STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Case No. 89-05
Issued: October 25, 1988
____________________________________
)
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 48, )
State, County, Municipal and )
University Employees in the )
State of Maine, )
)
Complainant, ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
v. )
)
CITY OF WESTBROOK, )
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
The question presented in this prohibited practice case is whether
the City of Westbrook (hereinafter referred to as "Employer")
transgressed 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C)&(D), in violation of 26 M.R.S.A.
964(1)(E). The Union alleged that the Employer violated the Act
through its negotiating team's failure to submit the final tentative
agreement to the Westbrook City Council for ratification, until
several months after said package had been reached at the bargaining
table. The Union further charged that the Employer failed to negotiate
in good faith because, after having discussed the tentative agreement
with members of the City Council, the Employer's negotiating team
reported that the agreement would probably be rejected because said
team had not been authorized to negotiate a change in the area of
retirement and that the Council would not accept the "2/3's retire-
ment" at any cost. We hold that the Employer's actions violated the
Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law ("Act"), 26 M.R.S.A.
ch. 9-A (1974 & Pamph. 1987). We will, therefore, fashion a remedy
appropriate to redress this violation and to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
The prohibited practice complaint was filed on August 17, 1988,
pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(B) (Pamph. 1987), by Teamsters Local
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Union No. 48, State, County, Municipal and University Employees in the
State of Maine ("Union"). The Union's complaint charged that the
Employer violated the sections of the Act mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. The Employer filed its answer on September 14, 1988 --
three business days after it was due, pursuant to Rule 4.05 of the
Maine Labor Relations Board's ("Board's") Rules and Procedures.
A pre-hearing conference on the case was held on September 22,
1988, Alternate Chairman Peter T. Dawson presiding. After the
Complainant raised the issue of the Employer's failure to file a
timely response, Alternate Chairman Dawson delivered a Preliminary
Pre-Hearing Order to the parties at the pre-hearing conference.
Alternate Chairman Dawson issued a Pre-Hearing Conference Memorandum
and Order on September 22, 1988. The contents of both the Preliminary
Pre-Hearing Order and the Pre-Hearing Conference Memorandum and Order
are incorporated herein by reference.
On September 27, 1988, the Employer filed a Motion for Extension
of Response Filing Period and a Memorandum in support of said Motion.
A hearing on the motion and, hence, on the question of whether the
Employer's failure to file a timely response was due to excusable
neglect was held on September 30, 1988, Alternate Chairman Peter T.
Dawson presiding, with Employer Representative Thacher E. Turner and
Employee Representative George W. Lambertson. The Employer was repre-
sented by Michael D. Cooper, Esq., its City Solicitor, and its Staff
Attorney, Richard A. Sullivan, Esq., and the Union was represented by
John A. Perkins, one of its Business Agents. The parties were given
full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce
documentary evidence, and to make argument on the issue of excusable
neglect. After hearing said evidence and argument, the Board deli-
berated and decided, for the reasons set forth in the discussion por-
tion of this decision, that the Employer's failure to file a timely
response was not due to excusable neglect. The Board announced its
entry of a default order against the Employer. The Board then gave
the parties full opportunity to present evidence and argument relevant
to the fashioning of appropriate relief herein. The parties' arguments
and the Union's offer of proof were duly considered by the Board in
reaching the decision and issuing the order reported herein.
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JURISDICTION
The Complainant, Teamsters Local Union No. 48, State, County,
Municipal and University Employees in the State of Maine, is the cer-
tified bargaining agent, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(2)
(1974), for the Westbrook Fire Department Bargaining Unit. The City
of Westbrook is the public employer, within the definition of 26
M.R.S.A. 962(7) (Pamp. 1987), of the employees whose positions are
included in the bargaining unit mentioned in the preceding sentence.
The jurisdiction of the Board to hear this case and to render a
decision and order herein is based upon 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5) (1974 &
Pamph. 1987).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon review of the entire record, the Labor Relations Board finds:
1. The Complainant, Teamsters Local No. 48, State, County,
Municipal and University Employees in the State of Maine, is the cer-
tified bargaining agent, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(2)
(1974), for the Westbrook Fire Department Bargaining Unit.
