" was legis- latively intended broadly to mandate continuance of the unilaterally exclusive powers of school boards to -15- "supervise" and "manage" the public schools--as such powers had been traditionally conferred by statute prior to the enactment of the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law; and that, therefore, any concrete item tending to impinge upon any area ordinarily con- ceived as "supervision" or "management" must be excluded as an appropriate subject of mandatory collective bar- gaining regardless of its concomitant relationships to the "working conditions" of teachers. It is of extreme significance, therefore, that in Section 965, subd. 1, par. C the legislature revealed that it was not content to leave the language as above set forth--thereby to open the door to the extreme "exclusive-management-prerogatives" interpretation above indicated. On the contrary, the legislature was careful, explicitly and definitively, to insert addi- tional language having strong tendency to show that "educational policies" was legislatively intended to be restrictively, not broadly, conceived--specifically that "for the purpose of this paragraph" the calculated meaning is that "educational policies shall not include wages, hours, working conditions or contract griev- ance arbitration." Such double emphasis by the legislature upon the overriding importance of the concept of "working con- ditions" in relation to the collective bargaining process,--first, that by affirmative definition teacher "working conditions" are explicitly included within mandatory collective bargaining and, second, that by negative exclusion "working conditions" are eliminated from the limitational effects of "educational policies"-- signifies, most clearly in my view, a legislative design that the general doctrine of "unilaterally exclusive managerial prerogatives" must not be permitted to operate as an instrumentality by which all practical substance may be scooped out of the concept of teacher "working conditions", to transform teacher collective bargaining-- in marked contradistinction to the collective bar- gaining of all other public employees--into a litany noble in sound but hollow in reality. More particularly, I interpret such double legis- lative emphasis upon the "working conditions" of teachers to mean that the legislature intended that teacher "working conditions" shall be bilaterally negotiable in collective bargaining and subject to binding arbitration (except for "salaries, pensions and insurance") notwith- standing that they touch upon one specific "managerial" function with which, as a practical matter the "working conditions" of teachers are almost invariably inter- -16- connected--i.e., the organization, supervision, direction and distribution of working personnel. Since decisions concerning almost every "working condition" of teachers will tend to encroach upon the "managerial" organization, supervision, direction or distribution of the working personnel, were this single facet of "managerial" functioning to be permitted to accomplish, under the category "educational policies", a per se automatic exclusion of teacher "working conditions" from the collective bargaining process, there would result precisely that emasculation of "working conditions" as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and of binding arbitration which, as above indicated, the legislature--by its specially reiterated emphasis upon "working conditions"--must reasonably be interpreted to have sought to prevent. Thus, (1) negatively, not only must impact upon the organization, supervision, direction and distribution of personnel be held insufficient, per se, to exclude items related to teacher "working conditions" as proper matters of collective bargaining and binding arbitration but also, (2) affirmatively, the reasonably manifest legislative intention must be held to be that other contacts of such items with other functions generally cognizable as "managerial" and "policy-making" can subordinate the "working conditions" features, and accomplish an exclu- sion from negotiability and binding arbitration, only if, on balance, their quantitative number or qualitative importance, or both, are found significantly substantial to override the prima facie eligibility for collective bargaining and binding arbitration established by the presence of reasonable relationships to "working conditions." City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association, 304 A.2d 387, 418-420 (Me. 1973). We shall now apply this standard to the proposals in the instant case to determine whether the Committee's refusals to bargain were permitted under the rubric of the "educational policies" exclusion. Compensation and Payment Issues We have carefully examined those portions of the record which concern the issue of whether the Association informed the Committee, prior to impasse, of its desire to negotiate a compensation formula in the event the Committee refused to maintain contractual language concerning the nonmandatory subject of limitations on general instruc- tional time. We conclude that the Association's proposals regarding the negotiation of issues of general instructional time were made in -17- the alternative prior to impasse. We credit the testimony of the Association's chief negotiator and secretary that the prosposal in the alternative was orally made in negotiations on May 15, 1985. The evidence establishes that the Association's working copy of its contract proposals contains nota- tions made prior to the negotiation sessions, suggesting negotiation of a compensation formula in the event of the Committee's rejection of the contract's present language. Although the Association's secre- tary's notes contain no express record of