The Maine State Employees Association, SEIU Local 1989
("MSEA" or "Union"),  filed this prohibited practice complaint
with the Maine Labor Relations Board on October 27, 2011,
alleging that the Maine Turnpike Authority ("MTA" or "Employer")
violated the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law (the
"Act") by discriminating against Steve O'Leary for assisting his
union and complying with instructions from Union counsel during
the arbitration of his grievance.  The Complaint further alleges
that the MTA discriminated against Mr. O'Leary because his Union
subsequently refused to withdraw his grievance from arbitration
and otherwise interfered with the Union's right and ability to
represent Mr. O'Leary in the arbitration process, in violation of
§964(1)(A)(B) and (E)[fn]1.  The Complaint further alleges that
the MTA's conduct interfered with, restrained and coerced Mr.
O'Leary in the exercise of rights protected by §963, in violation
of §964(1)(A).  

     1  As MSEA did not present any argument on the alleged violation
of §964(1)(E), we deem that allegation waived.

[end of page 1]
            
     Throughout this proceeding, Anne F. Macri, Esq., represented
the Maine State Employees Association, SEIU Local 1989; and  
William H. Dale, Esq., represented the Maine Turnpike Authority. 
An evidentiary hearing was held on July 31, 2012, at which time
the parties were able to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and
introduce documentary evidence.  The parties submitted post-
hearing briefs, the last of which was filed on October 16, 2012. 
On November 15, 2012, Board members Peter T. Dawson, Chair,
Karl Dornish, Jr., and Robert L. Piccone met to deliberate this
matter.    
                
                           JURISDICTION
 
     The Maine State Employees Association-SEIU Local 1989 is the
bargaining agent within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. §962(2), and
the Maine Turnpike Authority is the employer within the meaning
of 26 M.R.S.A. §962(7).  The jurisdiction of the Board to hear
this case and to render a decision and order lies in 26
M.R.S.A. §968(5).                                                 
             
                       FINDINGS OF FACTS
                                
1.  Stephen O'Leary began his employment with the Maine Turnpike
Authority in 1990.  He has been an E-Z Pass Customer Service
Representative for the past 14 years.  O'Leary is very familiar
with the collective bargaining agreement and the grievance
process, having filed over 20 grievances over the course of his
employment with the MTA.
      
2.  The EZ pass group moved to a new facility in May of 2009,
which was much noisier than the previous location.  O'Leary sent
several e-mails to various managers during the summer of 2009
asking for a seat assignment in a less noisy part of the room. 
His requests were rejected as were similar requests for new seat 

[end of page 2]

assignments from other employees.
 
3.  In the fall of 2009, O'Leary requested a change in seat
assignment to a quieter work station as an accommodation for his
hearing impairment under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
Although the MTA made some efforts to address the noise issue, he
was not assigned to a different seat.  He filed a grievance on
January 10, 2010, under the Non-Discrimination Article of the
collective bargaining agreement over the failure to accommodate
his disability and for the alleged retaliation of assigning him
to a less attractive job.  Subsection 3(a) of the Non-Discrimin-

ation Article (Art. 23) includes a procedural requirement that
the employee must elect to pursue a complaint either through the
grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective bargaining
agreement or through the procedures available at the Maine Human
Rights Commission.
 
4.  O'Leary filed a complaint of employment discrimination with
the Maine Human Rights Commission (MHRC) on July 6, 2010.  His
complaint charged a failure to accommodate his hearing
disability, creation of a hostile work environment, and
retaliation for requesting an accommodation.  In light of the
choice of forum requirement in the contract noted above, O'Leary
also sent a notice to his Union representative that he was
withdrawing the grievance he filed on January 10, 2010, so that
he could pursue his MHRC complaint. 
      
5.  Around the time he filed the complaint at the MHRC, O'Leary
was disciplined three times for raising his voice to a co-worker
and for being rude and giving incorrect information to EZ-Pass
customers contacting the call center. 
      
6.  On July 16, 2010, Brian Oelberg, the MSEA Field Represent-
ative, filed a grievance on O'Leary's behalf charging the MTA 

[end of page 3]

with violating the collective bargaining agreement by: "Failure
to make adequate ADA accommodation. Hostile work environment." 
The grievance stated the remedy sought was "Comply with request
for accommodation. Cease hostile work environment. Remove and
rescind related disciplines (7.16.10 reprimand)."
       
7.  The grievance procedure established in the collective
bargaining agreement's Article 13 consists of several steps,
including grievance mediation and binding arbitration.  The
record is not clear on how the grievance was addressed in the
initial steps, but it is undisputed that the parties established
a tentative date for arbitration of June 29, 2011.
     
8.  The complaint O'Leary filed at the Maine Human Rights
Commission proceeded through that agency's investigation and
conciliation efforts during the summer and fall of 2010.  O'Leary
represented himself in this process, including in the
conciliation efforts.  He testified that he consulted with an
attorney on one occasion during the attempt to settle the
complaint.
      
9.  On March 15, 2011, the Executive Director of the MHRC issued
the "Investigator's Report" which recommended that the Commission
conclude that there were no reasonable grounds to find that the
MTA discriminated against O'Leary.  The charge addressed by the
MHRC was:
     Complainant, Steve O'Leary, alleged that Respondent
     failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation
     for his disability (hearing loss), violated his right
     to medical confidentiality, asked for more information
     than was necessary to grant his accommodation request,
     and retaliated against him for requesting a reasonable
     accommodation by changing his assignment to repetitive
     work that had previously caused him to suffer a
     workers' compensation injury.
 
10.  On April 27, 2011, the MHRC gave written notification to the

[end of page 4]

MTA that the Commission had not found reasonable grounds to
believe that unlawful discrimination had occurred and dismissed
O'Leary's complaint.
      
11.  In May, the MTA's Human Resource Director, Lauren Carrier,
contacted Oelberg and the parties' arbitrator about scheduling an
arbitration date for O'Leary's grievance of July 16, 2010, as the
previously-scheduled date of June 29, 2011, was no longer an
option.  After they settled on the date, Carrier notified
Elizabeth Olivier, the attorney who had represented the MTA in
O'Leary's case before the MHRC, that the arbitration would be
held on September 27, 2011.
      