2. The Respondent, City of Westbrook, is the public employer,
within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(7) (Pamph. 1987), of the
employees whose positions are included in the bargaining unit men-
tioned in the preceding paragraph.
3. The most recent collective bargaining agreement between the
parties for the bargaining unit mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof expired
on December 31, 1986.
4. On February 4, 1987, the parties agreed to written ground
rules to guide their negotiations for a successor agreement to that
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Among the ground rules were the
following:
9. As each proposal is approved, it shall be re-
duced to writing and initialed by the chief
negotiators.
10. The negotiating teams will attempt to draft a
complete contract proposal which will be sub-
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mitted to the Union membership and the City
Council for ratification after both parties have
reviewed each item to be sure that no misunder-
standing exist [sic].
11. Once a tentative package agreement has been reached
at the table, the negotiating team members from
each side will use their best efforts to gain
final ratification from their respective parties.
12. It is understood that no articles or other sub-parts
of any such contract proposal are binding on either
party until the entire package is agreed upon
following negotiations and is ratified by both
the Union and the City Council.
5. On February 26, 1988, the parties successfully concluded nego-
tiations for a successor collective bargaining agreement by reaching
tentative agreement on all issues.
6. Despite the provisions of ground rules numbered 9 and 10 quoted
in paragraph 4 hereof, no written tentative agreements on individual
proposals were ever prepared and initialed by the parties' chief nego-
tiators and no complete contract proposal was drafted.
7. For a period of several months after final tentative agreement
had been reached by the parties, the Employer reported that the agree-
ment had not gone to the City Council for "political reasons" and that
it would not be submitted to the Council until the primary elections
were concluded.
8. At a meeting called by the Employer on July 12, 1988, the
Employer's negotiators reported that the City Council would "probably"
reject the agreement and insisted in re-negotiating it, claiming that
the Employer's negotiators had had "no marching orders to negotiate a
retirement package and the City would not accept the 2/3 retirement at
any cost."
9. The prohibited practice complaint that is the subject of this
action was filed with the Board on August 17, 1988, after having been
served on the Employer on August 11, 1988.
10. On August 17, 1988, Board Counsel M. Wayne Jacobs, Esquire,
sent a letter to Ms. Marti Blair, City Administrator of the City of
Westbrook. This letter, which was received by the Employer, stated:
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You are hereby notified that the City of
Westbrook has been named Respondent in the above-
styled [Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v. City of
Westbrook, No. 89-05] prohibited act complaint,
filed with this agency on August 17, 1988, pursuant
to Section 968(5)(B) of Title 26 of the Maine Revised
Statutes. 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(B) (Pamph. 1987).
Rule 4.05 of the Maine Labor Relations Board's
(Board's) Prohibited Practice Complaint Rules pro-
vides that "[tlhe party against whom a complaint
has been filed shall file a response to said
complaint with the Board in original and four (4)
copies and shall serve said response upon the com-
plaining party, within fifteen (15) working days of
the date of the filing of the complaint with the
Board." Accordingly, your response is due to be
filed with this agency and served upon the Complainant
on or before September 9, 1988.
Failure to file a timely response may result in
a default judgment against you.
11. The responsibility for preparing and filing the response to
the prohibited practice complaint mentioned in paragraph 9 above was
assigned to a particular attorney in the Employer's legal department.
12. Upon receiving the complaint, the attorney mentioned in the
preceding paragraph noted on his calendar that the Employer's response
needed to be filed with the Board and served on the Complainant on or
before September 9, 1988.
13. On or about the day after Labor Day, September 6, 1988, the
attorney, noted in the preceding paragraph, for unknown reasons,
changed the due date for the Employer's response on his calendar, from
September 9 to September 15, 1988.
14. The Employer's attorney, mentioned in the preceding three
paragraphs, was busy handling numerous matters, including several
involving the fire department, during the period of time relevant
hereto.
15. On September 13, 1988, Board Counsel Jacobs telephoned the
attorney assigned to prepare the Employer response herein, inquiring
whether the Employer had mailed its response to the Board. The
Employer's attorney stated that he thought that the response was due
on September 15th, that he was working on it at that time, and that he
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would be filing the same as soon as possible.