the chief negotiator's oral modification of the Association's original position, the testimony of the secretary established that a copy of the modified draft proposal was already in her possession at the negotiations, that the comments of the Association's chief negotiator concerning the alternative pro- posals did not vary from that copy and that the secretary would have recorded only variations from the modified draft's proposals. The Association's alternative proposal regarding compensation for general instructional time is similar in effect to several of the Association's other proposals suggesting compensation schemes regarding permissive contractual subjects requested to be deleted from the contract by the Committee. Moreover, it is identical in effect to the Association's proposals regarding compensation for greater than specified instructional times for department heads and athletic directors. In light of these facts, we conclude that the proposal regarding general instructional time was made in the alternative prior to impasse. The record does not establish that the Association con- ditioned its consent to bargain over any mandatory subject sought to be bargained by the Committee, on the Committee's consent to negotiate the nonmandatory subject of limitations on general instructional time. On the contrary, we conclude that the manner of the making of the Association's alternative proposals constitutes a reasonable effort by the Association to determine whether the Committee desired to avoid negotiations concerning a compensation formula by agreeing to maintain contractual language concerning the permissibly negotiable subject of limits on instructional time. -18- Finally, we note that the parties' stipulation appears to establish that the Association's general instructional time proposal, as presented to the fact-finding panel, contained the original language setting forth limitations, as well as added language spe- cifying the method of compensation for excess amounts of instructional time. Although inartfully phrased, the modified proposal as a whole cannot be construed to impose a limit on the amount of instructional time which the Committee may require of employees. We conclude that the Association's proposals concerning compen- sation for work in excess of seven hours per work day, compensation for each required preparation period in excess of three preparation periods per day, compensation for greater than specified general teacher and department head/athletic director instructional times, compensation for mandatory attendance at evening open houses and sti- pends for itinerant kindergarten teachers are all pure wage issues. These proposals address wages alone and do not require the Committee to bargain over its educational policy prerogative to unilaterally determine, after satisfying any obligation to meet and consult, the length of the teachers' work days; the numbers of preparation periods, if any, which may be allowed or required of teachers; the amount of instructional time which may be required of regular teachers, depart- ment heads or athletic directors; the existence of or frequency of evening open houses, or whether teacher attendance thereat may be man- datorily required; whether kindergarten teachers may be employed or be required to travel from place to place; or whether the Committee may involuntarily transfer an employee. We conclude that these proposals lie at the extreme "working con- ditions" end of the educational policies standard set forth above. Although agreement to these proposals may impinge on educational poli- cies decisions in other areas, the requirement that teachers' working conditions be negotiated would be meaningless were we to allow educa- tional employers to avoid negotiation on the basis of this spectre. It should be noted that agreement to such proposals is not required by the Municipal Act and, to the extent that these proposals concern salary, they may not be imposed through binding arbitration. -19- Finally, we conclude that it may not reasonably be disputed that limited payments to teachers, for the acquisition of teaching materials, constitutes a working condition. we have not been apprised of any fundamental Committee interest which would operate to exclude this subject on educational policy grounds. Therefore, given the Committee's admission of bargainability, we find the Association's proposal in this regard to be mandatorily negotiable. Designation of Supervisors We now turn to the determination of the negotiability of the spe- cific Association proposal regarding the assignment or designation of supervisors. An Association proposal that the Commit@ee negotiate regarding a method whereby employees may be apprised of the Committee's expectations concerning the resolution of competing or contradictory supervisory demands certainly addresses a negotiable working condition. While it clearly is educational policy as to whom the committee designates as its supervisors and administrators, it, nevertheless, is within the employee's working conditions for him to know to whom he is responsible. Thus, employees may generally request to bargain over a method whereby they may be informed of the identity of their supervisors but they may not insist that they be allowed to participate in the process of the identification or selection of those supervisors by the Committee. The specific proposal in issue in this case goes beyond this to require negotiation over matters affecting educational policies. The Association's proposal, taken as a whole, has the impermissible second- ary effect of requiring the Committee to designate only one super- visor, of demanding that the Committee concentrate all management functions concerning each employee in that supervisor, and of