12.  On September 19, 2011, just over a week before the scheduled
arbitration, the MTA attorney (Olivier) e-mailed a letter to the
arbitrator, with a copy to Oelberg, requesting that the demand for
arbitration be denied on the grounds that the issue raised in the
demand was not arbitrable.  She relied on Art. 23 §3(a) of the
collective bargaining agreement in arguing that no aspect of
O'Leary's grievance could proceed because he had elected to pursue
all of the same claims at the MHRC.  In her letter, Olivier
described various communications O'Leary had with the staff of the
MHRC and referred to eight exhibits attached to her letter.  The
exhibits were all either memos or e-mail exchanges between O'Leary
and staff at the MHRC regarding his complaint of July 6, 2010. 
Neither the MHRC Investigator's Report of March 15, 2011, or the
April 27, 2011, decision of the Commission adopting that report
were included as exhibits. 
                                                            
13.  On Thursday afternoon, September 22, 2011, Olivier followed
up with an e-mail to Oelberg and the arbitrator referring to her
earlier letter "raising questions about whether this matter is
properly subject to arbitration."  She suggested a telephone 

[end of page 5]

conference call to "decide how this issue will be addressed"
offering the following day, Friday, or the coming Monday for the
call.  The arbitrator responded late that night, suggesting a
time frame on Monday.  Oelberg responded mid-day on Friday
indicating he was fine with a conference call but would be in
negotiations all day on Monday after 7 a.m.[fn]2  He pointed out
that they could address it at the start of arbitration.  Olivier
responded to that comment, stating that their purpose was "to
define the issues, if any, that will be addressed on Tuesday, and
identify witnesses and exhibits" needed with respect to those
issues. 
 
14.  Late on Friday afternoon, September 23, 2010, Oelberg
contacted MSEA's General Counsel, Tim Belcher, on his cell phone
to tell him that the attorney for the MTA was raising an
arbitrability question and was asking for a conference call with
the arbitrator.  Belcher was driving to Boston, where he was
living at the time, having just returned to work for MSEA after a
two-year absence.  When Belcher arrived in Boston, he reviewed
Olivier's electronic submissions.  
  
15.  Sometime on Friday evening, the parties set the conference
call for Monday at 1:00 p.m.  More e-mails were exchanged over
the weekend to gather phone numbers to use for that call.  When
Oelberg indicated that MSEA's attorney Belcher needed to
participate in the call, the plan fell through because bringing
four people into a call was beyond the capacity of the
arbitrator's phone.  The arbitrator proposed that the MTA start
with the arbitrability question at the arbitration hearing
scheduled for that Tuesday.

     2  We note that the sequence of some of the e-mails in this
exchange is confusing because at least one of the sender's computer
clock or time-zone setting was incorrect.

[end of page 6]
 
16.  Olivier responded with an e-mail suggesting that they start
with the arbitrability question on Tuesday, and schedule another
day for a hearing on the merits, if the arbitrator determines the
matter is arbitrable.  In this email, Olivier stated her concern
about a hearing on the merits before resolving the arbitrability
question.  She wrote, "it is not clear to me what issues the
Union is claiming are being arbitrated and/or survive the MHRC
disposition of Mr. O'Leary's claim." 

17.  The arbitration hearing was scheduled to begin on the
morning of September 27, 2011, at the MTA headquarters building. 
O'Leary had previously been granted leave to assist his union in
processing his grievance, as allowed by the terms of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement.  The leave is referred to as
administrative leave or "ad leave" by the parties, although that
is not a term used in the agreement.  The relevant provision of
the bargaining agreement provides that an aggrieved employee or
grievant's witness "shall not suffer any loss of pay or shall not
be required to charge leave credits as a result of processing
grievances during such employee's or witnesses' scheduled work
hours..." Art. 13, §7(k). 
     
18.  O'Leary met with Oelberg and Belcher in a caucus room before
the scheduled start of the arbitration.  Prior to meeting with
the grievant, Belcher was comfortable that they could litigate
the arbitrability question that day.  Upon meeting with the
grievant, however, Belcher saw that O'Leary was very agitated and
concerned that they had not had time to prepare more thoroughly
for the arbitration.  Belcher decided to approach the MTA's
attorney about a continuance of the hearing.  
     
19.  Belcher left the caucus room, found Olivier and introduced
himself.  Olivier gave Belcher a stack of documents that he had 

[end of page 7]

requested on the previous day.  Olivier testified that some of
the documents were related to O'Leary's grievance which Oelberg
had probably seen, and some were documents from the MHRC
proceeding which the Union probably had not seen.  Belcher asked
Olivier for a continuance of the hearing, citing the complicated
nature of the issues presented as well as the need to review the
stack of documents.  Olivier refused his request for a
continuance.  Olivier told Belcher that she intended to call
O'Leary as her first witness. 
      
20.  Belcher knew that Olivier's arbitrability argument rested on
the claim that the issues in the grievance had already been
addressed at the Maine Human Rights Commission.  Since O'Leary
had been a pro se litigant at the MRHC and Olivier had
represented the MTA, Belcher considered her plan to question
O'Leary about statements he made as to MRHC staff during
settlement discussions as inappropriate and "playing hardball." 
Belcher did not want to provide her with an opportunity to
"ambush" his grievant, so he returned to the caucus room and
instructed O'Leary to leave the building and wait for their call. 
Oelberg took O'Leary's cell phone number so he could be reached
when needed by the Union.
           
21.  When the arbitrator arrived, the parties met in the MTA
conference room.  Belcher and Oelberg were present for the Union
and Carrier, Olivier and Doug Davidson (an MTA division head)
were present for management.  Belcher presented his request for a
continuance, arguing that the issues were complicated, he had not
had adequate time to prepare, and it would not be fair to his
client to proceed.  The MTA countered that they had attempted to
have a conference call to define the issues, and they had
prepared their witnesses and were ready to go.  The discussion of
the continuance issue went on for several minutes.  The 

[end of page 8]

arbitrator denied Belcher's request for a continuance. 
      
22.  The discussion turned to the arbitrability question.  When
Belcher argued that it was improper for the MTA to call the
grievant as a witness, the arbitrator stated that he thought the
MTA had the right to call Oelberg as a witness on the
arbitrability question.  
           
23.  Carrier testified that she left the conference room to go
get O'Leary.  When she got to the customer service area, she
asked Richard Somerville, O'Leary's supervisor, where he was.
O'Leary was not in the room, and they did not see either
O'Leary's car or his truck in the parking lot.  Carrier returned
to the arbitration and informed everyone that O'Leary was not
around.  Carrier testified that there was no statement or
indication made that Belcher had instructed O'Leary to leave,
though Belcher, Olivier and Oelberg all testified to the
contrary.
  