16. The Employer's response was filed with the Board on
September 14, 1988.
17. At the hearing before the Board, the Union was not prepared
to establish, by testimony or otherwise, the substance of the final
tentative agreement mentioned in paragraph 4, supra. The Union was
prepared to offer testimony that a final tentative agreement had been
reached and that the parties had subsequently met to agree on the
language of the draft final tentative agreement.
DISCUSSION
The first issue presented in this case is whether the Employer's
failure to file a timely response was due to excusable neglect. Rule
4.05 of the Board's Rules and Procedures provides that the failure of
a charged party to file a response with the Board within fifteen
working days from the date on which the charging party files its pro-
hibited practice complaint "shall be grounds for the Board to render a
default order against the respondent unless the Board finds that the
respondent's failure to answer is the result of excusable neglect."
The response herein was filed eighteen days after the complaint was
filed with the Board.
The Board has recognized that the concept of excusable neglect
incorporated in Rule 4.05 is analogous to that referred to in Rule
60(b)(1) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure; therefore, in
interpreting Rule 4.05, the Board has adopted the excusable neglect
standard set forth by the Supreme Judicial Court, Maine State
Employees Ass'n v. Baxter State Park Authority, MLRB No. 84-20, Slip
op. at 13, 7 NPER 20-15014 (May 16, 1984). The Law Court has
described excusable neglect as follows:
Failure to obtain knowledge of entry of judgment in
time to file a timely notice of appeal will almost always
occur as the result of some act of neglect. The essential
injustice that results from such lack of knowledge is
that a procedural remedy is barred before one has the
information requisite to protect one's entitlement to
that remedy. Where the neglect causing such lack of
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knowledge is beyond the control of the party or counsel
charged to act for that purpose, simple justice
requires that the "neglect" be "excused." Where, as
here, however, the neglect is that of the party charged
to act, some extraordinary circumstance must be proven
to justify excuse of such neglect. See Reynolds, 407
A.2d at 314; Begin, 435 A.2d at 1082; Young, 441 A.2d
at 321.
Maine State Employees Ass'n, supra at 13-14, quoting from State v.
One 1977 Blue Ford Pick-up Truck, 447 A.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Me. 1982).
The relevant facts regarding the issue of excusable neglect are:
the Employer's attorney received a copy of the prohibited practice
complaint, the Employer received written notice from the Board's
Counsel of both the date on which the response to the complaint was
due and of the sanctions contained in Rule 4.05 for a failure to file
a timely response, the Employer's attorney correctly noted the due
date on his calendar but later changed said date for unknown reasons,
and the response was not filed until after the Board's Counsel had
telephoned the Employer's attorney, informing the latter that the
answer was overdue and inquiring whether it had been mailed. The
neglect involved here was solely that of the Employer's attorney and
did not involve any occurrence beyond the Employer's control; there-
fore, some extraordinary circumstance must be established to consti-
tute excusable neglect. The explanations offered for the failure to
file a timely response were that, for unknown reasons, the Employer's
attorney changed the due date on his calendar and that, at the time,
that attorney was very busy handling numerous matters, including
several involving the fire department. In Maine State Employees
Ass'n, supra at 14, the party seeking to be excused claimed that its
failure to attend a scheduled pre-hearing conference was, in part, due
to its attorney's being heavily involved with other matters at that
time. Holding that the "crush of other business" does not constitute
excusable neglect, the Board cited the Law Court's opinion in Begin
v. Jerry's Sunoco, Inc., 435 A.2d 1079, 1083 (Me. 1981), where the
Court stated:
"We do not consider the fact that an attorney is
busy on other matters to fall within the definition of
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excusable neglect. Most attorneys are busy most of
the time and they must organize their work so as to be
able to meet the time requirements of matters they are
handling or suffer the consequences. [citation
omitted.] Filing a notice of appeal does not require
much time or deliberation."
Pinero Schroeder v. Federal National Mortgage
Association, 574 F.2d 1117, 1118 (1st Cir. 1978)(per
curiam); see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Conner, 382 F.2d
13, 17 (10th Cir. 1967); Stern, [Changes in the Federal
Appellate Rules, 41 F.R.D. 297].