limiting the reconciliation of competing requirements for employee performance to an immediate supervisor and no other. Moreover, the proposal has the effect of restricting the Committee's ability to invest ultimate supervisory authority over each of its employees on a less than yearly basis. The record contains no evidence of an attempt by the Associa- tion to bargain anything less than the entire proposal in this regard. -20- Because we are unable to isolate any discrete aspect of the pro- posals as stated, in which teacher interests in working conditions are not outweighed by the implicated educational policy considerations, we find that the Committee's refusal to bargain this proposal does not constitute a prohibited practice.fn4 Religious, Political and Academic Freedom and Right to Privagy For reasons similar to those discussed above regarding the Association's proposal concerning designation of ultimate supervisors, we conclude that the Committee has not committed a prohibited practice by refusing to negotiate the Association's specific proposals con- cerning personal privacy, concerning rights of citizenship, religious and political activities, and concerning academic freedom. Each of the Association's proposals regarding these three areas addresses both negotiable working conditions and non-mandatory educational policies. However, the specific provisions of these proposals have defied our considered attempts to classify any portions thereof as discrete, severable and mandatorily negotiable. We shall now discuss, seriatim, each of these three proposals. Employees are obviously not required to abandon their right to personal privacy when they pass through the schoolhouse door. It follows, therefore, that an Association proposal seeking the Committee's agreement that the Committee will not require waiver of these rights as conditions of employment would be mandatorily nego- tiable as a working condition. However, we are loath to conclude, as is apparently required by the specific wording of the Association's proposal, that all aspects of a teacher's life which do not "directly prevent the employee from performing properly his assigned function during the workday" are outside the proper concern of the Committee. For example, it is conceivable that such a provision would condone a teacher's inability to complete job-related functions customarily per- formed by teachers at times other than during the workday such as _______________ 4 In so ruling we are cognizant of the requirements set forth by the Superior Court in M.S.A.D. No. 43 v. M.S.A.D. No. 43 Board of Directors, No. CV-79-541 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty, July 8, 1980). -21- grading papers, preparing lesson plans, or attending continuing educa- tion courses. Furthermore, there may be other activities or con- ditions inherent in certain teacher's private lives which affect their fitness to teach. Persons who have admitted or who have committed various drug or sexual offenses may well be considered unfit to teach by the Committee, although in a purely functional sense they may be capable of adequately performing their teaching functions during the workday. Similarly, an Association proposal requesting the Committee's agreement not to require surrender of religious or political rights as a condition of employment would be nvandatorily negotiable as a working condition. However, we conclude that the Committee is not required to relinquish totally its authority to regulate the conduct of teachers in the presence of students at school merely because such conduct could be characterized as political or religious. The contours of the academic freedom aspect of the right of free speech guaranteed by both the United States and Maine constitutions, see Solmitz v. Maine School Administrative District No. 59, 495 A.2d 812, 816 n.2 (me. 1985), have been widely debated. See, e.g., Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293 (1976); Hunter, Curriculum Pedagogy, and The Constitutional Rights of Teachers in Secondary Schools, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (1983); McCann, School Board Authority and The First Amendment Rights: The View After Board of Education, Island Trees v. Pico, 18 Akron. L. Rev. 283 (1984); Schauer, School Books, Lesson Plans and The Constitution, 78 W. Va. L. Rev. 287 (1976); Developments in the Law, Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045 (1968). It is not the role of this Board to determine constitutional issues such as whether the contours of academic freedom in the context of university education, see Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), and in the context of secondary education, see Solmitz v. Maine School Administrative District No. 59, 495 A.2d 812 (Me. 1985), are the same with regard to kindergarten and elementary school students. See -22- generally Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students In The Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model of Analysis, 12 Hastings Const. L. Q. 1, 14-17 (1984) (pointing out the widely accepted "inculcative" role of teaching in elementary education as opposed to the concept of the "market of ideas" generally accepted concerning higher education, pointing out the captive nature of the elementary audience, the lower capacity for skepticism and idea screening of elementary students and the differences in qualifications required of the teachers in elementary as opposed to university education). It is sufficient for the resolution of the negotiability issue before us to note that whatever the contours of such academic freedom rights and regardless of whether the specific Association proposals at issue herein are otherwise coextensive therewith, the Association's proposals admit of no