24.  Olivier testified that during the discussions at the
arbitration hearing, she somehow learned that O'Leary was no
longer in the building and she was under the impression that he
had been instructed to leave the building by Belcher.  She could
not recall the specifics of the conversation.  Belcher testified
that he explained to the arbitrator that he was trying to protect
his client from being questioned inappropriately about the prior
proceeding at the MHRC.  
      
25.  Oelberg testified that Belcher clearly stated that he had
instructed O'Leary to leave the building.  At that time, neither
Belcher nor Oelberg knew O'Leary's exact location but knew that
he was not in the building and had been instructed to remain
nearby.

[end of page 9]
      
26.  Olivier, Belcher and the arbitrator met in a separate room
to discuss the issue of the absent witness further.  When Olivier
asked Belcher if he knew where O'Leary was, he testified that he
honestly replied "No."  He was not asked if he knew how to reach
O'Leary.  Olivier was trying to determine what she should do, and
she mentioned the possibility of getting a subpoena.  Olivier
testified that she did not pursue that idea as it was apparent to
her that Belcher was not going to help locate O'Leary.  She
eventually decided not to go ahead with their case because she
thought it would be prejudicial to proceed without O'Leary as a
witness on the arbitrability issue.  The parties scheduled
another hearing date in mid-November and the arbitration meeting
ended. 
      
27.  After the arbitration hearing ended, Olivier and Carrier
went to Carrier's office.  Olivier testified that they were both
upset by the action of the Union in making their first witness
unavailable.  Olivier testified unequivocally that she was
"outraged" by the Union's action in making O'Leary unavailable to
her.  Olivier testified that she and Carrier discussed what had
happened and how to handle the case going forward.  They also
talked about having the rest of the arbitration picked up by
Michael Messerschmidt, another attorney at Olivier's law firm who
had done several arbitrations for the MTA.  
           
28.  Carrier testified that, generally, a grievant would be
present at an arbitration, but it is not unheard of for the
grievant to be absent, as the grievant's presence is not a
requirement.  
 
29.  When the arbitration hearing ended, Belcher and Oelberg
called O'Leary and learned that he was sitting in a nearby donut
shop.  They joined him there and discussed the status of his case

[end of page 10]

with him.  Belcher told him that the MTA was upset with their
tactic of making him unavailable and that he should be careful
when he returned to work.  They told him to go straight back to
his work station and to refer any questions the MTA had about
what had happened to Oelberg or Belcher.  Belcher assured him
that he had every right to comply with their directives. 
      
30.  O'Leary returned to work.  When he got to his work station,
his supervisor, Richard Somerville, asked him, "Where have you
been?"  O'Leary responded "With my union".  Somerville said, "No,
I mean just now."  O'Leary said he was with his union.  O'Leary
did not say anything further.  He did not refer the question to
the Union, as Belcher had instructed him, nor did he indicate to
Somerville that he wanted union representation.
      
31.  Somerville knew that O'Leary had not been in the room where
the MSEA representatives were handling the arbitration proceeding
nor had he seen O'Leary near the arbitration, so he called
Carrier.  He repeated the conversation he had just had with
O'Leary and Carrier asked him to repeat it.  At some point later
that day, Carrier went to Doug Davidson, the division head who
was Somerville's manager, to fill him in on the situation. 
 
32.  The following day, September 28, 2011, Oelberg sent an email
to Olivier and Carrier (with a copy to Belcher) stating, "Betty
and Lauren: Please direct all communications re Steve O'Leary
directly to MSEA general counsel Tim Belcher. Thanks, Brian." 
 
33.  Carrier sought clarification in a responding email, asking
"In what respect? Do you mean just the arbitration hearing or all
day-to-day issues at work? Thanks, Lauren."  The email was
directed to Oelberg and copied to Belcher and Olivier.
     
34.  Belcher responded to Carrier, (with copies to Oelberg and 

[end of page 11]

Olivier), "I'm not interested in participating in day-to-day
supervision.  Any communications relating to the arbitration
including any matter relating to Mr. O'Leary's actions while on
union leave to support the union's advocacy during the hearing
should go through me. Tim Belcher."
       
35.  At no point after Somerville's conversation with O'Leary on
September 27, 2011, did any manager or supervisor ask O'Leary for
further clarification of his responses or seek an explanation of
his whereabouts during the arbitration, nor were any questions on
this subject directed to Belcher or Oelberg. 
 
36.  Mike Messerschmidt worked at Preti Flaherty with Olivier and
had previously handled many labor arbitration cases for the MTA. 
Messerschmidt took over O'Leary's grievance arbitration.  After
consulting with Olivier on the matter, Messerschmidt wrote to
Belcher on October 7, 2011, explaining the Authority's position
that O'Leary's grievance was not arbitrable because the issues
had been addressed at the MHRC.  Messerschmidt asked Belcher to
withdraw the arbitration request and pointed out that they would
both save money by withdrawing the demand for arbitration before
the point at which a cancellation fee would be imposed.
      
37.  On October 11, 2011, Belcher replied to Messerschmidt's
letter agreeing that some of the issues raised in the grievance
were addressed in the MHRC complaint and were therefore not
arbitrable.  He refused to withdraw the arbitration request, 
pointing out that the discipline imposed on July 16, 2011, had
not been formally presented to the MHRC, had not been addressed
in the MHRC investigative report or by the Commission itself. 
Belcher considered it a proper subject for arbitration.  Belcher
also pointed out that the MTA's challenge to arbitrability relied
on statements made by O'Leary during settlement discussions at 

[end of page 12]

the MHRC which could not be used in the subsequent arbitration
proceeding.
      
38.  On Wednesday, October 12, 2011, Carrier wrote a letter that
was hand delivered to O'Leary stating, in full:
     By this letter please be advised that it is the intent
     of the Maine Turnpike Authority to suspend you without
     pay for a five (5) day period commencing October 24,
     2011.  This action is a result of you leaving the
     jobsite on September 27, 2011 without notifying your
     supervisors and for making knowingly false statements
     to your supervisor.

     A meeting with Management has been scheduled on Monday,
     October 17, 2011, at 10:00 a.m. at MTA Headquarters to
     discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding this
     intent to suspend.  At the meeting you will be given
     the opportunity to present any new information that you
     believe is relevant to the allegations against you. 
     You are entitled to representation by the Maine State
     Employees Association at such meeting, if you so
     choose.  If, as a result of this effort, any dispute
     between you and the Maine Turnpike Authority Management
     regarding this decision is not resolved you will then
     be disciplined in accordance with this notice.