Nor does a mere palpable mistake by counsel or by
counsel's staff constitute excusable neglect. Such an
interpretation would render the requirement meaningless.
Spound, 534 F.2d at 411 (counsel); Airline Pilots in the
Service of Executive Airlines, Inc. v. Executive
Airlines, Inc., 569 F.2d 1174, 1175 (1st Cir. 1978)(staff)
(per curiam).
Counsel here allege merely that due to the press of
other business they failed to timely file a notice of
appeal. Thus, they failed to allege grounds upon which
the trial court could base a finding of excusable
neglect.
Maine State Employees Ass'n, supra at 15. As was the case in Maine
State Employees Assn, the failure to take a required action due to an
attorney's heavy caseload does not constitute excusable neglect.
Finally, the Employer has argued, in its Memorandum in Support of
Respondent's Motion to Extend Period for Filing Response filed
together with said motion on September 27, 1988, that the situation
here is analogous to that in Kittery Teachers Ass'n v. School
Committee of the Town of Kittery, MLRB No. 75-21, Slip op. (June 26,
1975). In that case, relying on the language of 968(5)(B) of the
Act that the "party complained of shall have the right to file a writ-
ten answer to the complaint" and unaware that Rule 4.05 made such an
answer mandatory, the respondent did not file a response until twenty-
eight working days after the filing of the complaint and only after
having been served with complainant's motion for default. The Board
held that the respondent's neglect was excusable. Unlike the respon-
dent in Kittery Teachers Ass'n, the Employer was placed on notice by
the Board Counsel's letter that the response was due on September 9,
1988, and that, under Rule 4.05, failure to file a timely response
could result in a default judgment. In the circumstances, we hold
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that the Employer's failure to file a response within the time
required by Rule 4.05 of our Rules and Procedures was not due to
excusable neglect; therefore, we enter a default order against the
Employer in this matter.
The Union has averred, in paragraph 5 of its complaint, that the
Employer's conduct cited in the complaint constitutes violation of
965(1)(C) and (D) of the Act. The effect of the default order entered
herein is that the allegations of fact contained in the Union's
complaint are deemed to have been established and, in effect, become
findings of fact. Forbes v. Wells Beach Casino, Inc., 409 A.2d 646,
652 (Me. 1979). We will proceed to examine the Union's allegations of
violations of the Act.
Title 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(D) (Pamph. 1987) requires, as a com-
ponent of the duty to bargain collectively, that parties "execute in
writing any agreements arrived at, the term of any such agreement to
be subject to negotiation but shall not exceed 3 years." The Board
has held that the obligation to reduce agreements to writing and to
sign the same only applies to the negotiated collective bargaining
agreement concluded between parties vested with authority to reach
final binding agreement. Saco Valley Teachers Ass'n v. Maine School
Administrative District No. 6 Board of Directors, MLRB Nos. 85-07 and
85-09, Slip op. at 18, 8 NPER ME-17002 (Mar. 14, 1985). In the
instant case, the negotiating teams explicitly reserved, in paragraphs
10, 11 and 12 of their negotiating ground rules, the right of their
respective principal parties -- the Union membership and the Westbrook
City Council -- to ratify the final tentative agreement reached at the
table. In an analogous case, the Board discussed the requirements of
965(1)(D) as follows:
Once a principal party has reserved the right
ratify, any agreement reached by the negotiators
will not be concluded or binding until it is rati-
fied by the principal. Arundel Teachers Association
v. Majercik, PELRB No. 73-08 at 15 (May 22, 1973).
Implicit in the right to ratify is the right to
reject. Biddeford Unit of Local 1828 v. City of
Biddeford, PELRB No. 75-33 at 3 (Dec. 10, 1975).
In particular, if the right to ratify is to mean
anything, the principal party must be able to
reject tentative agreements erroneously agreed to
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by its negotiators. See Westbrook Police Unit v.
City of Westbrook, MLRB No. 78-25 (Sept. 5, 1978).