authority in the Committee to avoid any "disruption of educational activities," which may result from the exercise of the academic freedom rights purported to be secured therein. See Solmitz v. Maine School Administrative District No. 59, 495 A.2d 812, 817 (Me. 1985). Because the Association's proposal requires surrender of this aspect of the Committee's educational poli- cies discretion, it is non-mandatory. As was the case with the Association's proposal regarding designation of ultimate supervisors, the record contains no evidence of an attempt by the Association to bargain anything less than the entirety of each of the three proposals discussed next-above. Similarly, because we are unable to isolate any discrete aspect of these proposals in which teacher interests in working conditions are not outweighed by implicated considerations of educational policy, we find no violation by the Committee. Reappointment of Involuntarily Transferred Employees Although the record is unclear and the express wording of the proposals does not so specify, the Association states in its brief that its proposal concerning reappointment applies only to involun- tarily transferred employees. Upon consideration of the provisions of -23- this proposal we conclude that it is not mandatorily negotiable. It cannot be argued that procedural rights concerning preference in reap- pointment to a previously held position fall initially within the definition of interests affecting working conditions within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C) (Supp. 1985). However, we conclude that the Association's specific proposal in this regard goes far beyond procedure. We reach this conclusion based upon the Association's use of the word "practicable" in its proposal. In common understanding the word "practicable" means "that [which] can be done or put into practice; feasible." Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (1974). Thus, the use of the word practicable in the Association's proposal appears to attempt to vest a near alsolute right of reappointment. We conclude that the provisions of the proposal in question create more than a procedural right concerning reappointment as is suggested by the Association. The proposal's specific provisions improperly subject the Committee's decisions with regard to both hiring and the lateral transfer of teachers to independent assessment of "practicability" by contractual arbitrators. We therefore conclude that the Association's insistence upon negotiating this provision constitutes a demand that the Committee negotiate matters concerning interests affecting employee working conditions which are overwhelmed and submerged by overriding employer interests fundamental to the setting of standards of educa- tional services. We therefore conclude that the Committee was not required to negotiate this proposal. The Identity or Qualifications of Evaluators In its present form, the Association's proposal is not a man- datory subject of bargaining. It intrudes into areas of educational policy since it attempts to identify and define who shall be the eval- uators. This issue along with the qualifications of those evaluators must remain a prerogative of the Committee. This Board has determined'that such matters as the frequency and form of evaluations, Caribou School Department v. Caribou Teachers Association, No. 76-15 (Me.L.R.B. Jan. 19, 1977), are matters of -24- educational policy and not mandatory subjects of bargaining. Conversely, we have found that there is an obligation to bargain the impact of the implementation of new evaluation programs. Saco Valley Teachers Association v. M.S.A.D. No. 6 Board of Directors, No. 79-56 (Me.L.R.B. Aug. 9, 1979). In M.S.A.D. No. 43 v. M.S.A.D. No. 43 Teachers Association, No. 79-36 (Me.L.R.B. Mar. 18, 1981) we deter- mined that a proposal that each teacher will receive a copy of the evaluation criteria and form at the beginning of the school year is a mandatory subject of bargaining. So, too, do we determine that it is a mandatory subject of bargaining for teachers to be informed of the identity of their evaluators. As was the case in M.S.A.D. No. 43, the proposal "is sufficiently related to working conditions to be a man- datory subject of bargaining." Just as was the case therein that teachers should "receive early notice of the criteria by.which he or she will be evaluated," in this case it is an appropriate subject of bargaining that teachers might know the identity of the individual or individuals who will be evaluating them. This is not to say that those individuals must be identified by name or that circumstances might change during the school year to require a change in the eval- uation; however, the teachers should know the identity of the eval- uator at least by position, should there be a demand on the part of the Association or the Committee to negotiate such a proposal. Conversely, the Association is barred, as a matter of educational policy, from bargaining the identity of the evaluators with the Committee. While the functions of an evaluator involve such important employment decisions as those concerning promotion, transfer, assign- ment, discipline, dismissal and non-renewal, on balance, the respon- sibility of the Committee for the effective implementation of the educational program and its quality shifts the matter of designating the evaluators into the educational policy arena. Both the naming of evaluators and determining what qualifications they must have must be reserved to the Committee as a matter of educational policy. The selection and designation of the Committee's evaluators is inextricably intertwined with the substance and quality of the eval- uative product. The evaluative function is of such "qualitative importance," per