     A copy of this correspondence is being placed in your
     personnel file.
      
39.  A copy of this letter was hand delivered to O'Leary at his
workstation in a sealed envelope on either October 12 or October
13, 2011.  The notation at the bottom of the letter indicates
copies were sent to Peter Mills, the MTA Executive Director;
Davidson, the MTA division manager; Somerville, the supervisor;
MSEA, and to "Personnel File."
  
40.  The October 17, 2011, meeting was postponed until Friday, 

     3  Holding this pre-suspension meeting complied with the
directives of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, which requires such a meeting prior to the
suspension or termination of a public sector employee having a
property interest in his or her continued employment.  The purpose of
such a meeting is

[end of page 13

October 21, 2011, at the request of MSEA Field Representative
Oelberg.
  
41.  Carrier testified that the period of time between the
September 27 incident giving rise to the discipline and the
actual imposition of the discipline nearly one month later was
not an inordinate period.  The letter indicating their intent to
impose discipline was dated October 12, 2011, a little over two
weeks following the incident.  Carrier testified that they made
the decision based on that fact that O'Leary did not tell the
truth and did not have authorization to leave the building, and 
she emphasized that "we did not have factual evidence of what had
happened that day and we didn't get it really up until the
hearing [on October 21st]." 
   
42.  Carrier testified that after she initially informed
Davidson, the Division Manager, of O'Leary's statements of his
whereabouts during the arbitration, she and Davidson agreed to
have a further meeting to talk about it and try to sort it out. 
There is no further testimony on whether this meeting occurred or
what was said.
      
43.  At the October 21, 2011, "Loudermill" meeting, when Carrier
offered O'Leary the opportunity to give his side of the case, he
said only that his Union would speak for him.  O'Leary did not
speak after that.  Oelberg told Carrier that Belcher had
instructed O'Leary to leave the building immediately before the
start of the arbitration hearing.  Oelberg stated that because
O'Leary was under the direction and control of the union, where
O'Leary was actually located at the time was irrelevant.  Carrier
asked why, when asked where he was, O'Leary said he was with his 

[fn3, cont'd.]  not a full evidentiary hearing, but merely "an initial
check against mistaken decisions." 470 U.S. 532, 545, 105 S.Ct. 1487
(1985).  

[end of page 14]

Union rather than he was told by his attorney to leave the
building.  Carrier testified that Oelberg never answered that
question, but only emphasized that O'Leary was under the union's
control.  Carrier testified that she had not known until this
meeting that Belcher instructed O'Leary to leave the building. 
 
44.  When it became apparent that the MTA would not alter its
conclusion on the discipline, Oelberg handed Carrier a copy of a
grievance contesting the suspension and a copy of a prohibited
practice complaint that he intended to file with the Maine Labor
Relations Board.  The prohibited practice complaint stated that
O'Leary was acting on the instruction of the MSEA attorney when
he left the building before the start of the arbitration hearing
on September 27, 2011.  At the close of the meeting, Carrier
affirmed that the suspension would be imposed as scheduled.
           
45.  The week-long suspension began on Monday, October 24, 2011.
On Wednesday, October 26, 2011, the MTA received the formal
filing of the prohibited practice complaint that had been given
to Carrier the preceding Friday in draft form.  Carrier testified
that when they "had written confirmation that he was in fact
directed to leave the premises" they were still unsure what to do
because it was the first time it had happened and, in their view,
O'Leary had lied.  Carrier testified that she "had a conversation
with Richard Somerville and then we called counsel," but she did
not indicate when these conversations occurred.
 
46.  In a letter to Oelberg dated Thursday, October 27, 2011,
Carrier informed Oelberg that the MTA was rescinding the
discipline imposed on O'Leary.  Her reason for rescinding the
suspension was that the draft prohibited practice complaint that
Oelberg gave her during the meeting the previous Friday contained
"new information" that O'Leary was directed to leave the premises

[end of page 15]

by MSEA's Counsel.  The letter was copied to D. Davidson and
"File," but no one else.
 
47.  Carrier testified that she telephoned Oelberg and told him
of the decision to rescind the suspension on the same day she
wrote the letter, October 27, 2011.  Oelberg had no specific
recollection of that conversation, noting that he had many
conversations with Carrier.  Carrier testified that she did not
contact O'Leary directly because she claimed that she had been
instructed by the Union not to communicate directly with O'Leary.
 
48.  O'Leary served the full suspension with the understanding
that it was a suspension without pay.  One co-worker testified
that O'Leary told him he had been suspended for complying with
the union attorney's instructions during an arbitration hearing.
 
49.  O'Leary returned to work on Monday, October 31, 2011.  His
supervisor brought him into his office and informed him that they
had rescinded the discipline and he would suffer no loss of pay. 
O'Leary testified that is was the first notice he received that
the MTA had rescinded his suspension.  O'Leary testified that he
did not receive a copy of the letter dated October 27, 2011,
rescinding his suspension until the Union provided it to him much
later.
      
50.  The arbitration hearing that was postponed on September 27,
2011, was held in mid-November, and the issue was limited to
whether there was just cause to reprimand O'Leary in June and
July, 2011.  The parties agreed that the other issues raised in
the grievance had been addressed by the MHRC complaint and were
therefore not arbitrable.

[end of page 16] 
                            DISCUSSION
                         
     The initial question presented is whether the Employer
suspended Stephen O'Leary for one week as a form of retaliatory
discrimination for engaging in an activity protected by the Act,
thereby violating §964(1)(B) and, derivatively, violating
§964(1)(A).  The conduct alleged to be protected activity
occurred shortly before the start of an arbitration of O'Leary's
grievance when O'Leary complied with the Union attorney's
instruction to leave the building.  The Union further alleges
that the Employer's decision to impose the discipline was a
discriminatory act that was retaliation against the employee for
the Union's refusal to withdraw the demand for arbitration as
requested by the MTA attorney.  The Union also alleges that the
conduct of the Employer independently violated §964(1)(A) because
it interfered with, restrained, or coerced employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed by the Act.  The Employer
raises the final issue of the effect of the Employer's rescission
of O'Leary's suspension on the Board's analysis.
      
     Section 964(1)(A) of the Act prohibits an employer from
"interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 963."  Section 963,
in turn, protects the right of public employees to:
     
     join, form and participate in the activities of
     organizations of their own choosing for the purposes of
     representation and collective bargaining, or in the
     free exercise of any other right under this chapter.   
 