The fact that the Directors' negotiators erro-
neously agreed to the 13-step salary scale there-
fore in no sense precludes the Directors from
deciding whether to ratify or reject the tentative
agreement. Since the Directors properly reserved
the right to ratify and since the necessity for
ratification was clearly disclosed to the
Association, the Directors' refusal to ratify the
July 2nd tentative agreement was proper. The
Directors cannot be required to sign the tentative
agreement.
Fox Island Teachers Ass'n v. M.S.A.D. No. 8 Board of Directors, MLRB
No. 81-28, Slip op. at 6-7, 4 NPER 20-12020 (Apr. 22, 1981). We hold
that, since the right of ratification of the principals was explicitly
reserved and since the City Council has not ratified the final ten-
tative agreement reached at the table, no binding successor collective
bargaining agreement has been concluded; therefore, the Employer has
not violated 964(1)(D) of the Act.
The Union also alleged that the Employer's conduct violated
965(1)(C) (Pamph. 1987). The relevant portion of this section of the
Act requires the parties to "negotiate in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, working conditions and contract grievance arbitration."
The thrust of the Union's charge is that the Employer violated
965(1)(C) by failing to submit the final tentative agreement to the
City Council for ratification for a period of several months and,
after having discussed the same with members of the City Council,
reporting to the Union that the Council "probably" would reject the
agreement and insisting on re-negotiating the agreement, claiming that
the Employer's negotiating team had had "no marching orders to nego-
tiate a different retirement package and the City would not accept
the 2/3 retirement at any cost."
Turning to the Union's first averment, we have held that a
bargaining team's failure to submit the final tentative agreement to
its principal party for ratification for an unreasonable length of time
constitutes evidence of a failure to bargain in good faith. Union
River Valley Teachers Ass'n v. Trenton School Committee, MLRB Nos.
80-28 and 80-32, Slip op. at 4, 2 NPER 20-11020 (May 30, 1980). Such
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conduct evidences a lack of intention to reach a final binding
agreement and frustrates the bargaining process. In the instant case,
the prompt submission of the proposed settlement for ratification,
even if said proposal had been rejected, would have facilitated the
parties' return to the table for further negotiations.
Second, the Employer's comments that the final tentative agreement
would "probably" be rejected, that the Employer team had had no
authority to negotiate changes in the employees' retirement package,
and that the City Council would not accept the "two-thirds retirement"
at any cost also constitute evidence of a failure to negotiate in good
faith. While the principal parties to negotiations may lawfully
retain the right to ratify the final tentative agreement reached by
their negotiators, they must, consistent with the duty to negotiate in
good faith, clothe their negotiators with sufficient knowledge, guide-
lines, and authority to reach tentative agreements. Kittery
Employees Ass'n v Eric Strahl, MLRB No. 86-23, Slip op. at 13, 9 NPER
ME-18002 (Jan. 27, 1987); City of Westbrook v. Westbrook Police Unit
of Local 1828, Council 74, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, MLRB No. 81-50, Slip op.
at 6, 4 NPER 20-12044 (Sept. 24, 1981). Once conferred on the nego-
tiating team, bargaining authority may not be changed by the principal
party without prior notice to the other parties to the negotiations.
Westbrook Police Unit of Local 1828, Council 74, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, v.
City of Westbrook, MLRB No. 78-25, Slip op. at 5 (Sept. 5, 1978).
At the hearing before the Board, both parties indicated that the
retirement issue had been the major stumbling block in their nego-
tiations for a period of several months. It was only after the
Employer bargaining team indicated that it would consider adopting
significant changes in the employees' retirement package, within the
context of an overall settlement, that meaningful progress was
achieved. The Employer's statement, cited in the preceding paragraph,
indicates that its negotiators bargained beyond the scope of their
negotiating authority or that authority, once conferred by the City
Council, had later been withdrawn. In either event, the Employer's
statement constitutes evidence of a failure to negotiate in good
faith. Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v. Town of Bar Harbor, MLRB No.
82-35, Slip op. at 9, 5 NPER 20-14004 (Nov. 2, 1982). In the cir-
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cumstances, we hold that the Employer has violated the statutory obli-
gation to negotiate in good faith and we will provide remedies
appropriate to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The prayer for relief in the Union's complaint seeks the
following:
A. An order directing the City to honor the ground rules and
complete the draft agreement and submit same to council
for ratification.