the words of Biddeford, that we find that the iden- -25- tification of the evaluators must be reserved to the Committee as a matter of educational policy. The performance evaluation is the most fundamental supervisory assessment tool by which the Committee may tailor teaching to meet its established standards and respond to the needs of the public relative to the quality of its educational prod- uct. We therefore conclude that the Committee's interest in the suitability of the educational product rendered by each of its teachers predominates over the interest of the employees in deter- mining the identity and qualifications of the evaluators selected by the public employer. Since the evaluator selection and designation (not to be confused with conveying of the identity of the evaluators once so named) and their qualifications are so closely and fundamen- taly related to considerations of educational policy, subjecting these matters to mandatory negotiation would hamper both the evaluative pro- cess and the latitude reserved to the Committee under the educational policy exclusion of the Muncipal Employees Labor Relations Act. CONCLUSION The parties participated in some unspecified mediation procedures on June 19, June 27 and August 13, 1985. However, because the record is indefinite concerning the nature of the parties' dealings after May 15, 1985, we conclude that the next concrete step in the nego- tiations with regard to which the parties' positions may be accurately characterized is the Committee's demand to delete nonmandatory sub- jects made on August 15, 1985. It is clear that refusing to remove, after demand, non-negotiable items from the bargaining table consti- tutes a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith required by 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C) (Supp. 1985), in violation of 26 M.R.S.A. 964(2)(B) (1974). Caribou School Department v. Caribou Teachers Association, No. 76-15 (Me.L.R.B. Jan. 19, 1977). It is also clear that such a demand to remove permissive subjects may be made at any time prior to fact-finding. See M.S.A.D. No. 22 Non-Teachers Association v. M.S.A.D. No. 22 Board of Directors, No. 79-32, slip op. at 8 n.6 (Me.L.R.B. Jul. 30, 1979). The Committee has refused to submit to fact-finding a number of issues which we have concluded to be mandatory subjects of bargaining. -26- Additionally, the Association has refused to remove from collective bargaining negotiations at the point of fact-finding a number of issues which clearly fall within the definition of educational poli- cies. We shall therefore order the Committee to, upon request, com- mence bargaining over those proposals determined negotiable herein and order the Association to cease and desist from insisting on the nego- tiation of non-mandatory subjects. Because it is reasonable to conclude that the parties were essentially in pari delecto with regard to the impasse in negotiations herein neither posting or any other remedial measure shall be ordered. ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and discussion and by virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor Relations Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5),(C) (1974), it is ORDERED: 1. That the Lewiston School Committee, its representatives and agents: a) Cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with the Lewiston Teachers Association in violation of 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) (1974). b) Upon request, bargain in good faith with the Lewiston Teachers Association over the Association's collective bargaining proposals discussed herein which concern: 1. compensation for work in excess of seven hours per work day. 2. compensation for preparation periods in excess of three per day. 3. compensation for the instructional time of department heads or athletic directors which exceeds 4/5 of the instructional time of regular teachers. 4. compensation for mandatory attendance at evening open houses. 5. stipends for itinerant kindergarten teachers. 6. payments for the acquisition of teaching materials by involuntarily transferred teachers. -27- 7. compensation for greater than specified general instructional time. c) Upon request bargain with the Lewiston Teachers Association over conveying the identity of evaluators by name or position to the Association and/or individual teachers. 2. That the Lewiston Teachers Association cease and desist from demanding to negotiate, in violation of 26 M.R.S.A. 964(2)(B) (1974), over its non-mandatory collective bargaining proposals concerning the selection or qualifications of performance eval- uators, reappointment of involuntarily transferred employees, the appointment of ultimate supervisors and the retention of previous contract language herein concerning academic freedom, employees' religious and political activities and personal privacy. 3. That all other allegations of Prohibited Practices by the parties, alleged in the Association's complaint and the Committee's Response herein, which are not specifically addressed in paragraphs one and two above be and hereby are DISMISSED. Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 30th day of June, 1986. MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The parties are advised of their right pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(F) (Supp. 1985) to seek review /s/_______________________________ of this decision and order William M. Houston by the Superior Court by Alternate Chairman filing a complaint in accordance with Rule 80B of the Rules of Civil Procedure within 15 days /s/_______________________________ of the date of this Thacher E. Turner decision. Employer Representative /s/_______________________________ George W. Lambertson Employee Representative -28-