     The legal analysis of whether a public employer's conduct
violates section 964(1)(A) by "interfering with, restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
section 963" is well established: 

[end of page 17]

     Section 964(1)(A) prohibits an employer from engaging
     in conduct which interferes with, coerces or restrains
     union activity.  A violation of section 964(1)(A) does
     not turn on the employer's motive, or whether the
     coercion succeeded or failed, but on "whether the
     employer engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be
     said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of
     employee rights under the Act."  Jefferson Teachers
     Association v. Jefferson School Committee, No. 96-24,
     slip op. at 25 (Me.L.R.B. August 25, 1997); MSEA v.
     Department of Human Services, No. 81-35, slip op. at
     4-5, 4 NPER 20-12026, (Me.L.R.B. June 26, 1981)(quoting
     NLRB v. Ford, 170 F.2d 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1948)).  

Sanford Police Assoc. v. Town of Sanford, No. 09-04 Interim Order
at 5 (Jan. 29, 2009), quoting Duff v. Town of Houlton, No. 97-20
at 21 (Oct. 19, 1999), and citing MSEA v. State Development
Office, 499 A.2d 165, 169 (Me. 1985)(Law Court citing this
standard with approval).
                
     Interference, restraint or coercion violations are either
derivative or independent violations.  A derivative violation
occurs when the employer violates the Act and that illegal
conduct, in turn, has the effect of restraining employees in the
exercise of their §963 rights.  An independent violation of
§964(1)(A) occurs when the conduct itself directly interferes 
with the exercise of rights granted under the Act.  Examples of
independent violations occurring in an established union setting
include an attempt to interfere with the employee's right to
serve on the union's bargaining team, MSEA v. Dept. of Human
Services, No. 81-35, at 5 (June 26, 1981), a supervisor's
statement to an employee not to go to the "wrong people" and get
"bad advice," Ouellette v. City of Caribou, No. 99-17, at 10
(Nov. 22, 1999), a supervisor's threatening conduct toward
grievants interfering with their right to file and process
grievances, William Single and Sanford Police Assoc. v. Town of
Sanford, No. 85-04, at 4 (Oct. 18, 1984).

[end of page 18]

     Section 964(1)(B) of the Act prohibits an employer from
"encouraging or discouraging membership in any employee
organization by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment."  In order to support a §964(1)(B) discrimination
claim, the Union has the burden of proving that:  (i) the
employee engaged in protected activity; (ii) the decision-makers
knew of the employee's participation in protected activity; and
(iii) there is a relationship, or "causal connection," between
the protected activity and the adverse employment actions against
the employee.  Litchfield Educational Support Assoc. v. Litch-
field School Committee, No. 97-09, at 22 (July 13, 1998) citing
Casey v. Mountain Valley Educ. Assoc. and SAD 43, Nos. 96-26 &
97-03, at 27-28 (Oct. 30, 1997) and Teamsters Union Local #340 v.
Rangeley Lakes School Region, No. 91-22, at 18 (Jan. 29, 1992).   
     
     We turn first to the question of whether O'Leary engaged in
protected activity.  We conclude the O'Leary's conduct of leaving
the building just prior to the start of the arbitration of his
grievance was protected activity because he was following a
directive of his Union's attorney that was made as part of the
attorney's tactical decision on how to handle the arbitration. 
While this maneuver may have been unusual and unprecedented for
these parties, there is no basis for concluding that the
Attorney's decision was not protected conduct. 
      
     The MTA attorney's letter to the arbitrator of September 19,
2011, was an attempt to get the entire grievance dismissed.[fn]4 
The 

     4  Contrary to the MTA's assertions in its briefs, Olivier's
letter to the Arbitrator dated September 19, 2011, did not seek to
"clarify the scope of the grievance" before the arbitration (MTA Reply
Brief at 5), it sought to have the entire grievance dismissed as not
arbitrable based on the assertion that the same issues had been
addressed in the MHRC proceeding.  The first clear statement Olivier
made of a need to clarify what issues had not been addressed at the
MHRC and thus might

[end of page 19]

MTA's attorney had the right to present an arbitrability argument
to the arbitrator and to employ tactics in making that present-

ation that might be considered "playing hardball," as the Union
described it.  Similarly, the Union attorney had the right to
protect the grievant from what the Union attorney considered
improper questioning by the MTA attorney.  The exhibits Olivier
attached to her letter of the preceding week clearly indicated
that her argument was based on statements made by O'Leary during
the MHRC conciliation and settlement discussions, a proceeding in
which O'Leary was pro se and Olivier represented the MTA. 
Belcher considered it improper to solicit testimony about
settlement discussions at the MHRC proceeding, a concern that
was heightened by the fact that O'Leary was not represented by an
attorney in that forum.  In light of Olivier's direct involvement
with the MHRC case, Belcher was concerned that she would try to
solicit testimony about settlement discussions on direct
examination before an objection could be lodged.  The Union was
not trying to prevent the MTA from presenting its arguments on
arbitrability, it was just not going to make it easy for the MTA
to use the grievant to make their case.  In light of these
circumstances, Belcher's decision to tell O'Leary to leave the
building and wait for their call was a valid tactical decision
concerning a complicated arbitrability question and designed to
protect the grievant from what Belcher felt would be improper
questioning.  See, e.g., Lundrigan v. MLRB, No. CV-83-81 (Me.
Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., July 25, 1983) at 4 ("The attorney must 

[fn 4, cont'd.] remain for arbitration came in her email of Sunday,
September 25, 2011, two days prior to the arbitration.

     5  Citing 5 M.R.S.A. §4612 (1)(A), setting forth the procedures
at the MHRC for compromise settlement negotiations, which states
"...statements made in compromise settlement negotiations, . . . may
not be disclosed . . . nor used as evidence in any subsequent
proceeding, civil or criminal . . ." 

[end of page 20]

use his discretion and professional judgment in determining how
to proceed with and present a grievance."), aff'g Lundrigan v.
State Dept. of Personnel and MSEA, No. 83-03 (Feb. 4, 1983);
aff'd, 482 A.2d 834 (Me. 1984).
          