B. An order directing the City to sign the contract.
C. An order directing the City to confer and negotiate in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, working con-
ditions, and contract grievance arbitration in the
future.
D. Any other remedy the Board deems appropriate.
We note, at the outset, that we are unable to grant the second remedy
sought for the same reasons that we held that the Employer had not
violated 965(1)(D) of the Act. In short, since no final binding
agreement was agreed to by the parties, 965(1)(D) was not violated
and there is nothing for us to order the Employer to sign.
Second, within the context of the default order, the Board found
as a matter of fact that the parties had reached a final tentative
agreement on February 26, 1988, and that said agreement had not been
submitted to the City Council for ratification for a period of several
months. The Union was unable to establish the details of the final
tentative agreements through written tentative agreements, oral testi-
mony, or otherwise, at the hearing before the Board. This situation
illustrates the value of adhering to the practice embodied in
paragraph 9 of the parties' negotiating ground rules. Had the parties
reduced their individual tentative agreements to writing and ini-
tialed the same, the constituent elements of the final tentative
agreement could have been readily established and, in the Board's
view, the entire controversy might well have been averted. While it
might seem expedient to reach agreement on the gist of individual
agreement articles and leave the documentation of such agreement to a
later time, the shortcomings of such practice become apparent in cir-
cumstances like those now before us. Since the substantive provisions
of the final tentative agreement are open to conjecture, an order
requiring the Employer to reduce said agreement to writing and to sub-
mit it to the City Council for ratification would be speculative and
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unenforceable; therefore, we decline to issue such an order.
We believe that, in the circumstances, the interests of both par-
ties, as well as the policies underlying the Act, will best be served
by the parties' returning to the bargaining table and resuming nego-
tiations, while strictly adhering to the established negotiating
ground rules. We will issue an order designed to facilitate such
return to the bargaining table as well as to assist the parties in
resolving their negotiating controversy.
ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and discussion and
by virture of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor
Relations Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5) (1974 &
Pamph. 1987), it is hereby ORDERED:
1. That the Respondent, City of Westbrook, and its
representatives and agents shall:
A. Cease and desist from failing to negotiate in
good faith as required by 26 M.R.S.A. S 965(1)(C)
and, in particular, cease and desist: from fail-
ing to submit such final tentative agreement as
may be concluded at the bargaining table to the
Westbrook City Council for ratification within a
reasonable time of the conclusion of such agree-
ment; from failing to provide its negotiators
with sufficient knowledge, guidelines, and author-
ity to reach tentative agreements; and, once said
bargaining authority is conferred, from changing
the same, without first notifying the Union; and
B. Take the following affirmative action, necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(1) Provide its negotiators with sufficient
knowledge, guidelines, and authority to
reach tentative agreements.
(2) Within 10 days receipt of written notice
from the Union requesting a meeting for
collective bargaining purposes, meet with
the Union; review, reduce to writing and
initial tentative agreements previously
reached; and negotiate in good faith
with the Union over all issues that remain
unresolved.
(3) Adhere to the established negotiating ground
rules, especially the rule requiring that
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tentative agreements be reduced to writing
and initialed by the chief negotiators as
they are reached.
(4) Promptly submit the final tentative agreement,
once reached, to the Westbrook City Council
for ratification.
2. The parties will each report in writing to the Executive
Director of the steps taken in compliance with this order,
within 30 days of the date hereof. In the event that the
parties are unable to reach final tentative agreement
within 45 days of the date hereof, they shall each report
said failure to the Executive Director in writing, in-
cluding in said report discussion concerning the progress
of their negotiations. The Executive Director will then
determine the steps that may be required to assist the
parties in their negotiations.
Dated at Augusta, Maine this 25th day of October, 1988.
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
/s/___________________________
Peter T. Dawson
The parties are advised Alternate Chairman
of their right pursuant
to 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(F)
(Pamph. 1987) to seek
review of this decision /s/___________________________
and order by the Superior Thacher E. Turner
Court by filing a com- Employer Representative
plaint in accordance
with Rule 80B of the
Rules of Civil Procedure
within 15 days of the /s/___________________________
date of this decision. George W. Lambertson
Employee Representative
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