MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Case No. 06-24
Issued: June 1, 2007
AFSCME, COUNCIL 93, AFL-CIO,
Complainant,
v.
LINCOLN COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, LINCOLN COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, and LINCOLN
COUNTY'S AGENT,
Respondent.
DECISION AND ORDER
AFSCME, Council 93, AFL-CIO (the "Union") filed this prohibited practice complaint with the Board alleging that the Lincoln County Commissioners, the Lincoln County Sheriff's Department and Lincoln County's Agent (the "Employer") violated the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law (the "Act") by directly dealing with an employee regarding his pay and benefits. The Union's complaint alleges that this conduct violated section 964(1)(A) and (E) of the Act. The Employer argues that its conduct was not a violation of the law. The Union filed the complaint on June 6, 2006, and the Employer filed its response on June 29, 2006. The prehearing conference on January 5, 2007, included Peter T. Dawson, Esq., the presiding officer; Erin Goodwin, Esq., representing AFSCME; and Ms. Annalee Rosenblatt representing Lincoln County. The parties agreed to a number of stipulations at the prehearing conference. At the evidentiary hearing on January 25, 2007, the parties were able to examine and cross-examine witnesses and to offer documentary evidence. Chair Peter Dawson presided at the hearing, with Employer Representative Karl Dornish, Jr., and Employee Representative Wayne Whitney serving as the other two [end of page 1] Board members. The parties agreed to file simultaneous briefs which were received by February 28, 2007. The Board deliberated this matter on March 16, 2007. JURISDICTION Lincoln County is a public employer within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(7) and AFSCME is a bargaining agent within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(2) at all times relevant to this complaint. The jurisdiction of the Board to render a decision and order lies in 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5). STIPULATIONS 1. AFSCME is the bargaining agent, within the meaning of section 6 of Title 26 M.R.S.A. 962 (1988), for certain employees of the Respondent. 2. On or about December 29, 2005, Sheriff Todd Brackett called bargaining unit member Mike Murphy into a meeting in the County Commissioners' Office. 3. Mike Murphy is a member of the bargaining unit represented as described at paragraph 1. 4. Present at this meeting were County Commissioners Bond, Blodgett and Honey as well as Sheriff Brackett and Annalee Rosenblatt. 5. No representative was present from AFSCME. 6. During this meeting, Murphy was offered the position of "Acting Special Services Supervisor." 7. Commissioner Honey questioned why Murphy wished to remain in the Unit as he was given "a written assurance of job security." FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The collective bargaining agreement between the Lincoln County Commissioners and Council 93, AFSCME for the period [end of page 2] of January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2005, contains a recognition clause which describes the bargaining unit as including: "all Sheriff Department employees in the classifications of full-time lieutenants, sergeants, corporals, deputy sheriffs and corrections officers." 2. At the Lincoln County Commissioner's meeting of February 1, 2005, Sheriff Todd Brackett requested that the position of jail administrator be changed to a rank of lieutenant rather than the rank of captain. Two changes prompted this request: The then-current jail administrator was planning to retire and the county jail was scheduled to close sometime during 2006, as soon as the new joint Lincoln County/Sagadahoc County jail opened. As a lieutenant, the new position would be in the bargaining unit, which Sheriff Brackett thought would provide a greater sense of job security to prospective applicants for a position with an uncertain future. Once the regional jail opened, there would be no need for a jail administrator like the one that had existed before the closing. Little was known about what would happen to the jail budget once the jail closed, and the jail administrator's salary had traditionally been housed in the jail budget. After considering the matter, the Commissioners voted to approve the Sheriff's request to change the jail administrator position to a lieutenant. 3. On February 7, 2005, Sheriff Brackett posted a promotional notice for the new lieutenant position called "Special Services Supervisor." The posting indicated that the position was formerly known as "Jail Administrator." The posting included an application deadline and tentative dates for further steps in the interview process. 4. Four applicants applied for the position, all of whom were bargaining unit members. All four were given an oral board and the top three candidates had an interview with the [end of page 3] Deputy Chief. It is not clear from the record when these steps were completed, but the process was well underway by the end of March, 2005. 