     Evidently, it had not occurred to the MTA attorney that the
grievant might not be available as a witness to give testimony
supporting their effort to get the entire grievance dismissed. 
Olivier testified that she had denied Belcher's request for a
continuance because "we had prepared our witnesses and were ready
to go."  This proved not to be the case.  After Olivier dis-
covered that O'Leary was not in the building, she felt she had to
postpone the hearing because "the MTA's case would be prejudiced"
if they could not call O'Leary as their first witness. 
Presentation of evidence and arguments on the arbitrability
question could have proceeded, albeit not as Olivier had
envisioned.  MTA's case depended upon the testimony of an adverse
witness, but they did not protect against the possibility that
O'Leary would not show up voluntarily.  Once the arbitration
began, Olivier chose not to seek a subpoena or an order from the
arbitrator to compel the attendance of O'Leary.  It appears that
Olivier did not have a back-up plan and thus felt compelled to
postpone the arbitration.          
     
     The MTA has not presented any discernable argument that the
Union's tactical decision in this case is somehow beyond the
protection of the Act.  Instead, the MTA argues that the actions
for which O'Leary was disciplined was his abuse of the adminis-
trative leave by not actively participating and assisting in the
processing of his grievance.  While this line of reasoning might
eventually be relevant in the analysis of a discrimination charge
under §964(1)(B), it is wholly irrelevant to determining whether
O'Leary's compliance with the attorney's instruction to leave the 

[end of page 21]


building was protected activity.  Similarly, the MTA's various
arguments that the terms of the contract regarding leave for
grievance processing dictate whether the employee is engaged in
protected activity are without merit[fn]6.   
 
     Having concluded that O'Leary's act of leaving the MTA
building shortly before the start of the arbitration as
instructed by the Union attorney was protected activity, the
second element of a §964(1)(B) discrimination charge requires
that we determine whether the employer knew of this protected
activity.  There was a substantial amount of inconsistent or
imprecise testimony in this case about who knew what when. 
Olivier, the MTA's attorney, testified credibly that as the
situation unfolded in the arbitration, it was her impression that
the grievant had left the building at the direction of Belcher,
the union attorney.  Carrier, the Human Resource Director,
testified without equivocation that there was no discussion of
such an instruction to O'Leary nor was there any discussion of
the possibility of asking for a subpoena to compel his
attendance.  It is undisputed, however, that Carrier was absent
from the room while she was looking for the grievant.
Furthermore, much of the discussion about the situation occurred
between the two attorneys and the arbitrator in a separate room
behind closed doors.  It is quite possible that Carrier was
simply mistaken or did not consider the fact that statements were
made while she was out of the room or while the attorneys were
conferring with the arbitrator.    

     6  The arbitration cases the MTA cites (Brief at p. 5, fn. 8) in
support of its assertion that "employees who abuse leave are not
engaged in protected activity" hold nothing of the sort--they merely
state that an employer may impose appropriate discipline for abuse of
leave.

[end of page 22]         

     We find the evidence insufficient to conclude that Carrier,
who appears to be the primary decision maker on the discipline
issue,[fn]7 knew at the time the decision to initiate the
discipline of O'Leary was made that O'Leary was following the
instructions of his attorney.  To conclude that she did would
require a  significant degree of speculation and inferences. 
Thus, the Union has failed to prove that the decision maker had
knowledge of the protected activity, the necessary second element
of a discrimination claim under §964(1)(B). 
 
     We note that the Employer did have an arguable basis for
considering discipline at that time.  It is not unreasonable for
one to interpret an employee's statement to his supervisor that
he was "with the union" or "with union representation" as a
"false statement" in these circumstances.  Carrier knew that
O'Leary was not in the arbitration room and the Supervisor,
Somerville, had not seen O'Leary in the room with the union
officials either.  On the face of it, there were legitimate
reasons to initiate the discipline of O'Leary. 
 
     The Union further argues that the decision to proceed with
discipline made on October 12, 2011 was a discriminatory act
taken against O'Leary in retaliation for his Union's refusal of
the previous day to withdraw its demand for arbitration.  Carrier
was copied on the MTA attorney's initial request to drop the
arbitration, but there is no evidence that she was informed of
Belcher's response.  Even if there were evidence of that
knowledge, we do not find a violation of 964(1)(B) because there
is no showing of causation.  We have previously held that a
temporal coincidence is not enough to prove causation, 

     7  Carrier signed the only documents in evidence regarding
O'Leary's discipline.  She apparently obtained the concurrence of Doug
Davidson, the manager, but there is no evidence of their interactions.

[end of page 23]

explaining: 

     While it is necessary in every discrimination case to
     prove that unfavorable treatment followed protected
     activity, the Board has determined that timing alone is
     generally an insufficient basis to support a finding of
     discriminatory motivation.  Teamsters Union Local #340
     v. Rangeley Lakes School Region, No. 91-22, at 20,
     (Jan.29, 1992); Maine State Employees Association v.
     State Development Office, No. 84-21, at 11, (July 6,
     1984), aff'd, 499 A.2d 165 (Me. 1985) (the fact that
     the conduct cited in the complaint happened to coincide
     with the employee's protected activity does not,
     without more, establish a prima facie case of
     discrimination).   
                    
UPIU v. Winthrop School Department, 98-11 at 3, Decision on
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, (April 22, 1998).  We suspect
that the Employer welcomed the opportunity to discipline O'Leary
and was not particularly interested in finding reasons not to
discipline him.  We are unable to say, however, that the evidence
shows that the reason for the discipline was either his protected
activity on the day of arbitration or in retaliation for the
Union's right to reject the MTA's request to drop the demand for
arbitration.
                   
     Before turning to the subsequent events, we must observe
that the behavior of most of the people involved in this dispute
leaves much to be desired.  O'Leary's response to Somerville's
question on his whereabouts was misleading, disingenuous, and
directly contrary to the instructions given to him a few minutes
early by his union attorney to refer all questions about the
arbitration to them.[fn]8  Had O'Leary referred the question to 

     8  O'Leary testified repeatedly that he responded to Somerville's
questions asking where he was by saying "I was with the Union."  The
same question was asked and answered three times.  Upon re-cross
examination, O'Leary responded to the question of whether he told
Somerville that Belcher told him to leave the premises with, "No, I
didn't, because I told him that they should contact the union."  We do

[end of page 24]

his union, a discussion between management and the union may have
forestalled the decision to discipline.  Had O'Leary asked for
union representation at that time or informed his union of the
supervisor's questioning that evening, again, the decision to
discipline might have been avoided. 
 
     The Union officials knew that management was upset with the
events that had occurred at arbitration and followed up with the
e-mail the following day to Carrier and Olivier.  The oblique
wording of Belcher's email could have been more direct and more
informative.  In addition, the Union might have headed off the
discipline if they had followed up with O'Leary that same day to
inquire about any conversations he had had with management about
the arbitration.  We also question the Union's judgment in
postponing the Loudermill meeting until the very last workday
before the suspension was scheduled to begin. 
      
     With respect to Carrier's conduct, the better course of
action would have been to investigate the matter or pick up the
phone and speak to the MTA counsel.  Belcher's e-mail the
following day that all inquiries about what happened at the
arbitration should go through him, the legal counsel for the
MSEA, should have been a red flag to Carrier to look into the
possible legal repercussions of discipline.  Her failure to
investigate the matter in even a cursory manner may have been due
to her eagerness to discipline O'Leary.  Once she found a reason
for discipline, it appears that she pursued that objective with
blinders on. 
      
     The final decision to suspend O'Leary was made on October 21, 

[fn 8, cont'd.] not find this last statement credible, as it is
inconsistent with his earlier statements and not corroborated by any
other testimony.  In any event, it has no direct bearing on our analysis
of this case.

[end of page 25]

2011, at the Loudermill meeting.  It is undisputed that at that
meeting, Oelberg told Carrier that O'Leary was following the 
Union attorney's direction when he left the building shortly 
before the start of the September 27, 2011, hearing.  There is 
no question Carrier understood that MSEA considered it within their
rights to do so, as Oelberg asserted that O'Leary was under their
control while he was on leave for grievance processing.  Carrier
testified that she was taken aback by Oelberg's statement that
O'Leary had been instructed to leave the arbitration and asked 
him to repeat it.  Nonetheless, toward the end of the meeting,
Carrier stated that they would impose the discipline as described
in their intent-to-discipline letter of October 12, 2011.  
Oelberg handed Carrier a copy of a notarized Prohibited Practice
Complaint which specifically described Belcher's instruction on 
the date of the arbitration and asserted that the MTA's action
suspending O'Leary interfered with, restrained and coerced 
O'Leary in the exercise of his rights, in violation of 
§964(1)(A). 
                                                                   
     Applying the three-part test for determining whether the
adverse employment action was discriminatory in violation of
§964(1)(B), O'Leary's compliance with the Union attorney's
instruction was protected activity and there is no dispute that
Carrier was told of that activity during the Loudermill meeting. 
Looking strictly at the Employer's decision on Friday, October 21,
2011, to go ahead with the one-week suspension, we do not see 
the requisite causal connection to conclude that a §964(1)(B)
violation occurred.  Carrier had never encountered a situation 
like what she was facing and was unsure what to do.  On the other
hand, she felt that the Union attorney's instruction did not 
alter the fact that O'Leary had lied to his supervisor and had 
left the work site without notifying management, the stated 
reasons for the discipline.  Thus, we conclude that the actual 

[end of page 26]

imposition of the suspension was not a violation of 964(1)(B). 
See MSEA v. State Development Office, 499 A.2d 165 (Me. 1985)
(affirming Board's decision based on its basic factual finding 
that there was no causal connection between employee's protected
activity and any of the State's actions).  We view Carrier's
failure to reconsider the discipline or to consider putting the
suspension on hold while investigating the matter further[fn]9 to be 
a lapse of judgement,[fn]10 but we find no causal connection to
O'Leary's protected activity. 
                                                            
     As previously noted, a violation of section 964(1)(A) does
not turn on the employer's motive, or whether the coercion
succeeded or failed, but on "whether the employer engaged in
conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with
the free exercise of employee rights under the Act."  See, e.g.,
Jefferson Teachers Assoc. v. Jefferson School Committee, No.
96-24, at 25 (August 25, 1997).  The Employer's course of conduct
over the days following the Loudermill meeting leads us to the
conclusion that the delay in deciding to rescind the discipline
and the failure to notify O'Leary of that rescission until even
later was an interference, restraint and coercion in violation of
§964(1)(A).
      
     Carrier had no explanation as to why it took so long after
the Friday Loudermill meeting to come to the conclusion that the 

     9  Carrier could have put O'Leary on administrative leave while
investigating the matter, as contemplated by Article 9 §8 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, which states, "An employee may be
placed on administrative leave with pay in order to conduct an
investigation which may result in termination, suspension without pay
or discipline.

     10  Ignoring the evidence presented at the meeting seems
inconsistent with the whole purpose of a Loudermill meeting which is
to guard against mistaken decisions. See Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).

[end of page 27]

discipline should be rescinded.  There is no specific testimony
on when Carrier contacted the other MTA managers to discuss the
situation nor when she contacted MTA counsel to seek advice. 
There was no testimony suggesting that there was any sort of
investigation of what actually happened on the day of
arbitration.  All we really know is that it was not until the
following Thursday, the fourth day of O'Leary's five-day
suspension, that Carrier decided to rescind the suspension.  Her
letter on that Thursday suggests that receipt of the "written
confirmation" of the attorney's instruction contained in the
prohibited practice complaint was somehow significant as "new
information," but does not explain why it took six days to act. 
The letter specifically refers to the MTA's receipt the previous
day of MSEA's formal filing of the Prohibited Practice Complaint,
the same complaint that Carrier had received the preceding
Friday.  Was the filing of the PPC with the Maine Labor Relations
Board the impetus for Carrier to rescind the discipline?  We do
not know.  What we do know is there is no evidence that the MTA
made any effort to correct quickly or prospectively what they
realized was an "unfair" discipline.  By letting the matter hang
for six days, other employees would reasonably view the
discipline of O'Leary as harsh treatment sending a message that
employees may suffer if they follow the instructions of their
union's attorney.
          
     Our conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that the
MTA did not notify O'Leary that the discipline was being
rescinded until after he completed the suspension, five days
after the decision was made.  The Thursday, October 27, 2011,
letter rescinding the discipline was addressed to Oelberg, and
had nothing in it suggesting that O'Leary could come back to work
immediately.  The letter was copied to the MTA Division Director
Davidson and to "File," but no copy was provided for O'Leary or 

[end of page 28]

Belcher.  This is in stark contrast to the wide distribution of
the intent-to-discipline letter, which was addressed to O'Leary
and copied to Peter Mills (the Executive Director of the MTA),
Davidson, Somerville, "Personnel File", and MSEA.  Carrier's
claim that a copy was sent to O'Leary even though there was no
indication in the "cc" line is not credible, is not supported by
any corroborating evidence, and is contradicted by O'Leary's
testimony on when he first saw the letter and when he first
learned that the suspension was rescinded.  
 