5. At the County Commissioners' meeting of April 5, 2005, the Commissioners went into executive session to discuss the new position. Also present were Sheriff Brackett and the County's labor relations consultant, Annalee Rosenblatt. Based on the consultant's advice, the Commissioners decided they no longer wanted the new special services supervisor position to be in the bargaining unit. The Commissioners wanted the rank to be a captain, and not in the bargaining unit, while the Sheriff wanted it to be in the unit with the rank of lieutenant. There was a heated discussion on this issue, as the Sheriff was not happy that the status was being changed after the interview process was underway. He also thought it would be difficult to fill a position that had such an uncertain future. After further discussion, the Sheriff recommended that the position be an unranked, non- bargaining unit position to be called "Acting Special Services Supervisor." The Sheriff planned to leave open the unit position vacated by the successful applicant, so that if the supervisory position were eliminated, the person taking in that job could slide back into his old position in the unit.[fn]1 The Sheriff viewed the acting status as providing some level of job security as long as they left the position vacated open. The Commissioners agreed. After coming out of executive session, the Commissioners voted 3-0 [fn]1 At some point, the Sheriff had a conversation with Ms. Rosen- blatt about the employees' concerns about job security and loss of bumping rights if the position were not in the unit. He testified that she informed him that making the position an acting status while keeping the employee's prior position vacant would enable that person to slide back into his old job if the supervisory position were eliminated. [end of page 4] to create an acting, non-bargaining unit supervisory position for the Jail and CID Division, with a $45,000 salary plus benefits, pursuant to personnel policy. 6. The Sheriff explained this change in the position to all three candidates. He told them that the position would not be in the bargaining unit, and because he and the Commissioners could not agree on the appropriate rank, it would remain unranked and the position would be just called Acting Special Services Supervisor. It would have a salary of $45,000, and benefits in accordance with other non- bargaining unit positions. 7. When Detective Sergeant Murphy was offered the job he was concerned because the pay represented a decrease for him, as he would no longer be eligible for overtime pay. The previous year he had made about $51,000 because of the overtime hours worked. Murphy was also concerned about job security because the future of the position after the jail closed was not assured and losing the bargaining unit status meant he would lose the protections of the collective bargaining agreement. 8. Sheriff Brackett and Murphy discussed these concerns. The Sheriff identified how much was available in the budget for the year and was able to increase the pay somewhat, but only for the remainder of the year. Sheriff Brackett also told Murphy that he anticipated that the union would be dealing with the employer on the bargaining unit status of the position somehow. 9. Murphy testified that he went to speak to Commissioner Bond at Bond's place of business to ask him to reconsider the decision to keep the new position out of the unit. After discussing the subject for some time, Mr. Murphy realized that Commissioner Bond would not reverse his decision on the issue so he left. [end of page 5] 10. Murphy accepted the position on the terms offered and assumed the new duties in April of 2005. Murphy testified that he thought that even though he would be in a salaried position, he would be able to continue to pay his union dues because he was in an "acting" status. He testified that he could not remember whether the issue of his continuing to pay dues was discussed specifically with Sheriff Brackett. 11. Murphy noticed that his union dues were not being taken out of his paycheck sometime in the early summer. He spoke to Nancy Giles, the County Clerk, and asked if she could deduct his union dues. She was not certain and said she would have to find out. He spoke with her again after a couple of weeks and she said it would not be possible. 12. Murphy let it go for a while, but became more concerned after speaking with the union steward, Rand Maker, the union steward and the President of the AFSCME local. Maker felt it was risky to remain outside the unit. Maker pointed out that if management decided to eliminate the position, he would not be able to bump back into his old position in the unit if the Union objected. He said Murphy would have no recourse because he was not in the bargaining unit. 13. In late September or early October, there was a newspaper article in which Murphy's name was published with the rank of Lieutenant before it. That prompted Commissioner Bond to direct Nancy Giles to write a memo stating that Murphy was not a Lieutenant but was a Captain. The memo was addressed to Sheriff Brackett and Major Mason, was from the Lincoln County Commissioners and was initialed by Nancy Giles, the County Clerk. A few days later an identical memo signed by Commissioner Bond was issued. 14. Murphy interpreted the memo about rank to mean that management had gone ahead and made the change without negotiating. Murphy spoke with Maker, the union steward, [end of page 6] about returning to his old position, which had been held vacant while he was in the Acting Special Services Supervisor position. Maker encouraged him to move back to his old position. 15. The memos and the conversation with the union steward prompted Murphy to meet with the Sheriff to request that he be placed in his former rank as soon as possible. Murphy agreed to continue to perform the duties of the Acting Special Services Supervisor position because he knew the job had to be done, he knew how to do the job, and he had a loyalty to the department. Murphy's memo to the Sheriff dated October 7, 2005, commemorating this meeting stated: Due to the uncertainty of the "Acting" rank I currently hold, I am requesting to return to my former rank of Detective Sergeant as soon as possible. I am offering to retain my current responsibilities while this matter is being resolved. 16. The Sheriff returned Murphy to his old position and to the pay rate he would have received had he not left his detective sergeant position in the first place, effective the following day. According to the contract, when an officer reaches 1, 3, 6, and 9 years of service, the officer moves to the next step on the pay scale. Murphy reached 9 years of service on June 15, 2005, a point in time in which he was out of the bargaining unit in the Acting Special Services Supervisor position. When he went back to detective sergeant they changed his pay to the rate he would have received if he had never left the detective sergeant job. The memo from the Sheriff directing this change states: [Murphy's] rate of pay should be returned to that of 9+ year detective or $19.02/hour in accordance with our collective bargaining agreement, as he reached his 9 year anniversary on June 15, 2005. [end of page 7] 17. All four detectives in the Sheriff's Department had about the same amount of seniority. 18. Article 4, paragraph A of the collective bargaining agreement in effect from 2003 through 2005 is entitled "Management Rights" and states: Management of the operations and the direction of the County work force shall be solely and exclusively vested in the County Commissioners ("County" or their designee). Without limiting the foregoing, the County shall have the sole and exclusive right to hire or promote, to transfer, assign, subcontract or relocate work, to discharge or discipline, to schedule hours and to require such overtime work as is necessary for County operations, to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work, to increase or decrease the work force or to decide the number and location of its operations, to establish standards for the quality and quantity of work to be performed, to establish the personnel required in supervisory, clerical and other positions not included in the bargaining unit, and the right to establish or change procedures, practices, programs, rules or regulations except when such establishment or change would conflict with the express provisions of this Agreement. The Union and the County agree that the Union shall have the right to bargain over the impact of a decision by the County to subcontract work. 19. Article 6 of the collective bargaining agreement covers seniority. And states in full: A. Seniority List The Employer shall establish a seniority list and it shall be brought up to date on the first of January of each year and posted at the Sheriff's Department. A copy shall be mailed to the secretary of the Union. Any objection to the seniority list posted shall be reported to the Sheriff in writing within ten (10) calendar days following the posting of such list or it shall stand as accepted. Objections to the accuracy of the list will be limited to changes or additions made since the last January posting. [end of page 8] B. Seniority Classifications 1. County Longevity - County longevity shall mean an employee's length of continuous service with the County since the employee's most recent date of hire. County longevity will be used for the purpose of computing vacation and sick leave entitlement, retirement, and placement on the seniority list. 2. Bargaining Unit Seniority - Bargaining unit seniority shall mean the total length of continuous service in the bargaining unit since the employees most recent date of hire into the bargaining unit. Article 8 B. details use of bargaining unit seniority. 3. Classification Seniority - Classification seniority shall mean the total length of continuous service in a position classification. 20. Article 8 of the Agreement covers promotions, layoffs and recall, and states in full: A. Promotions. Bargaining unit seniority shall be a factor effecting promotions provided that the employees are otherwise substantially equal in knowledge, skills, ability, and work record. Seniority shall be a governing factor in all matters affecting layoff and will be considered first within the affected divisions, then within the affected classification and finally within the Department. The employee(s) affected shall be allowed to bump into another lesser classification, only if the Sheriff or his/her designee agrees that the employee(s) is qualified to do so. B. Lay Off. Bargaining unit seniority shall be the governing factor in all matters affecting layoff, vacation preference, floating holiday preference, recall, shift bids, and transfer to a vacant position and will be considered within the affected divisions, then within the affected classification, and finally with the Department. C. Recall. Employees who are laid off shall be placed on a recall list by classification for one (1) year. Recall notices must be answered and a date as to the return to work agreed upon between the employee and the employer within (7) calendar days of receipt of the notice of recall. No new employee shall be hired until [end of page 9] all employees on layoff have been given an opportunity to return to work provided that the recalled employee has the skill and the ability to fill the vacant position. Nothing herein shall restrict the option of an employee to accept layoff in lieu of a reduction in job classification without loss of the employee's right to be rehired hereunder. 21. The collective bargaining agreement does not address the rights of former unit employees in positions outside of the bargaining unit to return to the unit or the status of such a returning employee. The agreement makes no reference to an "acting" status either inside or outside of the unit. 22. On Thursday, December 29, 2005, the Commissioners had a special meeting to discuss the unit clarification petition filed by the Union that sought to add the Special Services Supervisor position to the existing bargaining unit. The Sheriff and Ms. Rosenblatt were also present at this meeting. The Commissioners learned that Murphy had moved back to his previous position in the bargaining unit and had continued to perform the duties of the Acting Special Services Supervisor position. The Commissioners asked the Sheriff to see if Murphy was available to come over to their meeting to discuss this matter. Murphy arrived shortly after being called. 23. The Commissioners told Murphy that they had just learned that he was no longer in the supervisory position but was still performing those duties. The Commissioners wanted Murphy to return to the Acting Special Services Supervisor position at the pay and benefit level previously established. Ms. Rosenblatt said they would provide him a letter signed by all the Commissioners assuring him that if the supervisory position were cut in the next budget year, Murphy would be allowed to return to his old position. The Commissioners also wanted to compensate Murphy for the period he performed the duties of the Acting Special [end of page 10] Services Supervisor after returning to the Detective Sergeant position. 24. Murphy indicated that he would consider their offer if he were allowed to stay in the unit and pay his union dues until the status of the position was resolved. Murphy was concerned about job security. Commissioner Honey asked why Murphy felt a need to be in bargaining unit if they were giving him a written assurance of job security. Murphy questioned whether the employer could just let someone back into the bargaining unit without consulting the union. Ms. Rosenblatt responded that he was mistaken, and that the letter would be sufficient to allow him to move back. She and the Commissioners made it clear that they did not want the supervisory position in the bargaining unit. 25. Murphy stated that he needed to think about the offer. Sheriff Brackett stated that he could give them his answer after the weekend, but Ms. Rosenblatt interrupted and said that they would need the answer the following day. She said because of the Monday holiday, they would need the answer on Friday in order to have the paperwork prepared in time for the Commissioners' meeting scheduled for Tuesday. 26. Murphy returned to his office. As soon as Sheriff Brackett returned a few minutes later, Murphy told him he was not going to accept the offer. DISCUSSION The issue in this case is whether the Employer violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) and 964(1)(A) by dealing directly with Michael Murphy regarding his wages, benefits and working conditions during the meeting of December 29, 2005. There is no dispute that the Lincoln County Commissioners met with Murphy on that date to try to talk him into returning to the supervisory position he had previously held from April to October of that [end of page 11] year. They discussed the wages and benefits for this position (which was not in the bargaining unit) and offered to give him a written assurance that he could return to his detective position in the bargaining unit if the supervisory position were later eliminated. They also stated that he would get back pay for continuing to perform the supervisor's duties after he returned to his Detective/Sergeant position in October. Although there is very little dispute about the facts, the parties disagree on whether the Employer's actions violated the Act. It is well established that an employer violates the law by dealing directly with its employees about the mandatory subjects of bargaining instead of dealing with the exclusive bargaining representative. See Teamsters Union Local 340 v. Jay School Dept., No. 06-22, at 8 (Nov. 21, 2006) (Direct dealing with unit employees about work schedules violates the collective bargaining statute covering municipal, school district, and county employees); MSEA v. Bangor Mental Health Inst. (BMHI) and State of Maine, No. 84-01, at 7 (Dec. 5, 1983) (Negotiating directly with state employees about shift coverage rather than dealing with the union is a refusal to bargain in violation of the collective bargaining statute covering state employees); and MSEA v. Maine Maritime Academy, No. 05-04, at 22, 24 (Jan. 31, 2006) (Negotiating wages and benefits directly with an applicant for a unit position violates the statute governing collective bargaining for employees of state higher education institutions). When an employer bypasses the bargaining agent, whether by making a unilateral change in a mandatory subject or by dealing directly with a unit employee, it constitutes a failure to bargain in violation of 964(1)(E) because it is equivalent to an outright refusal to bargain. MSEA v. Maine Maritime Academy, No. 05-04 at 15, citing MSEA v. State of Maine, Bureau of Alcoholic Beverages, No. 78-23 (July 15, 1978). Direct dealing also interferes with the bargaining agent's status as the exclusive representative, [end of page 12] therefore violating 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(A). Teamsters Union Local 340 v. Jay School Dept., No. 06-22 (Nov. 21, 2006), at 11- 12; MSEA v. BMHI and State of Maine, No. 84-01, at 7. The focus of this case is the December 29, 2005, meeting, as all other evidence relates to conduct occurring outside of the statutory six-month limitation period. The Act precludes a party from using events occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the complaint as the basis for the alleged violation or to prove the illegality of conduct occurring within the six-month period. 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(2) ("[N]o hearing shall be held based upon any alleged prohibited practice occurring more than 6 months prior to the filing of the complaint with the executive director.") Evidence of events preceding the six-month period may be considered "to shed light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period." Teamsters Local 48 v. City of Waterville, No. 80-14, at 2-3 (April 23, 1980). In the present case, the six-month period runs to December 6, 2005. Thus, the only issue is whether the employer's conduct after that date constitutes a violation of the Act. The Union argues that this case is controlled by Maine Maritime Academy, in which the Board found the Academy had violated the law by negotiating directly with a new hire regarding starting pay and benefits. MSEA v. Maine Maritime Academy, No. 05-04. The Employer's argument is that the position of Acting Special Services Supervisor was not in the bargaining unit at the time of the events at issue and thus there was no duty to bargain. At the December 29, 2005, meeting, the Employer discussed aspects of wages, hours and working conditions with Murphy that can be separated into two distinct categories. One category involved the wages, hours and working conditions of the Acting Special Services Supervisor position and the other category involved the wages, hours and working conditions Murphy would [end of page 13] receive upon his return to the detective sergeant position in the event the supervisory position was eliminated. Thus, one category of issues involved a position outside of the unit; the other involved employment conditions within the bargaining unit. Even though Murphy was in the bargaining unit at the time of the December 29, 2005 meeting, we conclude that the Employer did not violate the Act by directly negotiating with him regarding the pay and benefits for the supervisory position because that position was not in the bargaining unit at that time. In the analysis of a direct dealing charge, the question is not whether Murphy was in the bargaining unit, but whether the direct dealing involved issues that materially and significantly affect the conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees, that is, mandatory subjects of bargaining. See MSEA v. Maine Maritime, No. 05-04, at 23, and cases cited therein. The wages, benefits and working conditions of a supervisory position that is not part of the bargaining unit do not signifi- cantly and materially affect the working conditions of unit employees. See, e.g., Upper Southampton Township Police Benevolent Assoc. v. Upper Southampton Township, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, No. PF-C-98-83-E (June 20, 2000)(Township has no duty to bargain over wages, benefits and working conditions of a non-bargaining unit position) and U.S. Dept. of the Navy, Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, N.C. v. FLRA, 952 F.2d 1434, 1441-42 (D.C. Cir. 1992)(Proposals that directly implicate supervisory employees not in bargaining unit by regulating their terms and conditions of employment are not within the duty to bargain.) Generally speaking, an employer does not violate the law by negotiating with a unit employee over terms of employment for a position outside the bargaining unit, absent evidence of an intent to weaken the union or eliminate [end of page 14] bargaining unit work.[fn]2 See MSEA v. State of Maine, No. 81-06 (April 28, 1981)("[T]he State has the sole discretion in determining the excluded group of employees' wages and benefits . . ."). Thus, we conclude that the employer committed no violation of the Act by dealing with Murphy over the terms and conditions of his potential re-employment as the Acting Special Services Supervisor. The issue of Murphy's status upon returning to the bargaining unit is, however, a different matter. The Employer's authority to keep Murphy's Detective Sergeant position vacant for the time he would serve as Acting Special Services Supervisor is not in dispute, nor is the Employer's authority to allow Murphy to return to the vacant unit position.[fn]3 Our concern is that the Employer made an offer to return Murphy to the bargaining unit without discussing this issue or the impact of such an occurrence with the Union. As the Employer points out in its brief, the offer the Employer made to Murphy on December 29, 2005, was essentially the same offer that he had accepted the previous April. Employer's Brief at 2, 6. We conclude that the assurance of being able to return to his old position in the unit would be under the same terms as what he actually experienced in October of 2005. When Murphy returned to the bargaining unit in October, the evidence shows that he suffered no loss of bargaining unit seniority, even [fn]2 There is no suggestion that the employer was trying to interfere with collective bargaining or weaken union support by enticing Murphy to leave the unit. See Lincoln Sanitary District and Teamsters Union Local 340, No. 92-UC-02 (November 17, 1992) at 15, fn. 2, and MSAD #14 and East Grand Teachers Assoc., No. 83-A-09, (Aug. 24, 1983) (Noting that a decision to assign confidential duties to an employee made with the intent to deprive the employee of collective bargaining coverage would be in violation of 964(1)(A) of the Act.) Similarly, there is no suggestion of an attempt to take bargaining unit work out of the unit. AFSCME v. Ellsworth School Committee, No. 81-41 (July 23, 1981) at 14 (preservation of bargaining unit work is a mandatory subject of bargaining). [fn]3 The Employer cites the broad management rights provision in the collective bargaining agreement. [end of page 15] though he was out of the bargaining unit for about six months. Sheriff Brackett set Murphy's pay at the level he would have achieved had he never left the unit, and there is no evidence that his seniority was reduced to reflect time spent out of the unit. The collective bargaining agreement identifies three types of seniority: County longevity, bargaining unit seniority, and classification seniority. "Bargaining unit seniority" is defined as "total length of continuous service in the bargaining unit since the employees (sic) most recent date of hire into the bargaining unit." Neither party presented any evidence or argument on the meaning of these terms, nor did they address these provisions in testimony or in their briefs. While it is not clear to us how these definitions are interpreted or applied, they have some significance as the provisions of the agreement covering promotions, layoff and recall all refer to one or more of these definitions of seniority. Seniority is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See, e.g., Palermo Teachers Assoc. v. Palermo School Committee, No. 81-29, at 5 (May 22, 1981) (A reduction-in-force seniority provision is clearly a mandatory subject of bargaining). See also Developing Labor Law, Hardin & Higgins, eds. 4th Ed. (2001) p. 1202 ("Seniority is so obviously a condition of employment, and so commonly exists under union contracts, that litigation questioning its mandatory status has been minimal.") Altering an employee's seniority has a direct effect on that person's status as well as the relative status of every other employee in the bargaining unit or job classification. The National Labor Relations Board considered this issue when it concluded that an employer's proposal regarding return rights for supervisors was a mandatory subject of bargaining because of the impact on the bargaining unit. Remington Arms. Co., 298 NLRB 266, fn. 1 (1990). In that case, the employer's proposal involved issues [end of page 16] such as the calculation of seniority for the returning super- visors, wage rates, bidding procedures, and the relative rights of employees on layoff. In the present case, Murphy's seniority upon his return to the bargaining unit would raise similar concerns. It is, therefore, a mandatory subject of bargaining. It is well-settled law that the employer has an obligation to notify the union and give the union an opportunity to bargain before making a change in a mandatory subject of bargaining. As the Law Court noted: . . . Concomitant with the characterization of a subject as within the duty to negotiate is a duty of the employer to notify the union to provide it with an opportunity to bargain over it. The failure to do so violates 964(1)(E). City of Bangor v. AFSCME, 449 A.2d 1129 (Me. 1982) (citation omitted). It is undisputed that the Employer did not give notice to the Union of their offer of a written assurance that he could return to the unit. The fact that the Union did not object to Murphy's return to the bargaining unit in October of 2005 or to his seniority status upon his return at that time does not affect the Employer's obligation in December to notify the Union and provide it an opportunity to bargain. In October, Murphy moved back into the vacant position in the unit shortly after discussing the issue with the Union President and receiving his encouragement. In December, without notice to the Union, the Employer offered Murphy a written assurance that he could again return to the unit at some unknown point in 2006 when the new jail was expected to open. The Union was entitled to determine whether the current circumstances or future concerns (such as the potential for other layoffs when the jail closed) warranted bargaining with the Employer over the issue. The Employer's failure to notify the Union and provide it with an opportunity to bargain over Murphy's seniority constitutes a failure to bargain in violation of section 964(1)(E) and section 964(1)(A). [end of page 17] The Union requests as a remedy an order to the Employer to cease and desist, to post a notice of the Board's order, and to pay Murphy at the rate of Acting Special Services Supervisor for the period in which he performed those duties while a Detective Sergeant. The Union argues that the Employer received the benefit of Murphy performing these duties without additional compensation from October of 2005 until August of 2006 "as a result of its illegal, direct dealing with a bargaining unit member." We find no connection between the direct dealing violation occurring on December 29, 2005, (which was limited to assurances regarding Murphy's return to the bargaining unit) and this requested remedy. The Union's argument is similar to the "continuing violation" theory rejected by this Board in Teamsters v. City of Waterville. No. 80-14, at 3-4 (April 23, 1980) ("where a complaint based upon [an] earlier event is time-barred," allowing that event "to cloak with illegality that which was otherwise lawful . . . [would revive] a legally defunct unfair labor practice.") There is no evidence in the record that paying Murphy at the Detective Sergeant rate while he performed the duties of the Special Services Supervisor violated the Act. The Union request for back pay is therefore denied. We have fully considered the Union's request for a remedial order in light of the evidence presented and the severity of the violation. On that basis, we conclude that a cease and desist order is sufficient in this case. ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and discussion and by virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor Relations Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5), it is hereby ORDERED: [end of page 18] That the Lincoln County Commissioners, the Lincoln County Sheriff's Department and Lincoln County's Agent cease and desist dealing directly with an employee over any mandatory subject of bargaining. Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 1st day of June 2007.
The parties are advised of their right pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. §968(5)(F) (Supp. 2005) to seek a review of this decision and order by the Superior Court. To initiate such a review, an appealing party must file a complaint with the Superior Court within fifteen (15) days of the date of issuance of this decision and order, and otherwise comply with the requirements of Rule 80(C) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
[signed]
Peter T. Dawson
Chair
[signed]
Karl Dornish, Jr.
Employer Representative
[signed]
Wayne W. Whitney
Employee Representative
[end of page 19]