     Finally, Carrier testified that she called Oelberg on the
same day the letter was written and told him of their decision.
She also claimed that she told Oelberg to inform O'Leary of the
decision, but there is no evidence to support this.[fn]11  We
are reluctant to believe that she would rely on a union
representative to provide the grievant with this important
information without, at the very least, making some reference to
that expectation in the letter to that union official explaining
the decision.  
 
     Carrier's purported reason for not notifying O'Leary of the
rescission when it was made was her claim that the Union said she
should not communicate directly with O'Leary.  The Union's
request on this point was that all communication should go
through Belcher.  Carrier's assertion that she was only complying
with the Union's request is inaccurate since she did not
communicate with Belcher or even copy him on the letter.  
  
     O'Leary testified credibly that he did not learn that the
suspension was rescinded until he returned to work on Monday and 

     11  Oelberg did not have any specific recollection of a
conversation with Carrier about rescinding the discipline.  O'Leary
testified he did not hear anything about the rescission until he
returned to work.  

[end of page 29]

was told of the decision by Somerville.  Thus, even though
O'Leary did not lose any pay, he had to spend a week away from
work thinking that he was at the next to last step of the
discipline process.  Each step in the MTA's handling of his
discipline compounded the harm done and, together, make it
abundantly clear that the MTA's conduct constituted an
interference, restraint and coercion violation:  First, the
Employer failed to promptly investigate the matter, then there
was the inexplicable delay in deciding to rescind the discipline,
and finally there was the glaring failure to promptly notify
O'Leary of the decision to rescind the discipline.  This course
of events would reasonably be seen by O'Leary and other employees
in the department as a message that the MTA could and would
restrain employees in the free exercise of their rights.  An
employee would think twice about following the instructions of
their Union's attorney in the face of disagreement or opposition
from the MTA attorney.  Consequently, we conclude that the MTA's
course of conduct constitutes a violation of §964(1)(A).
 
     The MTA's argument that there should be no violation because
the MTA rescinded the discipline is without merit.  The fact that
O'Leary did not lose any pay does not alter the fact that MTA
violated §964(1)(A) of the Act.  The chilling effect of the
message sent by the Employer's conduct is not expunged by the
rescission of the discipline.  In a similar vein, we have often
held that execution of a collective bargaining agreement does not
render moot a complaint of bad faith bargaining because
"subsequent acts of the parties do not mitigate prior unlawful
conduct."  Teamsters Local 48 v. City of Bangor, No. 79-29 at 1
(March 2, 1979); see also Winthrop Educators Assoc. v. Winthrop
School Committee, No. 80-05 at 5 (Feb. 8, 1980).  This is
particularly true in this case, where there was no effort to
repudiate the conduct or undo the harm done other than restoring 

[end of page 30]

O'Leary's pay for the week of the suspension.  See, e.g., 
Teamsters v. Town of Orono, No. 91-03 at 9-10 (Jan. 31, 1991)
(Employer may be able to remedy what would be a violation of
§964(1)(A) by a manager by effectively disavowing the manager's
conduct and promptly correcting any resulting harm).  
      
     Upon finding that a party has engaged in a prohibited
practice, we are instructed by Section 968(5)(C) of the Act to
order the party "to cease and desist from such prohibited
practice and to take such affirmative action . . . as will
effectuate the policies of this chapter."  A properly designed
remedial order seeks "a restoration of the situation, as nearly
as possible, to that which would have obtained" but for the
prohibited practice, Caribou School Dept. v. Caribou Teachers
Association, 402 A.2d 1279, 1284 (Me. 1979).  We will order the
Turnpike Authority to cease and desist from interfering with the
employee's right to follow the Union's instructions with respect
to processing a grievance and will order the Turnpike Authority
to post the attached notice.  

                             ORDER

     On the basis of the foregoing findings of facts and
discussion and by virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to
the Maine Labor Relations Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A.
§968(5), it is hereby ORDERED:
     
     1.  That the Maine Turnpike Authority cease and desist
     from interfering with the employee's right to follow
     the Union's instructions with respect to processing a
     grievance.
                                             
     2.  That the Maine Turnpike Authority shall post for
     thirty (30) consecutive days copies of the attached
     notice to employees which states that the Maine
     Turnpike Authority will cease and desist from the 

[end of page 31]

     actions set forth in paragraphs one and will take the
     affirmative action set forth in paragraphs three and
     four.[fn]10  The notice must be posted in conspicuous
     places where notices to Maine Turnpike Authority
     employees are customarily posted, and at all times when
     such employees customarily perform work at those
     places.  Copies of the notice shall be signed by the
     Executive Director of the Maine Turnpike Authority
     prior to posting and shall be posted immediately upon
     receipt.  The Executive Director shall take reasonable
     steps to ensure that the notices are not altered,
     defaced, or covered by other materials.

     3.  That the Maine Turnpike Authority shall notify the
     Board by affidavit or other proof of the date of
     posting and of final compliance with this order.

     4.  That Complainant's remaining allegations are
dismissed.     



Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 12th day of February, 2013.

 

Chair Peter T. Dawson participated in the hearing and
deliberation of this case and concurred with the decision of the
Board but died before the written decision was finalized.


[end of page 32]


                      NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
                            
               POSTED PURSUANT TO AN ORDER OF THE
                  MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
                                
AFTER A HEARING IN WHICH ALL PARTIES HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT WE HAVE VIOLATED
THE LAW AND WE HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO POST THIS NOTICE.  WE INTEND
TO CARRY OUT THE ORDER OF THE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND
ABIDE BY THE FOLLOWING:
          
     WE WILL CEASE AND DESIST from interfering with the 
     employees' right to follow the instructions of a Maine
     State Employees Association representative with respect
     to processing a grievance.

     WE WILL post this notice of the Board's Order for 30
     days.

     WE WILL notify the Board of the date of posting and
     final compliance with its Order.
                                                            



__________________       _______________________________________
Date                     Peter Mills, Executive Director
                         Maine Turnpike Authority



This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days as
required by the Decision and Order of the Maine Labor Relations
Board and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.  Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions may be directed to:


                         STATE OF MAINE
                  MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
                    STATE HOUSE STATION 90 
              AUGUSTA, MAINE 04333 (207) 287-2015

________________________________________________________________

             THIS IS AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT NOTICE
                    AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED.